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The question we must ask Fiji today is freedom from 
what? It is NOT freedom from military government. 
Today it is freedom from racism. It is freedom from 
poverty. It is freedom from social inequality. It is 
freedom from corruption. It is freedom from abuses. 
THIS IS DEMOCRACY. 
Fiji Independent Commission Against 
Corruption Interview 2008 
An active and capable European Union would make 
an impact on a global scale... leading to a fairer, safer 
and more united world. 
Javier Solana: The European Security Strategy 
2003. 
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ABSTRACT xi 
Abstract 
In early December 2006, the Fijian military seized power in a coup led by the 
Armed Forces commander Commodore Frank Bainimarama. It was a coup long 
expected, and Fiji’s fourth since 1987. Internationally, the response was swift 
imposing sanctions and removing or delaying international aid programmes. This 
has a potentially significant impact on Fiji because it is one of the largest per capita 
recipients of developmental aid funding in the world. However, it may also have 
little impact because, despite such assistance, the Fijian GDP has stagnated with an 
average growth of under 1% for the last 20 years. Other developmental indicators 
are also bleak. This thesis thus examines the dichotomy between Fiji’s ODA and its 
apparent inability to arrest the decline of the Fijian lifestyle and economy. However, 
to review all international developmental programmes across all sectors of Fijian 
society, while maintaining contemporary relevance and coherency, is untenable. 
Therefore, the thesis will focus on the European Union and its external relations 
with Fiji. The EU is one of the most influential partners for Fiji and is often 
overlooked by scholars, allowing this thesis to make a valuable contribution to 
developmental studies in the pacific region. The thesis has selected and examines 
four sectors of Fijian society, that of the Economy, Governance, Sugar, and 
Education sectors. This is because they are the sectors that the European Union is 
presently devoting most attention. Therefore, these areas best illustrate Fijian 
reaction to the importance and effectiveness of EU involvement. Overall, the thesis 
intends to demonstrate both the efficacy and the attitudes of local representatives to 
foreign aid programmes, and ultimately provide a unique ‘inside looking out' 
perspective  not typical of publications about Fiji. 
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1 Introduction 
On December 5th 2006, Commodore Josaia Voreqe (Frank) Bainimarama executed 
a military take-over of the democratically elected government of Fiji.1 This marks 
the fourth coup within 19 years for the Pacific Island nation, and forms the 
immediate basis upon which International Relations, aid, and development policies 
are conducted towards Fiji.2 Fiji is among one of the more developed countries in 
the  South Pacific3 with a GDP of F$5333 dollars per capita in 2007.4 It comprises 
of 330 Islands and coral atolls that are at the heart of the South Pacific 
geographically.5 With a total land area of 18,330 Sq km, and a census population in 
2007 of 837,271,6 it is also one of the larger pacific island nations in both size and 
population.7 Fiji’s economy relies primarily upon the sugar, garments, and tourism 
industries with the sugar sector employing almost a fifth of the total labour force.8 
There are other industries, like fisheries, forestry, and mining that also contribute to 
the economy, but are presently small and underdeveloped. All these factors make 
                                                
 
1 Nick Squires, "Armed Soldiers Take Control in Fiji Coup," The Daily Telegraph, 5 December, 2006. 
2 Raphael Minder, "Military Seize Power in Fiji Coup," Financial Times, 6 December, 2006. 
3 When the author refers to the ‘South Pacific’ he refers for convenience to the 15 Pacific ACP countries as per the 
Cotonou Agreement. These countries are: Cook Islands, Fiji Islands, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States 
of Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste (East Timor), 
Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. He will use the terms ‘South Pacific’ and ‘Pacific ACP’ interchangeably 
4 Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, "Gdp Summary,"(2009), 
http://www.statsfiji.gov.fj/Economic/gdp_summary.htm. 
5 See Appendix 10.1 
6 Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, "Census 2007," Key Statistics(2009), 
http://www.statsfiji.gov.fj/Census2007/census07_index2.htm. 
7 European Commission: Directorate-General for Development, "Republic of the Fiji Islands - European 
Community: Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the Period 2003 - 2007," ed. 
European Commission: Directorate-General for Development (Brussels: European Commission: Directorate-
General for Development, 2002). 
8 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European 
Economic and Social Committee: Eu Relations with the Pacific Islands - a Strategy for a Strengthened Partnership (Brussels: 
Commission of the European Communities, 2006), ———, The European Union and the Pacific, ed. DG 
Development (Belgium: European Communities, 2007). ———, The European Union and the Pacific. 
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Fiji an ideal regional hub for political intervention in the region and serves as a base 
for many Non-Governmental Organisations, (NGOs) Intergovernmental 
Organisations (IGOs), Embassies, and Delegations. As such, political instability 
here is of significant regional concern and is well documented by the world’s 
media.9 
Fiji is one of the world’s largest per capita recipients of developmental aid receiving 
roughly €25 per person or €20 million annually.10 Fiji’s main ODA (Official 
Development Assistance) partners are Australia, New Zealand, and the European 
Union. Arguably, the European Union is the most significant partner for Fiji 
because of its influence in trade, particularly, as a market and reform partner for the 
sugar sector. The EU also coordinates a large developmental grant every five to six 
years as part of the European Development Fund (EDF).11 However, despite such 
assistance, the Fijian GDP has stagnated with an average growth of under 1% for 
the last 20 years. More importantly, according to the UNDP, the quality of life for 
Fijian citizens has declined significantly in the past 20 years. The Human 
Development Indicators (HDI) of Fiji have moved from a respectable 44th in 1986 
to a concerning 92nd in 2008.12  
This thesis examines in depth the contemporary situation in Fiji through targeted 
analysis of four sectors of Fijian society, that of the Economy, Governance, Sugar, 
                                                
 
9 Alain Retiere and Heinz Schurmann-Zeggel, Conflict Prevention and Peace Consolidation in the South Pacific: Papua New 
Guinea, Solomon Islands, Fiji Islands (Brussels: European Commission Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management 
Unit, 2002), Satendra Prasad and Darryn Snell, "Fiji: Enabling Civic Capacities for Conflict Prevention and 
Peacebuilding," in Searching for Peace in Asia-Pacific: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peace Building Activities, ed. 
Annelies Heijmans, Nicola Simmonds, and Hans Van de Veen (London: Lynne Rienner, 2004).  
10 European Report, "Nielson to Survey Aid Projects in the Pacific Region," European Report 2004. 
11 European Commission: Directorate-General for Development, "Republic of the Fiji Islands - European 
Community: Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the Period 2003 - 2007." 
12 Ron Crocombe, The South Pacific (Suva: University of the South Pacific, 2001), Prasad and Snell, "Fiji: Enabling 
Civic Capacities for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding." UNDP, Human Development Report, ed. United 
Nations Development Programme (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). ———, Human Development 
Report, ed. United Nations Development Programme, Annual Human Development Reports (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992 - 2008). 
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and Education sectors. The thesis will also explore the dichotomy between Fiji’s 
ODA and its apparent inability to arrest the decline of the Fijian lifestyle and 
economy. To do this, the thesis selects the European Union and examines its 
influences on the chosen sectors. The thesis will first examine the concepts of 
democracy, dictatorship and development before creating a theoretical rationale for 
EU developmental actions. The thesis will then move to the macro level 
summarising Fiji’s turbulent history and the EU’s interventions in the country. This 
will be followed by case studies commencing with an overview of the Fijian 
economy. Then there is an examination of the governance of Fiji and an assessment 
of its unique issues. Fijian industry will be looked at through a case study of the 
sugar sector, which is the industry the EU is presently most involved with. The 
thesis will then turn to social sector policies, with a detailed examination of the 
education sector. Through this process, the thesis will illustrate the essential 
concerns encountered in Fiji today and the influence of the European Union in these 
four key areas of Fijian society. It will investigate if the international developmental 
response is appropriate, and truly beneficial to the growth of Fiji. The thesis takes a 
“hands on, grassroots” approach to research, interviewing many influential 
members of Fijian society and evaluating the opinions of local publications and 
media. Overall, the thesis intends to demonstrate both the efficacy and the attitudes 
of local representatives to foreign aid programmes, and ultimately provide a unique 
‘inside looking out' perspective  not typical of publications about Fiji. 
1.1 Literature Review & Methodology 
This study explores specific aspects of EU development policy (independent 
variable) upon the Fijian economy, government, education and sugar sectors 
(dependent variable). There is a plethora of scholarly information about the 
evolution of the EU as a global actor, and have a significant focus on development 
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policy and assistance.13 There are also many researchers that focus on the political 
and developmental issues in Fiji.14 However, literature that combines the EU 
development policy with Fiji are scarce. Indeed, it is rare to find articles examining 
EU policy and its influence in Fiji that has not been officially published by the 
European Commission. Therefore there is a potential capabilities expectation gap15 
between what the EU is doing, and what is desired by Fijians whose lives are 
directly affected. The chosen sectors examined are the ones in which the European 
Union has specific policies, agreements, or programmes in place. Therefore, these 
areas best illustrate Fijian reaction to the importance and effectiveness of EU 
involvement. 
1.1.1 Primary Research 
A number of primary and secondary resources have been used to effect this. The 
most valuable primary sources used are a series of 36 targeted elite interviews 
performed in Fiji during the months of June and July 2008. The officials were 
chosen by their titles, position, organisation and sectors they are professionally 
involved in. Recorded interviews ranged in length from 21 minutes to 1 hour 15 
minutes and were transcribed verbatim.16 However, because of the sensitive nature 
of the topic area two people declined to be recorded, and the University of 
Canterbury Human Ethics guidelines stipulated that all interviewees remain 
anonymous, represented by an organisational label instead. Through the writing of 
this thesis, the author thus liberally refers to these as ‘organisation’s opinions’, 
although he is in fact referring to the interviewees personal opinions which may 
                                                
 
13 Some significant publications include, Marjorie Lister, ed. European Union Development Policy (Houndmills: 
Macmillan,1998), Roy H Ginsberg, "The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire,"(2001), 
Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2006), 
Martin Holland, The European Union and the Third World, European Union Series (New York: Palgrave, 2002). 
14 Some of the more prominent are Ron Crocombe, Brij Lal, Biman Prasad, Vijay Naidu, & Greg Watson. 
15 Christopher Hill, "The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role," Journal of 
Common Market Stuties 31, no. 3 (1993).  
16 See Appendix 8.2 
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differ greatly to that organisations official stance. These interviews were done in a 
semi-structured style meaning that there was a set of general questions reviewed 
and accepted by the UoC Ethics committee, used as guidelines and a way to 
stimulate dialogue. Depending upon the officials responses and sector(s) of 
expertise, different probes were employed resulting in 36 unique interviews. The 
semi structured nature of the interviews did allow data to be gathered from some 
stock questions. These are graphed and shown in the thesis as indicative opinion 
responses. The statistics derived however, are only representative of the sample of 
experts who participated in my research, and although many responses are 
compelling, they can only be used as a very loose guideline to actual public opinion, 
with the statistical confidence interval sometimes exceeding 16%. The true value of 
the interviews is derived from the fact that they are experts in their particular fields. 
Official treaties, publications, speeches, and annual reports, were also essential 
elements of the primary research for this thesis.   
1.1.2 Secondary Research  
Academic articles, journals, and books were used to establish a firm historical and 
theoretical foundation for the thesis, as well as provide some insight to the critiques 
of official stratagem. Due to the contemporary and evolving nature of the situation 
in Fiji, there was also liberal use of contemporary media publications. However, 
since April 2009, there have been restrictions imposed upon the Fijian media and it 
was subsequently used in a very cautionary way. Material that couldn’t be 
independently verified is stipulated as such or discarded. Although the emphasis is 
on a contemporary examination of Fijian society, it is apparent that many of Fiji’s 
issues have a long history that must be taken into account. This thesis has a cross 
disciplinary approach to the sectors examined with relevant material sourced from 
many fields, including political science, economics, law, psychology, history and 
sociology. The employment and use of a variety of techniques of data collection, 
and reviewing such diverse sources ensured greater credibility and relevance of this 
thesis. 
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2 Background - Definitions, Theory, and 
the EU 
2.1 Definitions 
2.1.1 Defining “Democracy” 
Democracy is a word derived from the Greek ‘kratos’ meaning rule, and ‘demos’ 
meaning people.17 Thus it is an ideology and a system of government where the 
people rule. Decisions about governance come from the citizen body as a whole 
entity and not unilaterally from any single person or group. However democracy is 
much more than that and holds far more value in modern society. If a state is 
democratic, it is thought of as a good thing in that it creates freedom, choice, and 
liberty.18 Indeed it has such good connotations that virtually all governments today 
use it to gain favour and legitimacy within the international community. For 
example China, one of the last bastions of communism boasts in its name that it is 
the Peoples’ Democratic Republic. From a puritan perspective no word has been 
more abused than the word democracy.19 
Amongst scholars, there is a consensus that democracy implies a government that is 
selected by the people to respond to the people’s desires, and where no one person 
can gain unlimited powers.20 A democracy functions under the principles of 
                                                
 
17 Bernard Crick, Democracy: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
18 Ibid. 
19 Stephanie Lawson, Tradition Versus Democracy in the South Pacific (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
20 David Held, Models of Democracy, 2 ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), Crick, Democracy: A Very Short Introduction, 
Peter Larmour, ed. Governance and Reform in the South South Pacific (Canberra: Australia National University 
Press,1998), Lawson, Tradition Versus Democracy in the South Pacific, Holiday Powell, "The Road to Soverignity in the 
Pacific: A Framework for Pacific Island Development Policy," (Centre for Strategic Studies New Zealand, Victoria 
University, Wellington, 2003). 
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transparency, accountability, and participation.21 From these are derived many 
democratic norms, such as free and frequent elections that provide the voter with 
effective choice and ignore all heredity and class distinctions. Accountability 
suggests that the voted parliament  has the right to create legislation and uphold it, 
but must also abide by it. This usually means there needs to be a separation of 
judicial and legislative powers so each can scrutinise the others actions.22 A 
democracy becomes threatened when the principles of transparency, accountability, 
and participation are not upheld. Democracies tend to be more peaceful,  and a 
peaceful society is generally happier with greater economic development.23 
However, this connection is not the case in some countries in the South Pacific, 
including Fiji.24 Democracy is also far from perfect. Plato described it as “the rule 
of the mob where opinion overrides wisdom.”25 
2.1.2 Defining “Dictatorship” 
Dictatorship can be classically defined as when a single person has absolute control 
over the state. As Louis XIV is attributed to say “L’État, c’est moi.”26 
Consequently, the leader of a dictatorship is an irreplaceable part of the 
government. Without him, the government would lose its raison d’être.27 Whereas 
democracy represents the wishes of the population at large, dictatorship represents 
the preferences of a subgroup of the population, such as the elite, the military, or the 
                                                
 
21 Peter Harris and Benjamin Reilly, eds., Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators (Stockholm: 
IIDEA,1998), Crick, Democracy: A Very Short Introduction, Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson, Economic Origins 
of Dictatorship and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Adrian Leftwich, ed. Democracy and 
Development: Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Polity Press,1996). 
22 Harris and Reilly, eds., Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators. 
23 Held, Models of Democracy, Harris and Reilly, eds., Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators. 
24 Lawson, Tradition Versus Democracy in the South Pacific, Larmour, ed. Governance and Reform in the South South Pacific. 
25 Plato and Reginald Allen, "Plato: The Republic," Book VIII(2006). 
26 Claude Lefort, The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1986). 
27 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Meridian Books, 1958). 
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dictator solely.28 Propaganda is one of the more important instruments of a 
dictatorship when dealing with its own citizens and the democratic world.29 Leaders 
in power feel a need to make their propaganda, predictions and statements come 
true.30 Another important consideration for a dictatorship is to ensure no group is 
unhappy enough to seize power. Therefore abolishing social divisions and creating 
contentment is essential.31 Contrary to democracy, dictatorship is often considered 
to have pejorative connotations.32 For example, one scholar claims it is the 
gullibility of sympathizers that make dictator’s lies credible to the outside world, 
and creates recognition and respectability.33 However, dictatorships and other forms 
of non-democratic governance has been the norm for most of human history.34  
Indeed, Plato describes the most favourable form of government as the benevolent 
dictator, well versed in philosophy and war, and who has love, compassion and 
honour.35 Up until the 1970s non-democratic forms of government in the world 
were more common than democratic ones.36 The army is often a classic instrument 
of rule and in modern times is the most common instigator of a dictatorship.37 Many 
countries have experienced military coups in the past 10 years like Fiji including 
Ecuador, Venezuela, Pakistan, and Thailand.38 
                                                
 
28 Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. 
29 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Lefort, The Political Forms of Modern Society: 
Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism. 
32 Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. 
33 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism. 
34 Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
35 Plato and Allen, "Plato: The Republic." 
36 Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes. Gordon Tullock, The Social Dilemma of Autocracy, Revolution, Coup D'etat, and War, 
ed. Charles K Rowley, The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005). 
37 Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes. 
38 Ibid. Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. 
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2.1.3  Defining “Development” 
Development is a word that means many different things, and has both positive and 
negative connotations depending upon individual opinion. Development can be 
seen as destroying tradition, forcing unwanted change to society, while others think 
of it as something that should be actively sought.39 Traditionally, development was 
defined and assessed economically. The monies given by a donor country should 
therefore raise the recipients GDP by a corresponding amount.40 However to 
depersonalize development like this negates the prime goal of most development 
programmes, which is to help enhance the quality of life of a particular community. 
With a better quality of life, greater freedoms are obtained for people to forge their 
own destinies.41 Equality of opportunity is often paired with the need for political 
and civil liberties, and therefore favours a democratic political structure over a 
dictatorial one.42 Higher incomes are not the only goal but merely one of several 
means to achieve that end.43 Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, development 
is assumed to be a good ideological objective, and follows the UNDP definition. 
Development is a process of enlarging people’s choices [to allow people 
to] lead a long and healthy life, to be educated and enjoy a decent 
standard of living. If these essential choices are not available, many 
other opportunities remain inaccessible.44 
Modern theories of development has evolved from Amartya Sen’s significant work 
in welfare economics on the expansion of capabilities.45 Sen considers development 
                                                
 
39 Damien Kingsbury et al., International Development: Issues and Challenges (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
40 E. K. Hawkins, The Principles of Developmental Aid, Penguin Modern Economics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970). 
41 Amaryta Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1999). 
42 Kingsbury et al., International Development: Issues and Challenges. 
43 Ibid. 
44 UNDP, Human Development Report, ed. United Nations Development Programme (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1990). 
45 Kingsbury et al., International Development: Issues and Challenges. John M. Alexander, Capabilities and Social Justice: The 
Political Philosophy of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008). 
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as a way to achieve freedom of the individual through opportunity creation.46 
However, development must also aim to meet the needs for the present community 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.47 
As such development must be sustainable, and has certain social and physical 
limits. Development is multi-dimensional; achievement of broad goals above can be 
done in many ways and it is necessary for development to be flexible, because the 
needs of each community and each individual in that community are different.48 
2.2 Developmental Aid: In Theory and Practice 
Having a sound theoretical base that can be applied to real world situations is of 
crucial importance to understanding why institutions act in a particular way, and to 
have an analytical tool with which one can judge the effectiveness of the end result. 
For aid development programmes and effectiveness, there are a lot of international 
conferences and declarations. For example, the OECD organised Paris Declaration 
made 56 partnership commitments aimed at improving the effectiveness of aid.49  
However, there is a clear lack of transference from this rhetoric into action that 
creates obvious beneficial results.50 Aid cannot be a “welfare payment without 
strings.” It needs to be tied to real economic targets and good governance.  There 
are claims that the more liberal the donor is, the more corrupt the recipient 
becomes.51 
                                                
 
46 Sen, Development as Freedom. 
47 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1987). 
48 Kingsbury et al., International Development: Issues and Challenges. 
49 United Nations, "United Nations Millennium Declaration ", ed. United Nations General Assembly (New York: 
United Nations, 2000). Joint Progress Toward Ehanced Aid Effectiveness, "Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness," In Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results, and Mutual Accountablity. (Paris: Joint Progress 
Toward Ehanced Aid Effectiveness,, 2005). 
50 Stefano Manservisi, "We Need Action Not Words," The Courier, June - July 2008. 
51 Martin Robinson, "Foreign Aid Curse of Pacific," New Zealand Herald, 7 March, 2006. 
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2.2.1 Developmental Aid Delivery 
The ultimate goal of developmental aid had changed little over the years. The desire 
to improve the quality of life for the individual and the community is quite 
universal.52 However, the method of delivery to achieve this goal has gone through 
many changes and scholarly critique.53 A traditional conception of development, 
which it is directly linked per capita GDP, has fallen out of favour because over the 
past 30 years GDP growth has neither led to a corresponding decrease in poverty, 
nor helped to increase overall quality of life.54 Amaryta Sen was very critical of this 
relationship, it does not matter how wealthy one is comparatively, but how capable 
they are of achieving their desires.55 The requirements to achieve that potential are 
physical, emotional, as well as financial. Development has thus moved to an idea of 
fulfilling basic human needs with consideration given to projects that focus on basic 
health, education, and income.56 Nevertheless, delivery of these projects still cause 
concern. It was demonstrated by Easterly that agencies like the UNDP stipulate that 
international developmental aid works and is one of the most effective weapons 
against poverty. Yet at the same time the UNDP complains that the international 
system is too complicated and inefficient to deliver that aid effectively.57 All major 
agencies in the world are now engaged in an exercise to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals after one of the more remarkable UN declarations in recent 
history.58 Nine years after the declaration, an official report shows that it is unlikely 
that any of the goals will be fully achieved by 2015, and indeed, since the global 
                                                
 
52 Leftwich, ed. Democracy and Development: Theory and Practice. 
53 Kingsbury et al., International Development: Issues and Challenges. 
54 Margaret Snyder, "Transforming Development: Women, Poverty, and Politics,"(1995). 
55 Sen, Development as Freedom. 
56 Kingsbury et al., International Development: Issues and Challenges. 
57 William Easterly, ed. Reinventing Foreign Aid (Cambridge: MIT Press,2008). 
58 Ibid. 
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economic crisis, goals are more distant now in 2009 than they were in 2007.59 The 
utopian expectations of what developmental aid should deliver lies in stark contrast 
to what it is delivering.60 
Democracy and development are frequently paired as universal goals for the 
international community.61 A question asked by some scholars therefore is if 
democracy is a prerequisite of development or vice versa.  Classical theory 
following Lipset, suggest that democratic development is dependent upon a 
combination of economic, social and cultural requisites, which are unlikely to exist 
in an underdeveloped country. Consequently, progressive development is a requisite 
for sustainable democracy62 and there appears to be a “cruel choice between laissez-
faire liberalism without social justice, on the one hand and dictatorial forms of state 
centred economic development, on the other.”63 More recent scholars, following 
Sen’s work, illustrate that democracy creates freedoms and liberties which in turn 
helps facilitate development.64 Moreover if individual freedom though building of 
capacity is the desired objective, then promotion of democracy becomes one of the 
most important aspects of development. A World Bank report in 2000 confirms a 
positive correlation between stable democratic governance and aid effectiveness.65 
However, this is disputed by recent publications.66  
 
                                                
 
59 United Nations, The Millenium Development Goals Report (New York: United Nations, 2009). 
60 Easterly, ed. Reinventing Foreign Aid. 
61 Leftwich, ed. Democracy and Development: Theory and Practice. 
62 Ibid. Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York: Doubleday, 1960). 
63 Leftwich, ed. Democracy and Development: Theory and Practice. 
64 Ibid, Kingsbury et al., International Development: Issues and Challenges. 
65 C. L. Gilbert and David Vines, eds., The World Bank: Structure and Policies (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press,2000). 
66 Easterly, ed. Reinventing Foreign Aid. 
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2.2.2 Is ODA Good for Fiji? 
 
Figure 1: Is International Aid Good or Bad for Fiji? (Indicative Opinion) 
 
A large majority of the Fijians interviewed believed that international aid in general 
was bad for Fiji. Too few outside organisations offering aid and support to Fiji 
really spent time in Fiji listening to general public views.67 Instead, consultants 
come in with prearranged agendas and goals, and only talked with those that will 
reinforce their opinions and help facilitate pre-determined goals. “We have way too 
many of these ‘fly by night’ consultants, who state whatever they think. All of them 
are in fairyland!”68 The intention of international aid is desirous, it is the connection 
to practical solutions that is problematic. 
2.2.3 Conditionalities of Aid 
An unsolved academic argument that is very relevant to Fiji, is the conditionalities 
placed upon aid, especially in terms of its direct link towards ‘good governance’. 
Official Developmental Assistance is largely humanitarian in nature, supplying base 
physiological needs, or building infrastructure to help create opportunities. 
Therefore such ties have no relevance, and place unnecessary burdens on the 
                                                
 
67 Fiji Teachers Association: Member, "Fiji Interview 12 - Education Sector Interview" (FTA Headquarters, Suva, 24 
June, 2008). 
68 FASW Fiji Association of Social Workers, "Fiji Interview 11 - Ngo Sector Interview" (Suva, 24 June, 2008). 
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recipient country. If looked at from a strictly humanitarian perspective, tying aid to 
democracy and then applying sanctions due to lack of democratic progress, defeats 
the purpose and intention of the aid. The people the aid agencies are trying to assist 
are being adversely affected due to circumstances beyond their control.69 One 
interviewee stated that on principle, aid should not be conditional on the type of 
government because aid will generally be targeted at a community level, and 
administered by sub-governmental structures.70 Fiji is a safe and friendly country 
compared to many in the world. For the vast majority of people, life continues 
under the coup regime as it did before, without any impediment upon human 
rights.71 It is arguable that the EU, Australia, and New Zealand are demonstrating 
double standards by applying democratic principles and conditionalities only when 
politically expedient, and without any true moral basis.72 Alternatively, international 
partners are tying to impose their values upon Fiji. Indeed, one commentator called 
conditional aid a legacy of colonialism.73 Furthermore, “democracy works better in 
a country where everybody has enough food on the table”74 and adequate housing. 
If the basic physiological needs of a population cannot be met, then arguments over 
democratic identity and belonging become meaningless, according to traditional 
psychological thought as demonstrated by Maslow’s ‘Hierarchy of Needs’.75 
However, it is accepted that the donors will have a specific agenda and have to be 
responsible to their own constituents who wish to know that aid is being allocated 
wisely. Nevertheless if conditionalities are coercive and dictate significant structural 
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change, then it is more likely to be counter-productive, and create issues that need 
patience and time to resolve.76 
 
Figure 2: An adapted version of Maslow’s Heirachy of Needs  
 
The contrary argument is that the type of government in the recipient country is 
very relevant when it comes to receiving aid, because developmental aid requires 
accountability and transparency from governments, to ensure the aid will be 
delivered properly. Accordingly, aid and democracy are difficult to separate. 
Conditional aid ensures that it reaches the right places and is given in line with the 
donor’s principles. Aid by definition is money that the recipient doesn’t need to pay 
back. Therefore, the only obligation is the moral one of meeting conditions.77 Most 
aid especially in the case of Fiji is not directed at based on the physiological needs 
of the community, but instead is about building the capacity and status of certain 
sectors. As such, democratic and identity work becomes a prerequisite according to 
the Maslow’s Hierarchy. Donors have a right to place conditionalities to ensure 
structural change that will make the aid more effective, and ensure it reaches the 
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targeted recipient.78 If aid is considered a commercial transaction, then the donor 
has every right to put whatever conditions they feel are necessary to ensure that the 
investment is worthwhile and the taxpayers know that the aid is effectively creating 
positive change for the larger society.79 Indeed it has been claimed that principles 
and values so vital to a society, that conditions place upon aid must be there to 
encourage moral and structural change.80 Indeed, moral and structural changes are 
one of the rationales for a country to implement an aid programme. The empirical 
goal of aid to help a particular sector is only of equal value to the qualitative goals 
of changing people’s perceptions and values. 
EU opinion follows this conceptual framework, inserting concepts of good 
governance, transparency, accountability and human rights into aid programmes 
since the 1990’s.81 The type of government is always relevant when it comes to 
developmental aid. Aid and trade are never agreements done on a micro scale 
looking at a particular product or village. Instead, the agreements form the basis of a 
community of values which need to be shared by both donor and recipient. In 
effect, the EU “will not be able to continue having a developmental partner who 
systematically disregards the fundamental values that the EU has found for its own 
member states officially. This is critical.”82 To this end EU Delegation for the 
Pacific (EU Del Pac) continues to supervise, evaluate, and meet with authorities 
regularly.83 Wherever possible the EU attempts a cooperative rather than a punitive 
approach.84 Infrastructure and other developmental projects are only as effective as 
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the governance system that operates it. Ranking aid above governance or vice versa, 
will not be as effective as a holistic approach examining both concurrently.85 
Overall the interview results are quite profoundly and in favour of the EU argument 
agreeing to the necessity of conditional aid. Indeed a massive 69% voted for 
conditionalities, agreeing that not only does the EU have every right to place 
conditions on its ODA, but they are crucial to building a more cooperative, open 
and transparent Fiji. Statistically, Fiji and other developing countries are better of 
with aid coming in conditions attached, if the alternative was receiving no aid at 
all.86 It is also generally accepted that the donors have genuine intentions and are 
trying to do what they think is in the best interests of the people. But rarely do they 
truly appreciate the situation on the ground, and what is actually needed.87 
 
Figure 3: Do you believe that the EU should place conditionalities upon its humanitarian aid for 
Fiji? (Indicative Opinion) 
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2.2.4 Aid Dependency Theory 
Aid is designed to be a partnership between the donor and recipient with specific 
objectives and conditions. A potential threat for any recipient country is for it to 
become aid dependent. This is where a donor focuses on a particular area so 
successfully, that the government absolves itself from its own responsibilities. 
Therefore, if the donor stops targeted aid, and has no means to replace it, then the 
result is a potentially worse situation than before donor intervention.88 The donor 
generally needs to work with the recipient government to ensure that mutually 
acceptable programmes are put in place.89 Island nations receive nine times more 
aid than other developing nations in the world. However, often instead of assisting 
these nations, a dependency syndrome occurs often with attendant inflated 
bureaucracies.90 An editorial article in the NZ Herald was particularly harsh against 
the use of foreign aid in the Pacific.  
The global aid industry is wrecking small South Pacific island nations, 
exacerbating dangerous economic and social divisions, feather-bedding 
aristocratic non-performing elites, and creating a situation of permanent 
aid dependency, endemic corruption and economic stagnation and 
decline.91 
However, it has been counterclaimed that Fiji could probably dispense with aid 
altogether, and aside from the subsidisation of sugar, receives very little as a 
proportion of the GDP.92 Indeed, in 2005 Fiji received a total of about F$127.5 
million in aid out of a total GDP of F$4.212 Billion Dollars.93As such, aid 
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dependency is not a problem, although infrastructure and other needs will take 
longer and be of a different standard. 
2.3 EU Origins 
After World War Two, Europe was politically and economically exhausted. The 
citizens of Europe became willing to try a radical new idea of building a zone of 
peace through institutional integration, and the voluntary pooling of sovereignty.94 
The EU was established to fulfil those dreams and bring peace and security to a 
continent plagued by war. Jean Monet considered one of the founding fathers of the 
EU said in 1952, “To build Europe is to build peace. Our nations today must learn 
to live together under common rules and institutions freely arrived at.”95 Though 
cliché, it is evident that the EU has had unprecedented success in this goal of 
preventing war amongst its member states for over 50 years.96 Today, the EU’s flag 
has become an icon of unity to both European’s and people abroad divided by war, 
politics, and ideologies.97 However, the EU was initially formed as a limited 
economic community, and only gradually and recently evolved into a political, 
social, and security entity.98 The EU’s economic prosperity nevertheless remains a 
cornerstone of EU success and this relies upon its ability to ensure and “facilitate 
the trans-national flow of goods, people, information, money and commodities”.99 
The Treaty of the European Union in 1991 enabled the EU to become a more 
powerful external actor, and created a foreign development policy based upon the 
consolidation of democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental 
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freedoms.100 Some would argue that this might be the “hour of Europe”101 and that 
the EU has become the most important international actor in the world because it is 
the largest economic entity as well as the largest aid donor. The EU today is a union 
of 27 states composed of 495 million people, and collectively produced almost a 
third of the world’s gross national product in 2007.102 However because foreign 
policy is traditionally associated with nation states, and the EU is an association of 
many states, thinking of the EU as an independent international actor is often 
overlooked.103 Nevertheless, the EU has created an economic and security complex 
whereby the member states issues and concerns are so interlinked with their 
neighbours, that problems cannot be analysed and resolved independently.104 No 
other international association or organisation plays a similar role to the EU. Indeed, 
the EU has evolved into a hybrid of supranational and international forms 
transcending traditional state based theories established since the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648.105  
2.3.1 EU as a Normative Power 
It is apparent that the EU is a new type of international actor and represents a 
different type of power in international politics.106 Initially, scholars favoured 
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calling the European Union a civilian power or ‘soft’ power.107 This is contrasted 
with EU traditional conceptions of power originating from ‘hard’ military powers. 
The civilian power relies upon negotiation and persuasion in international affairs 
and backs the dealings up with economic influence. Realist thinkers like Bull in the 
1980s,108 and Kagan more recently in 2004,109 dispute this concept. They believe 
that the EU still derives its influence from member states hard powers and a security 
blanket provided by the United States. However, instead of defending the theory of 
soft power Europe, the EU acknowledges that it needs to build capacity in hard 
power areas. In 1993 with the Treaty of the European Union, a Common Foreign 
Security Policy (CFSP) came into existence, followed by a more elaborate 
European Security Defence Policy (ESDP) in 2003, and a European Security 
Strategy (ESS). Hard Power capacity was solidified the establishment of a rapid 
response forces and since 2003, the EU has been involved in 18 foreign 
deployments.110 However, the EU rationalises its increasing military capacity on the 
basis of becoming an effective value driven global actor.111 
Manners in 2002 wrote a seminal work suggesting that the EU should be examined 
following a new concept of normative power.112  Normative power does not rely on 
economic incentives or military force, but the force of the ideals themselves.113 It 
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creates a fundamental moral building block upon which all is aspects of the EU can 
be tied. The EU achieves desired goals because other countries admire the EU’s 
values and want to emulate its example to achieve the same level of liberty and 
prosperity.114 Manners suggests that the fundamental principles of the European 
Union are peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, and human rights.115 He also 
suggests four additional ‘minor’ norms of social solidarity, anti-discrimination, 
sustainable development, and good governance.116 It has been suggested that the 
EU promotes these norms because they are accepted by a majority of people and 
thus have universal value and that the EU will ultimately gain benefit from this 
unified world.117 Normative power doesn’t supersede civilian and military powers 
which are still relevant concepts. Instead, it has been suggested that normative 
values are complementary and can utilise the capacity of soft or hard powers to help 
achieve a global normative ideal.118  
2.4 EU Aid and Development Policy 
2.4.1 EU  Aid and Development Policy Background 
Thinking of the EU as a normative power when it comes to development policy 
means that not only does the EU wish to change the norms of the international 
system to its own ideological foundations, but the EU will naturally extend its 
norms into the international system because of international institution 
“isomorphism”.119 This is because conflict occurs when there is structural and 
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ideological differences between societies.120 The EU encourages international 
institutions that promote its normative principles, and have similar normative goals 
while working to prevent structures and institutions that seek to destabilise these 
principles. EU’s external relations are thus based upon human rights objectives, 
such as reducing and eventually eradicating poverty. In doing this, it is attempting 
to “create conditions in which the poor are able to raise their incomes and to live 
longer, healthier, and more productive lives”.121 The EC stated in a Pacific regional 
paper that ACP-EU development cooperation ought to be achieved through 
integrated strategies that incorporate economic, social, environmental, and 
institutional elements.122 The ESS also highlights the need for development by 
stipulating that there is increasing need for the EU to concern itself with the wider 
problems of more distant and foreign countries that require understanding and 
communication.123  
The EU provides around 60% of global aid if one adds both the member states and 
EU official programmes together. The EU Commission spends a sum of €6.8 billion 
annually, and is thus the largest single aid donor in the world.124 Furthermore, the 
EU is often the largest trading partner for many EU-ACP countries and collectively 
is the largest single market for global imports and exports.125 The EU understands 
the power and influence of trade in addressing developmental concerns.126 
Development abilities are traditionally the EU’s forte because of its origins as an 
economic union and purely civilian infrastructure. Stefano Manservisi, the Director 
General for Development of the European Commission (DG Dev) emphasised that 
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aid effectiveness is the key to development.127 To this end the DG Dev proposes 
four methods to help with this:  
1. Predictability of aid that donors should adopt multi-annual long-term 
programs with guaranteed multi-year financial commitments.  
2. Adapt the aid to use the recipient bureaucratic systems countries making 
sure contributions tie in with budget cycles.  
3. Having a result based approach with aid programmes geared towards 
concrete measureable outcomes.  
4. Ensure a division of labour between donors in a country, each one working 
towards their strengths rather than doubling up and wasting money on 
similar projects. 128 
2.4.2 Yaoundé & Lomé Conventions 
For over 40 years the EU has helped shape the fortunes of the ACP countries, firstly 
under the Yaoundé and Lomé conventions, and more recently with the Cotonou 
agreement. Yaoundé was first signed in 1964 and was designed to be a negotiated 
asymmetric trade agreement between Europe’s former colonies and the community. 
It also established a funding scheme called the European Development Fund (EDF) 
which made it an attractive convention that was renewed in 1969.129 In 1975 the 
Lomé Convention was signed as a significant update of Yaoundé. Lomé was 
designed to be more complementary to the greater independent voice of developing 
countries. Lomé was a more mature, comprehensive, agreement than Yaoundé 
entrenching a singular framework for organising EU development policy. Lomé 
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provided a consolidated system of unconditional aid, and non-reciprocal trade, 
which allowed these ACP countries significant economic advantages.130 The Lomé 
Convention was considered a hallmark of EU policy to the developing world, but 
ultimately failed to meet needs and expectations.131 It managed to increase trade 
volumes between the EU and ACP countries but the value of the preferences 
comparatively diminished as regional EU trade increased.132 Overall, only a limited 
number of ACP countries managed to improve their levels of development.133 
2.4.3 Cotonou to Present Day 
The Cotonou Agreement is a treaty signed between the European Union and 79 
developing ACP countries in June 2000, and came into force in 2003. This treaty 
builds upon the principles of Lomé, but also breaks away from it in some key 
areas.134 The most sweeping changes were in the area of trade cooperation to 
enhance trade liberalisation and bring EU relations with the ACP countries in line 
with WTO principles.135 The agreement provided a fresh basis for all aid and 
development activities between the European Union and Fiji, who is one of the 
signatory countries. Incidentally, the Cotonou conference, where this landmark 
treaty was signed was to have taken place in Suva, and be called the Suva 
Agreement. However, this was moved to Cotonou after the 2000 George Speight 
Coup.136 Article One of the Cotonou Agreement stipulated at length that the EU 
shall foster development cooperation to ensure:  
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1. Sustainable economic and social development.  
2. Smooth and gradual integration of the country into the world economy, 
3. Campaign against poverty.137  
The Cotonou Agreement “is an innovative framework for a deeper partnership with 
a view to facilitating economic development and addressing – together – the major 
challenges of poverty, conflict and war, environmental degradation and risks of 
economic and technological marginalisation”.138 In effect Cotonou strengthens the 
political dimensions of cooperation allowing greater dialogue and aid 
conditionalities.139 The Cotonou agreement is based on five pillars:  
1. Reinforcement of the political dimension.  
2. Involvement by the private sector and NGOs into civil society.  
3. Poverty Reduction.  
4. A framework for trade and cooperation.  
5. Rationalisation and streamlining of aid instruments.  
A constant theme to all aid the EU’s gives is in enhancing the regional framework 
of states until they have a proven capacity to deliver.140 The Cotonou Agreement 
also lays the foundations for reciprocal free trade agreements to be concluded 
between the EU and ACP countries called Economic Partnership Agreements in 
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Articles 34 to 37.141  The Cotonou agreement can be viewed as a treaty that is 
designed, at least in part, to promote and codify EU normative values.142 
2.5 Review: EU Pacific Development Policy 
The history of EU ACP collaboration in the Pacific comes from its colonial 
possessions of the 1950s. The tradition lives on, but is very much an apolitical 
partnership that emphasised development objectives over foreign policy 
objectives.143 The EU is also very interested in the Pacific because of the 
environmental focus that the EU is adopting worldwide, which makes the “Pacific 
take centre stage.”144 The Delegation for the European Union for the Pacific (EU 
Del Pac) receives its funding from two main sources; the EU budget directly, and 
the European Development Fund (EDF).145  Both have a focus on developmental 
policy and staffing at EU Del Pac reflect this to carry out its functions.146 
 In 2006 the European Union launched a Pacific Strategy Paper (PSP) that set the 
foundations for a re-examination of Pacific ACP relations. The strategy involves a 
plan for stronger political links and funding of around €500 million over the next 6 
years.147 The Strategy Paper could be seen purely as compensation for a recent 
WTO ruling stating that the preferential market access given to such countries is 
illegal.148 Nevertheless, the strategy paper is a landmark in EU-Pacific Relations as 
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it is the first formal regional strategy paper in over 30 years of EU-Pacific relations. 
The Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Louis Michel said that 
the strategy paper will strengthen political dialogue, focus development 
cooperation, and help to reduce poverty, in a region threatened by climate change 
and weak governance.149 The Strategy is the culmination of the development of the 
EU’s normative philosophy applied in a practical way to a specific region. 
The PSP makes three main proposals. Firstly, it aims to build stronger political 
relations on issues of common concern, particularly physical security, trade, and the 
environment. It will also concurrently aim to promote more efficient, accountable 
governmental systems and reduce corruption. Secondly, it aims to focus 
development cooperation on economic, social, and environmental concerns where 
the “EU has a comparative advantage and a good track record”.150 Finally it aims to 
promote more efficient delivery of aid by working with other governmental partners 
like Australia and New Zealand and Non-governmental actors, to ensure that the aid 
has an effect at the grassroots level.151 The PSP appreciates the need for policy 
coherence between different departments within the EU and coherence between 
different actors on the international stage, including NGOs, will make a more 
decisive and effective impact upon any issue of concern.152 
The comprehensive, structural, regional, and normative approach marks a 
divergence in EU from other parties like Australia and New Zealand since 2006.153 
However, one NSA was concerned about the emphasis the EU places upon 
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methodology. It thus questions the percentage of funding designated for 
developmental projects, that actually reaches the intended recipients.154 One 
incentive of the 2006 Strategy Paper is its promotion of regionalism as  a necessary 
long term step to ensure the survival of pacific island countries. This is considered 
an excellent move by some locals.155 There is also some support for eventually 
establishing a common pacific dollar currency which would help stimulate the 
economy. Some criticise the possible loss of sovereignty and fiscal control which 
makes this an ambitious dream that will not happen in the foreseeable future.156 
2.5.1 Fiji Specific Actions: From Lomé to Cotonou 
From 1975 to 2002, Fiji was allocated €230 million in development funds.157 The 
Lomé convention saw the direct subsidy of Fiji sugar exports with the EU Sugar 
Protocols paying almost three times the world market price.158 Lomé created a form 
of funding called the European Development Fund (EDF). This is a multi-annual 
funding strategy that focuses on particular sectors of society that the recipient has 
requested help with. The EU then looks at the sector, examines where it has 
advantages over other donors, and ensures it does not duplicate the work of another 
agency.159 It then implements a strategy, either bilaterally or in conjunction with 
other donors and NSAs. Every 5 years a new EDF is established and the 
consultations begin afresh. In June 2000, the EU suspended most of its non-
humanitarian assistance until it received commitments for a road map back to 
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constitutionality from the Qarase-led interim government.160 Although this was 
Fiji’s third coup, it was the first after the establishment of the Common Foreign 
Security Policy from the Treaty of the European Union. Through these actions, the 
EU displayed a strong commitment to linking development assistance to good 
governance conditionalities, in particular democratic freedoms and choice.161  
The 8th EDF from 1997 to 2002  was focussed on developing human resources and 
the environment. It allocated €25.5 million in aid but some implementation was 
delayed due to the 2000 coup and eventually Fiji received a reduced allocation of 
€17.85 million. Many infrastructural improvements occurred including a sewage 
works and the building of bridges at Sigatoka, Ba and Rewa.162 It also allocated a 
significant amount of funding to the upgrading of the Lautoka Teacher’s College. 
Other grants were used towards small projects in trade, tourism, and the 
environment.163 Laisenia Qarase stated that EU assistance since Fijian 
independence has made a significant impact on virtually all aspects of Fijian life 
and economy. The EU is not alone in giving aid to Fiji, and is thus is able to work 
with several other aid partners in Fiji to maximise the efficiency and quality of aid 
delivery.  
2.5.2  9th European Development Fund 
The 9th EDF was signed towards the end of 2002 for the years 2003 to 2007.164 A 
strong desire by the Fijian government was to get help facilitating infrastructure 
development in rural primary schools. There was hope that this work in conjunction 
with the curriculum work being headed by AusAID, would allow Fiji to advance 
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and achieve goal two of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG).165 The MDGs 
are eight international development goals that the 192 UN member states and 23 
international organisations, including the European Union, agreed to strive to 
achieve by 2015.166 The rural education work was agreeable to the EU, because it is 
one of the few donors that do infrastructure work. Also the EU reinforced its desire 
to help achieve the MDGs in Pacific ACP countries with the 2006 Strategy Paper. 
This core work forms the base of the 9th EDF and the Fiji Education Sector 
Programme  (FESP) was created to implement the project with a budget of  €17.3 
Million out of a total EDF allocation for Fiji of €21 Million.167  
2.5.3 10th European Development Fund 
The 10th EDF has a global allocation of €22 Billion of which €30.24 Million was to 
be granted to Fiji.168 The authority in Fiji that the EU negotiates with for these 
major grants is called the National Authorising Officer (NAO). This is a senior 
person in the Ministry of Finance (MoF). Since the 2006 coup there has been no 
NAO as the new nominated person from the military government was not 
acceptable to the EU. This has stalled talks for the 10th EDF, and is making donor 
coordination in other areas more difficult.169 
Draft proposals for the 10th EDF indicate that it will move largely away from the 
Education Sector on the bilateral scene, although the EU will still continue its 
investment in some multilateral projects like PRIDE.170 Preliminary discussions for 
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the 10th EDF have centred around water and sanitation.171 There is a significant lack 
of infrastructure especially with regard to fresh water supply in Fiji, which is ironic 
given its tropical location and high annual rainfall. Water tanks for rain water 
storage are virtually non-existent, and this makes basic living conditions 
particularly difficult in times of floods and droughts. Furthermore, there is no mains 
water supply for many villages, and in cities, if it does exist, there are significant 
maintenance issues. Suva has a logistical water supply problem with present 
infrastructure and pipes struggling to supply five times the population it was 
designed to meet.172 
2.5.4 Fijians Awareness of EU Policy 
 
Figure 4: Are you aware of EU involvement in Fiji? (Indicative Opinion) 
  
 
Indicative results show that Fijians knowledge of European Union involvement is 
excellent. Two thirds of respondents had a clear knowledge of EU operations, 
particularly in their field of work, and offered plenty of comments and criticisms. 
An additional 31% knew of the EU and its involvement from media publications, 
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showing a massive 97% of interviewees having some knowledge about the 
European Union in Fiji. However, even amongst these experts, the specific details 
of other programmes and the knowledge of how to access certain types of aid 
appears minimal.173 Also, the impact particular programmes have on the wider 
community is information that is particularly difficult to access for both the public 
and academics. This is shown by the question asking where the EU is proving most 
helpful to Fijians today. 21% said that did not know. A concern for the EU is that 
another 16% were very critical of the EU suggesting that it is not helping in any 
area of Fiji at present. Reasons highlighted were the recent EPA negotiations,174 the 
EU’s bureaucratic nature, and suspicion over the EU’s real intentions in being 
involved in Fiji.  
An example of this concern are ‘Fly by Night’ international researchers, who collect 
specific data they need for a project and then write up the research without 
establishing true relevance and context.175 In many cases, decisions are made upon 
the theoretical analysis by such people as opposed to active consultations with the 
directly affected community leaders.176 Additionally, once a project is started, there 
are concerns regarding the transference of knowledge during the delivery of the aid 
programme. The EU is known to spend  a lot of time on methodology and processes 
when it establishes a project. However, when they leave it to the locals to run the 
project, they do not properly train these people or explain to them a rationale for the 
methodology and processes.177 Such actions leave a knowledge and capability gap, 
and can potentially minimise the positive long-term effect of a project, increasing 
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the dependence on the donor.178 A new EU information point at the Suva Public 
Library was established in mid 2009 which could ameliorate these problems.179 
 
Figure 5: Where is the EU proving most helpful in Fiji?(Indicative Opinion) 
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3 Fiji - History 
 
  
3.1 Fiji: A History of Coups 
There has always been a thin veneer of stability in Fiji that splits open whenever the 
pressures are too much.180 The root causes of the coups are “deep seated 
perceptions about unequal access to development benefits.”181 This is something 
that has always existed since the first days of colonial rule, and has never been 
properly addressed by any government. Rather it has been ignored, or worse, 
exploited for political advantage.182 Furthermore, the politicians and system are still 
not mature enough for people to consider and choose a more conciliatory, 
collaborative, and rational path. A justification for the military coups could follow 
the arguments of J.S. Mills that economic and security issues must solved, before 
equality and liberty can be addressed.183  In the past 25 years there has been 10 
years of political Dictatorship in Fiji and 15 of Democracy. 
 
Figure 6:  Past 25 Years of Fiji Political History (1984-2009). Proportion of Years Fiji has 
experienced of democracy and dictatorship  
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3.1.1 Origins to Independence 
Fiji became a colony of Britain in October 1874. In many ways British rule was 
benevolent, choosing to rule indirectly through the already established local 
hierarchy of chiefs.184 Large scale cultivation of sugar cane was introduced to create 
an economy in Fiji, but to work these plots of land, the British imported indentured 
labourers from India. This system was designed to exploit the riches of Fiji while 
protecting the indigenous population and their lifestyles.185 Most of these labourers, 
once their indenture ended, chose to remain in Fiji, and in 1920 there was an edict 
to break up the sugar estates into 10 acre blocks to be leased and worked by newly 
independent farmers. This system remains in operation today.186 At the time of its 
independence in 1970, Fiji was a divided and inequitable society. Indigenous 
Fijians owned over 80% of Fiji’s land, yet were disadvantaged in the educational 
and commercial sectors in which Indo-Fijian and European communities performed 
better.187   
3.1.2 Independence to 2006 
In 1987, the Indian dominated Fiji Labour Party (FLP) won the general election, 
which confirmed the worst fears of many Fijians with ethno-nationalist tendencies. 
They were losing their country to the Indian settler community. The ethnic Fijian-
dominated military were quickly convinced to stage a coup lead by Colonel Sitiveni 
Rabuka.188 The economy plummeted after 1987 with a mass exodus of the best and 
brightest of the Fiji-Indian community, and the indigenous Fijian was faced with the 
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prospect of entering the marketplace with neither business knowledge nor 
applicable resources.189 Rabuka authorised a new constitution in 1990 aimed at 
ensuring Fijian dominance of the government.190 By 1997, the coup ten years earlier 
had become a source of embarrassment to many Fijians, causing them to realise that 
the communities must cooperate to create a prosperous future. Now an elder 
statesman of Fiji, Rabuka passed a new constitution removing many racist elements 
in the 1990 constitution, and drastically changed the ethnic divisions of 
parliament.191 The 1997 constitution also enacted a very complex proportional 
electoral system. The first election under the new constitution in 1999 was won by 
the Fiji Labour Party (FLP) and that gave Fiji its first Indian prime minister 
Mahendra Chaudhry. 
The victory was short lived and on the May 19, 2000, a failed businessman named 
George Speight seized parliament with an armed gang. Fijians all over the country 
reacted by hijacking the coup to vent their own concerns and anger.192 Frank 
Bainimarama the Head of the Fiji military played a critical role to resolve the 2000 
coup and negotiate the release the hostages. These actions further blurred the 
separation of the military to affairs of state, creating circumstances when military 
intervention is justified.193 The 2000 coup also showed how a small minority of 
activists can have a disproportionate and undemocratic influence on the affairs of 
the country. 
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3.1.1 2006 to Present 
On 5 December 2006, the hero of the 2000 coup Frank Bainimarama initiated his 
own coup. The immediate catalyst for this move was a dispute between him and the 
elected SDL government over two pieces of legislation. The first was the proposed 
‘Qoloqoli Bill’ which would transfer rights of the coastal waters from the 
government to indigenous Fijians.194 Land rights that would prove to be very 
“lucrative”195 to the indigenous population at the cost of international investors, 
tourists, and the Indian population. The second piece of legislation was to forgive 
the perpetrators of the 2000 coup and even allow them positions in government. In 
essence the 2006 coup was a revision of the 2000 coup involving the same 
politicians in the same power struggle.196 Indeed, Mahendra Chaudhry, the PM 
elected in 1999 was named the interim Minister of Finance.  
Bainimarama has more idealistic goals. He wishes to remove racism from the 
politics of Fiji altogether.197 Bainimarama also claims to want to clean up the 
corruption of the former democratic government.198 Ultimately he hoped that his 
coup would be the ‘coup to end all coups’.199 One of the more significant political 
moves of Bainimarama’s regime was to introduce the ‘Peoples Charter’, a quasi 
constitutional document aimed at addressing the deficiencies of the 1997 
Constitution. Bowing to international pressure, he also promised elections by March 
2009 instead of his original intent for elections in 2010.200 
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In June 2008, Frank Bainimarama backtracked on promises made to the EU, the 
Pacific Island Forum, and the Fijian public to hold elections by March 2009, by 
stipulating that a new electoral system needed to be introduced like the one 
proposed by the ‘Peoples Charter.’201 However, because of internal opposition and 
other pressures, even dates in 2010 were increasingly unrealistic, unless held within 
the confines of the 1997 constitution. This option was unacceptable to the military 
regime and strongly opposed by the Fiji Electoral Commission.202 
Internal dissent against the regime and international pressures reached critical levels 
in April 2009. Already the FLP had bowed to constituents pressures and resigned 
their positions in the interim regime. The Supreme Court of Fiji, in a landmark 
decision ruled the regime illegal and ordered the regime to remove itself from 
power.203 The following day the President of Fiji Ratu Josefa Iloilo, a stoic 
supporter of Bainimarama, abrogated the 1997 Constitution, temporarily fired all 
the Judges in the land, instigated martial law, and reinstated Bainimarama with even 
more dictatorial powers.204 Importantly, it cleared the way for Bainimarama to write 
a new constitution based upon the ‘Peoples Charter’.205 With such drastic steps “Fiji 
has taken a decisive step towards being a dictatorship.206 This crisis situation was 
predicted by the electoral commission, as being the way that the Bainimarama 
regime would have to proceed if opposition remained strong. Bainimarama 
defended this drastic step by reiterating the apparent need to get rid of racism in the 
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country.207 The Fiji Human Rights commission has voiced its support for the 
President’s abrogation of the Constitution. It was said there was no other option due 
to a governance vacuum and potential anarchy caused by the court decision.208 
The drastic move of abrogating the constitution was widely condemned by the 
international community. The Australian Foreign Minister, Steven Smith, said that 
this creates a belief that Fiji has no intention of returning to democracy.209 NZ 
Prime Minister John Key, said that he believed the situation was tragic.210 On May 
1, 2009, Fiji was formally suspended from the Pacific Islands Forum with a 
declaration that, “a regime which displays such a total disregard for basic human 
rights, democracy and freedom has no place in the PIF.”211 The international 
governmental response, although quite universally negative towards Fiji’s most 
recent actions, is not shared by members of the academic community. Professor 
Hugh Laracy from the University of Auckland, for example, stated that 
Bainimarama is an idealist and has the “best interests of Fiji at heart”.212  
On the 1st of July 2009, Bainimarama released his keynote speech outlining a new 
‘roadmap’ towards democratic general elections in September 2014, confirming 
that the military regime intends to rule for another 5 years.213 According to the new 
timeline, the Fijian Government for the next 3 years, will focus on wide ranging 
economic reform initiatives that are “pro-growth and pro-poor.” 214 These include 
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encouraging investor confidence, more public-private partnerships with financial 
institutions, closure of non-performing government entities, and outsourcing where 
possible to the private sector. He also stated intentions to perform major road 
works, and wide ranging land reforms.215 With the economy stable and growing, he 
then intends to implement work on a new constitution based upon the already 
published Peoples Charter no later than September 2012. The new Constitution will 
be enshrined into law no later than September 2013, which will allow a year of 
consolidation and people to get accustomed to the changes before general elections 
in September 2014.216  
Bainimarama also made it clear that he wants to reach out and engage with the 
international community and development partners and not remain isolated.217 
However, Australia, New Zealand, & the EU were all quick to condemn the new 
plan expressing concern yet again about the very long time frame before promised 
elections.218 Neighbouring Pacific Island countries were also concerned, with 
Samoa’s Prime Minister Tuila’epa Sa’ilele stating that democracy must be a pre-
condition for any international engagement and help.219 The PM for the Cook 
Islands stipulates that the time frame is just too long. Bainimarama is now 
publically declaring that he will do nothing to help progress and restore a 
democratic system in Fiji for 3 years. 220 The Charge d’Affaire for European 
Commission in New Zealand George Cunningham, appreciates that Fiji wants to re-
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engage in dialogue, but with the announcement and confirmation of such a delay, it 
will be create difficulties for re-engagement.221  
3.1.2 Fiji History of Coups Conclusion 
The history of the coups illustrate a significant ongoing constitutional crisis. Fiji 
needs to establish a formula that is satisfactory to all Fijians and influential 
stakeholders. There were underlying pertinent reasons for the coups, although many 
were very self serving.222 Eyewitness accounts attest to a noticeable stagnation of 
the economy through the cycle of coups, and as a result, there are many less 
opportunities in Fiji than there were in the 1980s.223 Change is needed and it must 
come from within Fiji. International agencies can help but they cannot create a 
society and a sense of belonging. 
3.2 Fiji’s Contemporary Strengths and Challenges 
3.2.1 Fiji’s Assets 
 
Figure 7: What do you think is Fiji’s Greatest Asset? (Indicative Opinion) 
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Overwhelmingly the greatest response to this question was the tenacity of the 
people of Fiji. One commentator states that it is amazing, considering the turmoil 
that Fiji has experienced over the last decade or more, how the people bounce back 
and move forward despite all the challenges they encounter.224 The Fijian people 
are open, friendly, and have an ability to get on with each other in diverse 
communities, despite challenging economic and political circumstances.225 In the 
last few years eyewitnesses accounts suggest this inherent sense of optimism and 
confidence about the future of the country is fading.226 Fijians also comment upon 
the unique geographical location of Fiji. Fiji is the natural regional hub of the South 
Pacific, an asset that could be encouraged and harnessed into the future.227 Once its 
geography was regarded as an extreme disadvantage but is now an extreme 
advantage.228 Despite the emigration of many of the highly skilled and qualified 
people from Fiji seeking greater stability and money in other countries. Fiji still has 
a good base of qualified people, which could be used more effectively in certain 
industries.229 It is a lack of opportunities, not ambition, that restricts the 
development of the individual and the wider economy.230 
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3.2.2 Fiji’s Challenges 
 
Figure 8: What are Fiji’s Greatest Challenges Today? (Indicative Opinion) 
 
Nevertheless, certain attitudes and traits of the Fijian people can also be considered 
Fiji’s greatest weakness. In particular, the lack of leadership shown by politicians, 
and the cultural mindset of traditionalists, which makes them unable to accept 
change and value progress as a necessary and good thing.231 The younger 
generation appear more willing to accept change and embrace progress, but the 
older generation generally wish to adhere to traditions and utilise traditional 
systems especially amongst the indigenous population.232 When a political crisis 
occurs, the people become disenchanted with modern democratic systems, and feel 
the need to retreat to what they know and feel comfortable with. This is the 
traditional chief based system.233 Fiji’s current economic climate is also bleak. 
There are a lack of employment opportunities able to absorb even a small 
percentage of graduates and school leavers. It is estimated that the employment rate 
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in Fiji is about 360,000 with 120,000 in the formal sector, and the other 240,000 in 
the informal sector meaning almost half the population is unemployed or 
underemployed.234 
However, the overwhelming response by interviewees about Fiji’s greatest 
challenge was the political instability caused by the present regime. A total of 43% 
of respondents targeted the coups as their central concern, 19% said so directly, and 
the rest lamented a lack of leadership and direction in the country, or expressed 
concern about democratic abuses. A lack of an elected government impacts upon 
the core values of many Fijians. It also affects the economy, and the basic human 
rights and physiological needs of Fiji’s citizens.235 The need to have a legal, 
responsible, and democratic government in place to make crucial decisions, is a 
vital issue in Fiji that needs to be solved.236 
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4 Fiji – Economic Sector 
4.1 Overview: A history of economic decline 
The political coups of 1987, 2000, and 2006 seriously hindered economic 
development in Fiji with a drastic loss of skilled people. In the UN Human 
Development Index (HDI), Fiji has plummeted from 44th in 1986 to 92nd in 2008.237 
The GDP has stagnated with an average growth rate of just under 1% per year since 
1995. Average incomes have risen just F$353 dollars in the past 12 years at 
constant 1995 levels. Recessions usually hit Fiji worst in the year immediately 
following a political crisis. For example in 2007 growth rate was -7% and in 2000 
the growth rate was -2.1%.238 There are no figures yet available for 2008 but the 
coup, coupled with a global recession, will likely show another contraction of the 
economy. At independence in 1970 Fiji’s GDP was roughly on par with Singapore. 
Today the disparity per capita is massive with the average income in Singapore that 
is 7.5 times greater than that of Fiji. This shows both the dramatic nature of Fiji’s 
relative economic stagnation, as well as indicating that there has been a lack of 
leadership and long-term economic planning from successive governments.239 
Political instability and coups cause significant short-term detrimental impacts, and 
prevents Fiji from creating and enabling long term strategies.  
Job creation in the formal sector has remained dismal, with formal sector 
employment less than half of the informal sector.240 It is estimated that up to a third 
of foreign income coming into Fiji comes from remittances, and if present issues 
continue, more highly qualified people will choose to emigrate causing the Fijian 
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economy to deteriorate further.241 The garments and sugar industries are suffering 
from a more open market, resulting in a large number of job losses.242 A key 
problem with Fiji’s economy is that it concentrates largely on mass market tourism 
and sugar, at the expense of many other potential and lucrative industries.243 The 
government is not proactive in nurturing the new industries needed to create 
economic stimulus.244 Fiji is a small country, and can potentially be left behind by 
global economic progress without innovative thinking and the creation of niche 
markets. Away from the urban centres, basic infrastructure and services decline and 
eventually vanish, making rural development particularly difficult.245 Without rural 
infrastructure, unfortunately, urban migration rates increase drastically beyond what 
cities can cope with, forcing the creation of squatter settlements on the peripheries 
of the urban areas.  
The number of jobs that can be sustained in the prime industries is not enough to 
cater for the present rural populations, especially in the case of sugar.246 A robust 
economy is vital to all other sectors of the Fijian economy. For example, when the 
economy declines, so too does available funding for the education and health 
sectors.  Consequently, the government is neither able to provide adequate funding 
to cover infrastructure needs, nor the salary and wages for the required number of 
professional teachers and doctors.247 
This chapter will outline many of the concerns encountered by the Fijian economy 
given the present political situation. It will look at socioeconomic problems before 
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targeting certain industries in Fiji to show their potential and structural weaknesses. 
The Chapter will then evaluate the EU developmental economic response in its 
flagship EPA policy.  
 
Figure 9:  The overall economic growth in Fiji in recent years 
 
 
Figure 10: The erratic nature of the economic growth, causing overall stagnation. 
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Figure 11: The overall decline in Fijian lifestyle according to the UNDP Human Development 
Indicators..248 
 
4.2 General Economic Concerns 
4.2.1 Disparity in income 
The inequality of income between the ethnic groups in Fiji is severe. Indo-Fijians 
are over represented in both the very poorest sections of society and the very 
richest.249 Poor Indo-Fijian households earn almost 14% less than the ethnic-Fijian 
equivalent. Likewise the average income of rich Indo-Fijian households is almost 
42% higher than high income Fijian households, leading to the misconception that 
Indo-Fijians are overall a far wealthier and more prosperous ethnicity. It is the 
Ethnic-Fijians that dominate the middle-income group of Fiji, and combined with 
the community activities and support systems, are considered relatively to have the 
best terms of lifestyles according to a UNDP report in 1999.250 The economic 
disparities between Fijian and Fiji-Indians need to be addressed especially in terms 
of access to jobs and land.  
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The UNDP ‘Fiji Poverty Report’ shows evidence that both suffer from 
physiological insecurities of poverty and unemployment. Indeed, such concerns are 
estimated to affect a third of the population.251 The physiological security concerns 
create a low-investment, low-growth developmental trap and there are no signs of 
improvement in the near future.252 
4.2.2 Trade Liberalisation 
Trade liberalisation is a good idea for Fiji, but how it is effected is concerning.253 
Through liberalisation policies, Fijian society has been gained a new level of 
complexity, with many new opportunities, businesses, and international partners. 
Fiji however, does not have the systems or expertise in place to take advantage of 
manage and control the opportunities and businesses that enter the country. This 
means exploitation by unscrupulous business practitioners is a very real 
possibility.254 Fiji is also a small country compared to its neighbours in the pacific 
rim. Therefore, its competitive advantage is minimal in many sectors. Additionally, 
globalisation, especially through bilateral and multilateral agreements that the 
governments sign, can lead to external control of economic power either by private 
enterprise or foreign government, damaging the soverignity and democractic will of 
the country.255 
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4.3 Present Industries in Fiji - Challenges 
4.3.1 Fisheries 
The Fishing industry in Fiji has been in trouble for a number of years, largely 
because of EU Health and Sanitation concerns that were not addressed when 
notified of them in 2005. When EU inspectors examined facilities in 2007 they 
found them wanting, leading to the EU decision to ban fish imports from Fiji until 
the problems are rectified. The industry at present is in total disarray.256 The EU 
laments the lack of action by the Fijian government. The EU estimates with such 
high demand for tuna and other fish the fisheries sector could easily become a 
billion dollar industry in Fiji, equalling or surpassing Fiji’s present number one 
industry of tourism.257 The resources of the sea are abundant, and strategies are in 
place to ensure the sustainability of the industry. It is a matter of having the right 
policies in place to ensure the fish that get to the international markets are fresh. 
Placing refrigeration facilities at rural airports would help expand the industry to 
remote islands that currently have little economic productivity at present. If fish can 
be shipped to the processing facilities in fresh and hygienic conditions, then the 
industry could flourish.  
4.3.2 Agriculture 
Land in Fiji is not being utilised well. There a several land tenure issues that 
discourage investment and specialisation of agriculture into many industries. At 
present, the focus remains on the sugar industry, which also has many systemic and 
structural issues.258 However the tropical climate and relatively large land mass of 
Fiji’s two main islands means that it is possible to plant and produce high quality 
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export fruit like paw paw and mango for the global market.259 It could also be 
possible to can and preserve such fruits for the export market. However, there is no 
industry producing canned fruit nor is there year round supply of such fruits, 
meaning Fiji has to import product from Hawaii, Australia, and other countries, 
instead of having a surplus to export. 260 
4.3.3 Tourism 
The Tourism industry is Fiji’s largest industry earning about F$800 million 
annually for the Fijian economy. Fiji also acts as the central hub destination for the 
Pacific facilitating travel and exploration for more remote parts of the South 
Pacific.261 For the tourism industry to be successful, a large amount of infrastructure 
is needed especially roading, power, telecommunications, water, sewage, and the 
internet. The lack of infrastructure is one of the chief constraints for expansion of 
the tourism sector beyond its core around Nadi and nearby offshore islands.262 A 
concern of the tourism sector and one of the purported reasons for the 2006 coup, 
was the ‘Qoloqoli Bill’ designed to transfer rights of the coastal waters from the 
government to indigenous Fijians.263 Even before the passing of this legislation, it 
was causing issues for fisherman and tourists in coastal waters, who were 
intercepted by locals and had money extorted as a fee for travelling in their 
waters.264 Such actions can be construed as piracy and create fears for the physical 
safety of Fiji tourists, as well as an additional economic burden.  There has been a 
lot of research and concern in the Tourism industry as to just how much of the 
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Tourist Dollar stays in Fiji.265 The Ministry of Tourism, quoting a Reserve Bank of 
Fiji Report, stipulated that only 40% of the tourist dollar is retained in Fiji. Even so, 
tourism remains Fiji’s highest form of foreign exchange revenue.266  
The coup has had adversely impacted upon. After the 2006 coup, Helen Clark PM 
of NZ at the time, stated that it was immoral for New Zealanders to holiday in 
Fiji.267 Tourism numbers nevertheless remained steady at about 500,000 visitors 
annually.268 The demography of tourist coming to Fiji was quite different however 
with a focus on budget holiday seekers. Consequently, the amount of income per 
tourist has declined sharply with budget backpackers making a far greater 
percentage of tourist numbers, as opposed to the high-end luxury hotel seekers.269 
The Ministry of Tourism stated that there was actually a 14% increase in arrivals 
from Australia in 2007, but a net decline in revenue from all Australian tourists.270 
Overall, revenue for the 2007 financial year was F$600 million as compared to the 
average of F$800 million.271 Even with such a decrease in revenue, the Ministry 
still affirms that Tourism is Fiji’s number 1 industry, 3 times larger than sugar. 272 
4.3.4 Linking the economic sectors of Fiji 
The market to supply the hotels and resorts with fresh food and commodities is 
considerable. Despite current contractions, the tourist sector is optimistic that its 
turnover will soon reach the elusive billion dollar mark. If Fiji could exploit its 
position as the heart of the South Pacific, the potential for supplying such goods to 
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other South Pacific countries, also reliant on tourism, is significant. Fiji is not 
unique in possessing beautiful beaches, but it does have the population, land mass, 
education, and industry that could allow it to quickly build capacity with sound 
investment. 273 At present Fiji is unable to produce crops of a consistent quality year 
round. This hinders its potential to act as a significant member of the food supply to 
Fijian hotels and resorts.274 More vocational training and planning is needed to help 
Fijian industries integrate with other sectors. 
4.4 Fiji: Socio Economic Concerns 
Poverty in Fiji is rising, with some penurious locals wondering where their next 
meals are coming from and feeling compelled to sell their children.275 In June 2009, 
the Fiji Times reported an increase in sale of young girls for prostitution by their 
parents.276 Such drastic measures show both the desperate situation some families 
are in as well as the feminisation of poverty. In difficult times it is the poor young 
female that suffers the most.277 Local NGOs are calling on the government to be 
more active investigating these issues whilst providing basic human rights 
education, and doing more to help economic insecurity.278 
There is a large urban drift in Fiji, particularly among the low-income casual labour 
market. This has meant a corresponding increase in squatter settlements with a rapid 
increase in the number of people forced into slums and shantytowns since 
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December 2006.279 These settlements lack proper shelter, good water supplies, and 
sanitation. As of 2007 there are 182 squatter settlements in Fiji.280 A particular 
concern are the very high rates of anaemia caused by poor quality and low iron 
diets. A recent report in 2009 estimated almost half children under 5 years of age, a 
third of women, and a quarter of men are anaemic. The long-term effects of 
anaemia include poor physical growth and mental development.281 People with 
anaemia spike after a natural disaster, such as the floods that affected the western 
region in January 2009. The Ministry of Health is addressing the problem by giving 
pregnant women iron supplements, although it is clear that more needs to be 
done.282  
The civil and charitable sectors of Fiji remain remarkably robust despite whatever 
political upheavals, and strives to solve immediate ‘grass roots’ concerns that make 
the daily lives of people more difficult. Often, NGOs are created in Fiji when it is 
discovered that an international aid partner wants to focus on a particular area. For 
example, there is a massive proliferation of women’s NGOs in Fiji with several 
dozen now operating when traditionally there were only a few.283 These new NGOs 
often work at cross purposes, increase administration costs, and prevent efficient 
delivery of needed services. Laws need to be established in Fiji to prevent the 
spontaneous establishment of NGOs, Separating those NGOs with genuine 
programmes and intentions from those without would be a difficult task and any 
laws will only create more levels of bureaucracy. Consequently, less funding and 
effort would be targeted towards the identified target group. those intended 
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according to the original goals of the NGO.  Even established organisations that 
have done good work with the European Union have fallen into this trap of 
unnecessary bureaucracy. Both the National Council for Women, and the Fiji 
Forum for Non-State Actors, admitted to procedural faults that have caused issues 
with the EU.284  
4.5 EU Response 
4.5.1 Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
The European Union Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) is the EU’s flagship 
new developmental agreement. It combines the principles of Cotonou with recent 
WTO rulings, to create a multi-tiered regional trade and aid agreement designed to 
replace the non-reciprocal trade concessions of the Lomé Conventions with those 
with more reciprocity.285 The EPAs are not intended to be a typical Free Trade 
Agreement, although it does include considerable FTA aspects. As of writing, 
Papua New Guinea and Fiji have signed and ratified the EPA and the EU delegation 
is confident that Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands will do so in the near future.286 
The Aim of the EPA is to help the Pacific improve competitiveness, diversify its 
exports, and build regional markets.287 The EU delegation compares the benefits of 
the EPA to the potential dangers of the PACER agreement that lowers economic 
boarders between Pacific Island states and Australia and New Zealand.288 It is 
concerned that while the EPA should encourage trade and establishment of 
industries, PACER will encourage them to move away from the Pacific Islands to 
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Australia and New Zealand, where through economies of scale, things can be 
produced more cheaply.289 The EU insists that the EPA is a developmental tool 
designed to work in conjunction with the EDF programmes.290 The EPA includes 
more details than just a pure trade agreement and has meant the EU regional budget 
for the PACP has almost tripled to help with measures to facilitate EPA 
implementation. The reciprocity clauses for the EPAs mean that there is a 10 to 20 
year buffer for most tariff reduction clauses. As such, the EPA is a cushioned 
approach to trade liberalisation.291  
There is a belief that Fiji does have the potential to have a competitive advantage in 
many areas if given the right incentives. One of the main hopes of the EPA, 
however, is that it “forces the (Pacific) region to integrate with itself,”292 which in 
the longer term will be of immense benefit to all the islands. All the islands have 
significant tariffs on other Pacific Island goods. Combined with small markets this 
effectively prohibits neighbouring islands from trading with each other.293 There is 
no solidarity between Pacific Island states, which makes regional development 
especially difficult.294 The EU prides itself as an exemplar of how a region can 
integrate with neighbours for mutual benefit. Certainly it wants to encourage greater 
integration in the Pacific, and views the EPAs as an opportunity to instigate that 
premise seriously into the Pacific-ACP countries.295 There are commissioned 
studies that claim the long-term benefits of the EPA outweigh the short-term 
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costs.296 It is however feared that the EPA although may appear to be of benefit to 
Fiji, but has a hidden agenda of securing EU rights to particular markets and in the 
longer term will be the principle benefactors.297 
Some NGOs have voiced considerable concerns about the EPA, and in particular 
how it is presented to them. For example a member of the NCWF was invited to 
EPA consultations in Papua New Guinea. However upon arrival she discovered that 
the EU were not actually doing consultations or asking any questions. They were 
merely informing people about the EPA and how it was going to be 
implemented.298 Generally supportive of EU and its community involvement, she 
felt for the first time that the European Union was abrupt, “crude and strong 
armed”, using its economic might to leverage a deal not necessarily favourable to 
Fiji in the longer term.299 There are also concerns from the sugar industry, to ensure 
that the EPA does not supplant the present Sugar Protocol and aid offerings by the 
European Union.300  
There is an argument that Fiji signed onto the EPA to simply secure sugar access 
rights to the EU in the medium to long term future. In a joint statement by various 
Fijian and regionally based NGOs, four key concerns were highlighted. 
1. The EPAs will reduce government revenue in Pacific Countries, by ensuring 
trade tariff barriers are reduced.   
                                                
 
296 Delegation of the European Union for the Pacific, "Fiji Interview 17 - Governance Sector Interview". 
297 Fiji Electoral Commission, "Fiji Interview 20 - Governance Sector Interview". 
298 National Council for Women in Fiji, "Fiji Interview 5 - Ngo Sector Interview". 
299 Ibid. 
300 PACnews, "18 Acp Sugar Producers Want to Preserve the Benefits of the Sugar Protocol," Pacific News, 4 May, 
2007 2007. 
FIJI – ECONOMIC SECTOR 73 
2. The EPAs will undermine the sovereignty of the pacific peoples, preventing 
pacific countries from discriminating in favour of local suppliers to boost 
the local economy.  
3. The EPAs contrary to the EU’s stated intensions will harm pacific 
development rather than promote it. This is due to the EPAs preventing 
pacific countries use of tariffs on export bans to nurture new industries. For 
example, at present there is a ban on exporting certain types of unprocessed 
wood, in an effort to create a value added furniture industry.  
4. The EPAs reduce the pacific nations abilities to meet human rights 
obligations rather than increase this capacity. This is mainly because of 
stringent intellectual property clauses that will mean the countries can only 
purchase trademarked medicines making them prohibitively expensive, and 
it puts large costs on transference of knowledge.301 
The EU argues that the EPA is much broader than this, and that maintaining the 
status quo is not an option because of the WTO,302 and that sustained growth and 
development is not happening in the Pacific-ACP countries as desired. A holistic 
trade and aid agreement will be able to provide more economic and social gain than 
aid policies like the EDFs in isolation.303 The delegation reaffirms that this is a 
cushioned approach to trade liberalisation that has to eventually happen in Fiji and 
the Pacific if it is to continue to develop is a global economy.304 
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4.5.2 EU Engagement with NGOs 
According to the Cotonou Agreement, NGOs were to administer up to 15% of any 
EU assistance given to a country. The Fiji Forum for Non-State Actors was set up 
in 2002 to act as a conduit between the European Union, other NGOs, and the 
community directly. The FFNSA had 35 NGO members and funds started to be 
channelled in 2005 for water projects, community administration offices, 
kindergartens, and small business enterprises.305 The FFNSA believed the projects 
and relationship were working well, but the EU decided to terminate the 
arrangement concerned that many projects approved by the FFNSA did not meet 
strict EU requirements. The relationship was terminated rather abruptly and things 
were “not left on a good note”.306 Instead, the EU decided to channel the funding 
through the Ministry of Finance. A member of the FFNSA was concerned that the 
EU were being overly bureaucratic, and that they were at times treated as simply 
another branch of EU Del Pac.307 However, all the targeted communities that 
received aid through this system appreciated the assistance the EU was giving, and 
overall there is a belief that the EU’s intention was sincere.308 The EU is involved 
with other small NGO projects. For example, it assisted the National Council for 
Women to provide vocational training to young women school leavers and help 
them become community counsellors.309 On the whole, NGOs are very supportive 
of the EU’s EDF funds, and the focus the EU has on non-state community 
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operations.310 Foreign developmental aid is not only considered beneficial but 
critical to the operations of many NGOs.311 
4.5.3 Humanitarian Assistance with Natural Disasters 
Despite the coup and the actions of the interim regime, The EU has not stopped its 
humanitarian actions in Fiji and provided considerable relief funding to victims of 
flooding and other natural disasters since in 2006.312 On April 16 2009, the 
European Union released a press statement declaring that it had committed an 
additional €250,000 to assist with post disaster rehabilitation efforts in the 28 
severely affected flood locations throughout Fiji from the flash floods of January 
2009.313 The aid is to be focussed on schools, health centres, and other critical 
public institutions in the flood affected areas.314 It also allows for capacity building 
at a community level. 
4.5.4 EU Future Options 
It has been suggested that the EU can focus more on providing technical expertise 
and capacity building in local communities as a prime focus for development.315 
With greater networking and connectivity grassroots concerns will be heard faster, 
and appropriate responses can both be faster and more targeted.316 With the EU’s 
focus on education, it can also help certain industries with labour mobility and 
upskilling of people wanting to enter new trades.317  Of particular importance is the 
need for more locals to be skilled in managerial operations, which are still largely 
                                                
 
310 Ibid. 
311 Ibid. 
312 Fiji Association of Social Workers, "Fiji Interview 11 - Ngo Sector Interview". 
313 Rova, "Eu Supports Unicef with €250,000 for Fiji Flood Rehabilitation."  
314 Ibid.  
315 National Council for Women in Fiji, "Fiji Interview 5 - Ngo Sector Interview". 
316 Ibid. 
317 Ministry of Tourism: Fiji, "Fiji Interview 1 - Tourism Sector Interview". 
FIJI – ECONOMIC SECTOR 76 
dominated by ex-pats.318 The EU considers itself to have a competitive advantage in 
renewable energies, which will become much more important to Fiji and other 
Pacific Island states as higher oil prices became permanent.319 Already the EU has 
helped the FEA with a wind farm project near Sigatoka, which could power up to 
15000 households.320 
4.6 Future Industry Possibilities 
4.6.1 Utilising English Skills of Fiji: Teaching & Call Centres 
Fiji has a relatively well-educated English speaking population and the Fijian accent 
is quite clear for people to understand. This means that Fiji has an opportunity to 
teach English as a second language to primarily Asiatic students, desperate for 
immersion. Already in Lautoka there is a community of Japanese students learning 
English in private institutions. This is an industry that can be fostered and 
developed. 321 Fiji could operate such institutions at very competitive prices in 
comparison to its Australian and New Zealand neighbours, and the Asian market is 
massive with Koreans, Chinese, Japanese, and Thai all very keen to increase their 
competence in English.322 
Another option for Fiji with its proficiency in English, neutral time zone, and access 
to the Southern Cross cable, is the call centre industry. At present the numbers of 
people involved in the industry are between 1,500 and 2,000.323 Indeed the ANZ 
Bank has already established an international call centre in Fiji. People are starting 
to identify both Fiji’s location and language abilities as strengths. As outsourcing of 
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call centres becomes more common in developed countries, this is an industry that 
just needs the right incentives and promotion to become an important player in this 
field.324  Call centres certainly appear an area that will repay the efforts to promote 
it. For larger expansions in this area there needs to be an upgrading of 
telecommunications facilities to make it more accessible and affordable. However, 
Fijians are known as a welcoming people, so to reorientate this to a customer 
service mentality will require minimal training. 
4.6.2 Niche Markets & Micro-Enterprises 
There are many niche industries in Fiji that have lots of potential and are not really 
being harnessed at present. These include agricultural products like saffron, and 
vanilla, which are both grown successfully in French Polynesia. Other agricultural 
products yield a very high profit on the world market and can utilise the little 
pockets of fertile soil in various islands.325 Eco-tourism is also a good possibility for 
Fiji with its large tracts of unspoilt native forests in the hinterland and uninhabited 
islands. However, the key concern is that the capital needed to invest in an eco 
retreat is intensive compared to the returns gained. 326  
There needs to be laws, policies, and international aid available to assist with the 
setting up of small businesses and entrepreneurship opportunities. Helping Fijians 
start something on their own at the grass roots level and become self employed, is a 
good way to expand the economy without large capital investment. At the moment 
policies are not favourable for small businesses, so even if the people have the 
initiative to start something, there are too many bureaucratic hurdles to 
overcome.327 
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4.7 Fiji Governmental Response: Economic outlook 
The interim regime is being quite proactive in trying to encourage economic 
performance in Fiji. Frank Bainimarama talked in July 2009 about the global 
recession, its impact upon Fiji, and the necessity to devalue the Fijian dollar in May 
2009 by 20%. A devalued Fijian dollar he hopes will spur tourist numbers, give 
greater income to the cane farmers and increase demand for other export industries 
like garments, timber and mineral water. In the short term the devaluation will 
comparatively increase foreign reserves from F$440m to F$660m.328 The expected 
cost of the devaluation is for inflation to jump 10% in the next year.329 The interim 
regime wants economic development to be spread throughout Fiji and not focussed 
on particular areas of Viti Levu, which has generally happened in the past.330 
Bainimarama has pleaded with international investors not to flee the country after 
he took power. On the contrary, he claims he wants to ensure that Fiji is a more 
business friendly place and will “accelerate the pace of economic reforms and move 
rapidly to cut out the red tape.”331 One initiative of the Fiji government is to offer 
tax concessions of up to 150% for any private investors that help with building and 
maintaining infrastructure related to the tourism sector.332 Nevertheless, as of July 
2009, the economic outlook of Fiji looks increasingly bleak, with the prospect of 
the country failing entirely becoming increasingly likely.333 
The EU EPAs are controversial. There maybe a necessity for a new trade regime 
between the EU & Pacific ACPs because of WTO rulings. However, the potential 
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consequences of the EPA, like any agreement on trade liberalisation, is that it will 
expose Fiji to market forces when its economy prospects are at their most 
pessimistic.334 Fiji may be a larger state in the South Pacific but still has very few 
industries that can demonstrate competitive advantage that ensures its growth and 
sustainability. The EU insists that it is a positive, revolutionary trade agreement that 
may have shot term costs, but the projected longer term economic benefits for Fiji 
are substantial.  
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5 Fiji – Governance Sector 
Many forms of government have been tried, and will be tried in this 
world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-
wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of 
government except all those other forms that have been tried from time 
to time.335 
5.1 A Cycle of Coups 
5.1.1 Why a Cycle of Coups in Fiji 
 
Figure 12: Why is there a Cycle of Coups in Fiji? (Indicative Opinion) 
 
It is clear that there is a sequence of coups in Fiji, and that the threat of a new 
constitutional crisis and coup is ever present. Academics have called this a cycle of 
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coups, and it is a system that causes inherent instability and destroys any genuine 
attempts at development and cooperation in Fiji.336 The reasons for the cycle of 
coups is diverse, interviewees cited a lack of leadership, and increasing mistrust of 
politicians, resulting in a gap between their rhetoric and their actions.337 
Constitutional issues, ethnic Fijian nationalist sentiments, and discrimination have 
also been suggested. However, interview results clearly place the blame for the 
cycle of coups upon the military, for it has been the common dominator in all 
actions. The military is one of the few organisations in Fiji that has the physical 
power to organise a successful coup. The only coup not backed by the military was 
the 2000 coup led by George Speight, and that subsequently failed after a prolonged 
and tense hostage situation. 
 
Figure 13: How do you break the Cycle of Coups in Fiji? (Indicative Opinion) 
 
Bainimarama declared that his 2006 coup shall be ‘the coup to end all coups’ and so 
there is an appreciation even from the military to stop the coup culture. The Peoples 
Charter emphasises that there are no long term winners in a coup.338 Regardless of 
                                                
 
336 Fiji Teachers Association: Member, "Fiji Interview 12 - Education Sector Interview". 
337 Transparency International, "Fiji Interview 3 - Ngo Sector Interview", Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes. 
338 Government of Fiji, "Fiji: Draft Peoples Charter for Change, Peace, and Progress & the State of the Nation 
Economy Report," ed. National Council for Building a Better Fiji (Suva: Government of Fiji, 2008). 
FIJI – GOVERNANCE SECTOR 
 
82 
the political orientation of a Fijian, for this to happen requires a “profound agenda 
of social engineering” with participation from all parties.339 However, the present 
regime has disenfranchised, and discouraged half the population from participating 
in its far reaching critical constitutional issues. Therefore, there is a fear that 
Bainimarama’s efforts will not help solve the cycle of coups when he eventually 
relinquishes power either. This is because those who may be delegated with 
carrying the reforms forward in following decades may not agree with them, and 
therefore organise another coup to rapidly enact new reforms.340  
One suggestion to end the cycle of coups is to ensure that those who instigate such 
actions, regardless of their intentions or background, be brought to justice and 
punished severely by a robust independent judicial system.341 Only when the justice 
system operates properly and people see justice happening will they realise how 
wrong conducting a coup is, and make those who contemplate such recourse to 
action reconsider their position.342 Unfortunately, a judicial system is only powerful 
when the government adheres to the democratic principles of accountability. 
Otherwise, when unhappy with a judicial decision, a regime can ignore its rulings 
and dissolve the court, such as what happened in April 2009.343 Therefore, mass 
civic education about democratic ideals, responsibility, transparency, and 
accountability would be a way to break the cycle of coups. If enough people 
sincerely believe in these ideals, such education will encourage people to stop being 
apathetic towards politics, and through inaction be implicit supporters of 
dictatorship.344 Ultimately, a cycle of coups will not stop until there remains no one 
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in society with influence willing stage a coup.345 In this sense it is not a matter of 
creating a strategy to specifically stop the cycle of coups, rather to ensure that there 
are principled people in positions of power who consider coups abhorrent. If that 
occurs then the cycle will stop on its own accord.346 
5.1.2 Democratic Values in Fijian Society  
The concept of democracy being a ‘Foreign Flower’ in Fiji and the South Pacific is 
not a new one.347 However, the internal reaction against the 2006 coup above would 
argue against that. A more refined argument would be that certain types of 
democracy are ‘foreign flowers’ in Fiji. Indeed, one interviewee claimed that the 
military coups are a direct reaction to the Westminster democratic system with 
coups becoming the way the minority get their voices heard.348 He suggests that so 
long as a semblance of Westminster democracy exists in Fiji, so too will the cycle 
of coups continue. As such, the demand for the restoration of democracy by the EU 
and other international parties ignores the fact that democracy as is understood by 
Western countries, has never occurred successfully in Fiji.349 For example, it is 
claimed that the long period of ‘democracy’ after independence under the guidance 
of Ratu Kamisese Mara were really years of benevolent dictatorship with a façade 
of democracy operating underneath him.350 Such concepts are problematic for the 
EU spreading a distinctive conception of democracy through its normative 
values.351 However, the system worked and created stability for 17 years. This 
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suggests that dictatorship could be a better direction for Fiji, which still remains a 
very traditional and hierarchal society.352  
A benevolent dictatorship concept lacks the checks to power that democracy offers. 
There are no constitutional or legislative controls to prevent Bainimarama and Fiji 
following the path of Mugabe and Zimbabwe.353 Nor are there any checks to power 
to prevent another coup from occurring. The Westminster democratic system means 
that a party that forms the government could have won 50.1% of the vote and thus 
not be truly representative of the people. The search for a democratic system that is 
suitable to Fiji continues.354 Eventually this search should bear fruit because over 
80% of interviewees stipulated that they still have faith in the democracy, and in 
democratic principles. 
 
Figure 14: Do you still have trust in a Democratic system for Fiji? (Indicative Opinion) 
 
Many aspects of Fijian society are very democratic, and in the Fiji school system is 
democratic values are taught and well understood. Many indigenous Fijians stated 
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that the most recent coup has given them an real appreciation of democracy and at 
the grassroots level, created a far greater awareness of the democratic ideal because 
“indigenous Fijians are at the moment feeling disenfranchised.”355 Improvements 
to the economy and the various social sectors can only happen when there is a 
government that is accountable and transparent. It is conceded that under a coup 
regime Fiji will still progress. However the impact upon the Fiji citizen’s lifestyle, 
health, education will be enormous. Each sector of Fijian society will become 
relatively worse as the regime maintains its grip on power.356 
There are some innovative forms of democracy in the world that Fiji can look to as 
it attempts to establish a system that works well with its historical, cultural, and 
geographical context. “The nuances of democracy are boundless.”357 However, it is 
clear that a coup culture is not a form of democracy. A suggestion for Fiji is that the 
system must be a process that maximises discourse and ensures the quality, 
transparency, and accountability of that discourse whilst remaining as non 
adversarial as possible.358 The concept of cooperative politics rather than adversary 
fits better with the ‘pacific way’ and is essential. Democratic needs also change 
from the local level to the national, and a new system must reflect that. To establish 
a system that caters for the needs of all the voices in the community and at all levels 
is complex. Only through an organic process of trial and error will an effective 
system evolve. Certainly in its traditional form, a Westminster based system doesn’t 
offer that.359 The cycle of coups can be seen optimistically as part of this organic 
process helping Fijians discover a system that works best. 
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5.1.3 Tradition v Democracy? 
Many Indigenous Fijians claim that the traditional tribal system is a democratic 
system, and indeed more democratic than the Westminster government that Fiji has 
inherited from the British after independence.360 Each chief in the Fijian hierarchy 
has immediate responsibility of those underneath him and gets advised by them in 
turn. Therefore at each level of the hierarchy there is some form of direct 
democratic representation.361 Traditional values in Fiji are considered one of its 
strengths, because according to a few interviewees,362 the traditional community 
teaches respect and generosity. It should be possible to incorporate the best 
elements of the traditional system into the new governmental system, but be 
different from the Great Council of Chiefs that presently exists. The traditional 
system can become problematic when self-serving individuals manipulate the 
system for their own benefits, as shown by vanua and the earlier Fijian coups.363 
Lawson attacks traditionalism by claiming that most of the time the chiefs are 
hypocritical, advocating values that they themselves do not live by.364 Indeed she 
concludes that traditionalism is really a façade that ensures the elite retain power 
and privilege, while avoiding demands for accountability and participation, two 
fundamental aspects of democracy.365 
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5.2 Ethnicity Debate 
5.2.1 Arguments for Ethnic Tensions 
Some international scholars suggest that ethnicity and the tensions between the 
Indo-Fijians and Indigenous-Fijians are the chief cause of political instability in 
Fiji.366 This perception is encouraged by international media which claimed that 
racial extremism and discrimination like that of Nazi Europe could be happening in 
Fiji today.367 Davies makes a convincing argument for the causes of ethnic tensions 
on either side. From the Indian side he suggests that Indians view themselves as 
victims of history and circumstance, reinforced by the coups that forcibly removed 
democratically elected Indian political control.368 The Indians have been subjected 
to racist policies throughout Fijian history marking them as inferior citizens.369 
Fijian public servants, for example, have been accused of discriminating against the 
Indian population by misusing taxpayer’s money, and allotting money exclusively 
to the welfare of the indigenous Fijians. Indeed the EU FESP programme was 
construed as such.370 Such views are confirmed by the surge of nationalism that 
occurred within the ranks of indigenous Fijians since the 1987 coup and a 
significant increase in violence and human rights abuses.371  
Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase in 2000 stated that the government must ensure the 
“paramountcy” of the Fijian indigenous community to ensure equitable 
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participation in all aspects of life.372 The dichotomy is that the “paramountcy” of 
one ethnic group over another means that racial equity is impossible. As such there 
are objective truths to the Indian image of victimisation. However this perception 
has been exaggerated to suit certain political ambitions and project an image of 
being the rational, fair, and just group in the debate.373  
The Fijian argument centres on a lack of identity, having been crippled by 
colonialism and migration. Many urban Fijians grow up in a cultural vacuum, being 
neither Western nor Fijian, and are essentially a product of poverty and competition 
for limited resources.374 Without doubt, Fijian society and culture is small and lacks 
the mass media resources available to their Indian and Western counterparts.375 The 
greater concern is the perception that the Fijian traditional structures have eroded, 
and so too the determination to rectify this. Present democratic structures are often 
considered unsatisfactory to meet the developmental security needs of the 
population. Statistics support this, and over the last 20 years, quality of life for all 
Fijians has diminished greatly.376  
5.2.2 Arguments Against Ethnic Tensions 
The scholarly attention towards ethnic tensions is contrary to what can be observed 
in Fiji when travelling to local and rural communities. In most villages it is apparent 
that ethnic Fijians and Indo-Fijians are living in harmony. “If you go down the 
streets of any Fijian town, you’ll see Fijians and Indians walking together happily 
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talking to one another.”377 Furthermore, the success of the tourism industry is based 
upon Fijians being known as a friendly and welcoming people, with optimism and 
joie de vivre.378 Of note is the fact that there hasn’t been any major racial conflict 
causing loss of life in the history of Fiji since the importation of indentured Indian 
labourers at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries.379  
The interview results resoundingly confirm casual observation with 65% of 
respondents saying there are no ethnic tensions at the grassroots levels. Instead, 
ethnic tensions are caused by, and ratcheted up from politicians trying to secure 
more votes because of an ethnically based voting system.380 Self-serving politicians 
effectively manipulate the system to make sure they gain and retain power.381 
Unfortunately, the public is manipulated by propaganda and start following 
politicians that have more extremist views.382 As a result, the good relations 
between Fijians and Indians disappear very quickly when it comes near election 
time because of electoral tensions. It has been suggested that ethnic-Fijian 
nationalists wish to create fear and division to secure their traditionalist hold on 
power.383 The EU agrees, placing the blame for ethnic tensions solely on the 
nationalist indigenous Fijians, and calls upon them to become more appreciative of 
the values of freedom, dignity, individual human rights and pluralism.384 Some 
interviewees do believe that there are some latent issues between Fijians and Fiji-
                                                
 
377 Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption, "Fiji Interview 25 - Governance Sector Interview". 
378 Ibid. Air Pacific, "Fiji Interview 32 - Tourism Sector Interview" (Nadi, 3 July, 2008). 
379 Fiji Teachers Union, "Fiji Interview 28 - Education Sector Interview". 
380 Ibid, Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption, "Fiji Interview 25 - Governance Sector Interview". USP 
Governance School, "Fiji Interview 8 - Governance Sector Interview", Fiji Teachers Association: Official, "Fiji 
Interview 2 - Education Sector Interview". Delegation of the European Union for the Pacific, "Fiji Interview 17 - 
Governance Sector Interview". 
381 Fiji National Olympic Committee FASANOC, "Fiji Interview 21 - Ngo Sector Interview" (Suva, 26 June, 2008). 
382 Fiji Teachers Union, "Fiji Interview 28 - Education Sector Interview". 
383 Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption, "Fiji Interview 25 - Governance Sector Interview". 
384 European Commission, The European Union and the Pacific. 
FIJI – GOVERNANCE SECTOR 
 
90 
Indians, otherwise there would be nothing to exploit by politicians.385 
Consequently, ethnic tensions are “something that people can deal with themselves, 
if left to their own devices.” If people stop talking about ethnic tensions, then it is 
likely to disappear from public dialogue and debate. 
 
Figure 15: Are there ethnic tensions in Fiji? (Indicative Opinion) 
 
5.2.3 No Ethnic Tensions but Ethnic Segregation 
It is important to note that the communities live alongside each other in harmony 
but they rarely marry, so the two ethnicities remain very distinct.386 Inter-racial 
marriages between Indians and Fijians total only 1,344 recorded ceremonies out of 
95810 in the past 25 years. Greater cultural assimilation is being achieved through 
inter-racial marriages which rose slowly from an average of 0.97% in the mid 80’s 
to 1.77% for the most recent 5 year cycle.387 Nevertheless, at this rate of growth a 
unique Fijian culture that is neither Indian nor Fijian will take centuries to occur. 
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Race   1984‐1988  %  1989‐1993  %  1994‐1998  % 
Fijian ‐ Fijian  4446  42.53  4917  46.18  14500  69.27 
Fijian ‐ Fiji Indian  101  0.97  119  1.12  183  0.87 
Fiji Indian ‐ Fiji Indian  5211  49.85  4698  44.12  5226  24.96 
Fijian ‐ Other  563  5.39  659  6.19  794  3.79 
Fijian Indian ‐ Other  132  1.26  255  2.39  232  1.11 
TOTALS  10453  100  10648  100  20935  100 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Marriages in Fiji divided by ethnicity for the past 25 years.388 
 
 
The ethnic segregation can also be illustrated by a story one teacher told the author.  
In a mixed classroom at a Fijian school the teacher one day asked how 
many Fijians have Indo-Fijian friends and vice versa. Every child in the 
class put up their hands. However, when she ask the follow up question, 
how many have visited the houses of those friends, no one put up their 
hands.389  
This clearly illustrates that there is cooperation, professional understanding, respect 
and friendship between the two main races in Fiji. However, there is very little 
assimilation, integration, and true cultural understanding between the races. Until 
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Race   1999‐2003  %  2004‐2008  % 
Fijian ‐ Fijian  6542  42.85  16567  43.03 
Fijian ‐ Fiji Indian  260  1.67  681  1.77 
Fiji Indian ‐ Fiji Indian  7093  46.46  18163  47.17 
Fijian ‐ Other  983  6.44  2224  5.78 
Fijian Indian ‐ Other  393  2.58  868  2.25 
TOTALS  15271  100  38503  100 
 
Total Fijian‐Fiji Indian  
Marriages 1983‐2008  1344 
Grand Total 1984‐2008     95810 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this changes, there will always be opportunities for unscrupulous politicians and 
leaders to utilise race for their own desires. 
5.3 Influence of the Fiji Military 
It has been suggested by some Fijian NGOs that the input and actions of the Fijian 
Military is the one constant to all the political crises of the past 25 years.390 Such a 
fact is indeed undeniable. However, consideration must be given to whether the 
military is working as an independent political actor or being used as a weapon by 
other influential parties. In 1987 and 2000 it appeared that the military was being 
influenced by ethnic Fijian nationalist. However, in 2006 Bainimarama announced 
his intention to set up a new political order in Fiji illustrating that the military is 
working independently today as a political group in its own right.391  
The military claim that the officer ranks are a group of people that are more open to 
new concepts and ideas because of their experiences on postings overseas. They 
have seen both the best and the worst the world can offer and arrive home with a 
different perception and mentality as to how things can be improved locally, which 
encourages them to enter the political fray.392 The Fijian military hierarchy also 
claims that it sincerely believes in social and ethnic equality. This is because they 
have seen first hand the significant problems that can arise when there is 
inequality.393 It must be noted that is only the field officers that make the decisions 
to involve themselves in political affairs, and not the common soldier.394 
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It seems the political landscape of Fiji will now always include the military as some 
level. The goal for the military is to be the guardian of Fiji, help with its political 
evolution, and yet remain totally independent. Such goals are contradictory.395 
Bainimarama and the military see reforming the country as a mission. Anybody that 
hinders their vision is a person that needs to be suppressed. Such a black and white 
attitude to politics, alienates, many of Fiji’s citizens and makes coercion of the 
population standard practice. Of course this only exacerbates the inequalities they 
are professing to eliminate and creates potential for more conflict.396  
One of the military regimes more debatable moves, is its desire to create ownership, 
nationalist sentiment, and patriotism for being Fijian in all races that live in Fiji. To 
do this they have instigated compulsory singing of the national anthem at 
schools.397 The Fiji military is also 98% ethnic Fijian which could cause tension and 
conflict because one ethnicity is armed against another, without any political 
controls.398 Indians have no desire to join the military but some are very aware of its 
threat.399If Fiji is to have a genuine democracy, the power of the military and its 
ability to intervene into national politics must be mitigated. 400 
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5.3.1 Use as UN Peacekeepers 
 
Figure 17: Do you see a conflict of interest when the regarding the UN using the Fijian military as 
peacekeepers? (Indicative Opinion) 
 
The Fijian military has established an international reputation for UN peacekeeping. 
This shows how the military can be used for both positive and negative affairs with 
their actions at home being of considerable concern to many Fijian citizens.401 The 
United Nations continues to use and supply the Fijian military because very few 
nations with credible disciplined forces are viewed as unbiased and prepared to help 
the UN with certain peacekeeping missions. There are also concerns about how to 
replace those Fijian soldiers if they were removed from active duty.402 In a 
compromise agreement in 2008 the UN decided not to deploy Fijian peacekeepers 
on any new missions but would continue to deploy those already engaged.403 
The UN has a dilemma that if it sends Fijian troops home, it is possible that newly 
repatriated soldiers will allow the army to exert more influence, and cause more 
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issues locally.404 The situation has divided the international community,405 and 
interviewees agree that the situation is quite hypocritical. However, opinion is split 
as to whether the Fijian military is to blame or the UN. This is because the good 
reputation earned by Fiji overseas comes from the soldiers on the ground, and not 
from the officers that make the decisions and conduct coups. The rest of the army 
are just following the orders of their superiors like any other army.406 Nevertheless, 
it is hoped that the UN will somehow use its influence with the peacekeepers to 
exact long lasting positive change in Fiji.407  
5.4 Constitutional Crisis? (Cause of Coups) 
One of the chief justifications by the Bainimarama regime to seize power is because 
of a constitutional crisis that enshrines an ethnically based segregated voting system 
in Fiji. This system is claimed to cause division and conflict, and thus stagnation of 
the economy and instability. Certainly, the people have not yet found a 
constitutional solution that responds adequately to Fiji’s historic circumstances.408  
Fiji has had three different constitutions since independence and with the abrogation 
of the 1997 constitution in April 2009. A fourth based upon the Peoples Charter is 
likely to be implemented by 2012. These significant moves show an inability to find 
a formula for the state that all citizens are happy with, and takes Fiji forward into 
the future. Until that formula is reached, instability and constrains upon the growth 
and development of Fiji will continue.409 Additionally, it is claimed by one 
interviewee that 90% of Fijians have never read the old constitution and thus do not 
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really know what rights and obligations they have. Without public knowledge or 
understanding of a constitution, there is no democratic voice of the people.410 
5.4.1 “Peoples Charter” 
In early 2007 the Bainimarama regime launched the ‘Peoples Charter for Progress 
Towards a Better Fiji’. The Peoples Charter is a strategy paper designed to create 
debate, dialogue, and presents an opportunity to Fijians to examine a whole variety 
of constitutional issues and the overall direction Fiji should endeavour to pursue 
into the future.411  
There are 11 key pillars established in the Peoples Charter: 
1. Ensuring  Sustainable  Democracy  and  Good  and  Just  Governance   
2. Developing a Common National Identity and Building  Social Cohesion  
3.  Ensuring Effective, Enlightened and Accountable Leadership   
4. Enhancing Public Sector Efficiency, Performance Effectiveness and Service 
Delivery  
5.  Achieving Higher Economic Growth While Ensuring Sustainability   
6.  Making More Land Available for Productive and Social Purposes   
7. Developing an Integrated Development Structure at the Provincial Level 
8. Reducing Poverty to a Negligible Level by 2015   
9. Making Fiji a Knowledge based Society 
10. Improving Health Service Delivery   
11. Enhancing Global Integration and International Relations.412 
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A crucial aspect of the Charter is the discussion of a new electoral system in Fiji, 
which eliminates the present racially based voting systems, as a way to achieve 
sustainable democracy and good governance.413 It also places a large focus on 
eliminating the cycle of coups and through removing the social and economic 
circumstance that cause coups and to redefine the role of the military brining it 
closer to the people. Most interviewees agree with the government’s assertion that it 
is imperative to get rid of the old electoral system as it was a catalyst for racial 
division in Fiji.414  
Two other important discussion points in the Charter are better care and provisions 
for the poor, and Land reforms.415 It is considered by some academics that any 
dialogue and discussion on such issues in Fiji can only be productive. Many of the 
questions raised by the Charter have not been discussed before as they were 
considered too sensitive.416 With so many pertinent issues raised in the Charter, it is 
clear that the constitution needs total revision.417 An interviewee from the electoral 
commission has found the Charter process and meetings very good and has 
admiration for the facilitators. He feels the process was very energetic and 
productive. Additionally, consultations done with the public regarding the electoral 
system provide excellent data for what people want.418 It is hoped that the charter 
becomes the start of a longer process that will break the cycle of coups, and firmly 
place Fiji on a stable political path.419 
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Unfortunately, the People’s Charter has a lot of procedural flaws. In particular, not 
all political actors are taking part in open dialogue and debate with all concerned 
parties is not occurring. If this doesn’t change, then there is very little chance that 
the Charter, or the constitution that maybe derived from it, will have a significant 
long term impact, and may indeed encourage the cycle of coups to continue.420 The 
need for a People’s Charter and constitutional reform must be decided by the 
majority of the public and not just the military.421 All political parties were invited 
to help with the consultations but many refused in protest that anything introduced 
by the military regime is fundamentally bad, and illegal under law.422  
Another concern was how the Charter was rapidly created and presented to the 
public, leaving little opportunity for public analysis and discussion.423 The 
objections to the Charter are not based upon its content and proposals, but to the 
process of how it is presented to the public. The larger argument is how it will be 
successfully placed into law with no democratically elected government.424  
International and internal opposition towards the Charter appears justified, because 
it seems the Fijian people are being forced to accept something unfamiliar without 
true consultation and consideration. The irony is that any hindrance to the process 
causes delay to a restoration of democracy and if embraced could be the ideal way 
to break the cycle of coups, and unite Fiji.425  
Overall, the content of the Charter is considered very good by some people, and 
there is a hope that if opposition parties actually read it, they may feel a greater 
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willingness to engage and support its efforts.426 The People’s Charter needs to be 
explained more clearly and its intent known to greater numbers of the Fijian public, 
It is an ambitious project, and if implemented could achieve the challenging goal of 
ethnic harmony in top level government, and a vision for a stable future not mired 
by coups. 427 
5.4.2 A New Constitution? Abrogation of the Old: April 2009 
In July 2009, Bainimarama announced his desire to implement a new Constitution 
on the basis of the People’s Charter. At the Constitution’s core will be the 
abolishment of the racially based electoral system and replace it with a 1 person 1 
vote proportional system. Bainimarama is also interested in reducing the voting age 
from 21 to 18, reviewing the number of MPs and the need for a senate or upper 
house.428 Accordingly the concerns and debates about public involvement with the 
Charter become more critical. If the proposed constitution doesn’t gain the 
involvement of a majority of the population, then it will not evolve organically and 
result in a document as flawed as its predecessor. This will only encourage counter-
coups to force additional reform and change.429 However, with elections now 
delayed until 2014, there is more time to have consultations, debate, compromise, 
and include opinions of diverse groups that will lead to a  valuable and integrated 
constitution that caters to the widest demographic possible. Ideally, this long period 
of discussion, public and civic education, must not linked to the aims of the 
Bainimarama regime or any other lobby group.  
This unfortunately is an unlikely scenario given the current political climate, and 
extreme media censorship that has been imposed throughout 2009.430 The 
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international response also hinders the opportunity for the Bainimarama regime to 
receive sound advice.431 If international parties swamped the regime with offers of 
assistance from constitutional experts, then the speed in which the constitution is 
implemented and the overall quality of the final product would be considerably 
enhanced. Consequently, the prime reason for delaying elections until 2014 would 
be negated, and earlier elections that fulfil all the regimes desires would be 
possible.432 If these things do not happen, then the constitution has the potential to 
have the same fundamental flaw that exists in the People’s Charter. 
5.4.3 Electoral System Debate 
The desire and debate to change the electoral system in Fiji has been ongoing for a 
number of years. In 1995 the government debated many options without finding a 
satisfactory solution. In 1997 the new Fijian constitution implemented a complex 
proportional electoral system which was a result of much compromise, leaving no 
lobby group satisfied. The electoral system was designed to primarily defuse the 
ethnicity concerns of the previous system. It had the opposite effect with race 
politics proving to be immensely useful when it came to securing seats in 
parliament.433  
This ethnic division and racial tensions caused by the electoral system is a 
significant reason for change. However, the electoral commission illustrates other  
significant issues. The electoral system was a preferential ranked transferable vote 
system that considerably distorted raw election results. In 1999 the FLP party 
gained a third of number one preference votes and ultimately ended up with an 
absolute majority and power. Meanwhile another party who also gained a  1/3 of 
number 1 votes a ended up with 5.2 times less seats than the ruling FLP. A third 
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party got almost a 1/7 of the electoral vote and failed to gain a single seat in 
parliament.434 Therefore the system was not providing the proportional 
representation the people voted for.435 The 2001 election results were also 
unrepresentative if examining the raw results. It is clear that it was only by virtue of 
manipulation of the transference system that Laisena Qarase gained power. Fiji was 
therefore stuck with an electoral system that was unpopular conceptually and 
malfunctioning in real world trials.436 In essence, “equality was not being allowed 
to reign.”437 The democratic systems in place from the 1997 constitution were the 
very systems that were causing Fiji’s greatest difficulties.  
Spoiled ballot inadmissibility rates were also quite unacceptable to the electoral 
commission surpassing 9% at the last election, and is resolved not to run another 
election based on that system as codified by the 1997 constitution.438 A voting 
system that is simple for the Fijian public to understand is paramount.439 The 
proposed system is a one-person one-vote proportional candidate system. The 
proposed ballot paper will have a list of candidates with tick boxes beside the names 
and electors must select and tick one. The previous paper had two sections in which 
the voter was asked to vote for a party, and thus agree with that party’s candidate, 
and transference system if their candidate is unsuccessful, or rank all the candidates 
independently, even if the elector has never heard of the candidate or the party they 
represent.  
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Figure 18: Actual Speciman Paper From the 2006 General Elections 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Based upon information collected, authors rendition of the proposed ballot paper for 
the 2014 elections. 
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It was clear to the electoral commission when interviewed in June 2008 that it 
would be impossible to hold elections in 2009 as promised to the EU and the PIF. 
The only way that could occur was under the old electoral system, which was a 
situation unacceptable to both the military regime and the commission.440 The need 
for electoral reform is supported by the EU.441 However the EU qualifies its support 
stating that it is unfortunate that such a reform process is being advanced by the 
military who has never attempted to integrate all ideas of society.442  
The necessity to change the electoral system is a view held almost universally 
regardless of whether a person supports  or opposes the present regime.443 The 
electoral commission is confident that if a referendum was held in Fiji about the 
electoral system, an overwhelming majority would vote for total revision. Fijians, 
don’t want to be segregated into Indian and ethnic Fijian at the political level. 
Equality is desirous at all levels.444 The debate continues however, when examining 
if the proposed system would be a suitable replacement.  
5.4.4 Leadership and Capabilities Gap 
Many interviewees suggested that a lack of leadership direction is the most critical 
thing that needs to be solved in Fiji today.445 This is not necessarily a direct 
criticism of the present regime, but a concern that is more endemic and long lasting.  
The direction of a country needs to come from political leadership that has a 
realistic and consistent vision and provides for the immediate needs of the people. 
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This will create stability to implement long term strategic and developmental plans. 
Fiji has had numerous constitutional crises since 1987 illustrating that the political 
leadership is not providing for all the citizens of Fiji. Many are disenchanted and 
disenfranchised from government policies. Coup regimes unfortunately, only 
deepen the political vacuum, and cause greater instability both domestically and for 
the region. The blame game remains vicious and no politician wants to take 
ownership for the past failures.446 One of the greater assets Fiji has in times of 
instability is a robust civil service that continues to function regardless of personal 
and regime changes in government. However, without the government functioning 
properly there is a fundamental gap in leadership and continuity.447 
One of the potential reasons for the vacuum of quality leadership in Fiji is that those 
who are most respected and qualified to take leadership positions are not prepared 
to volunteer themselves because of the constant flux of the political system.448 
Negative public exposure associated with political office also discourages many. 
For example, one commentator declares politicians are not doing their jobs and are 
instead “prancing about like peacocks,”449 talking and postulating but doing little 
that is practical. Fiji’s civil society appears to be full of educated and selfless 
people. It is crucial that Fiji encourages educated people with integrity and vision in 
leadership positions, to restore respect to the political sphere.450 
Bainimarama conducted his 2006 coup because he felt that many ideals were not 
occurring in Fiji. His subsequent conduct shows that his vision remains unchanged. 
But after 2 years in power he has yet to accomplish many goals. Consequently, 
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Bainimarama has become the person he initially condemned.451 Bainimarama has 
proven very poor at cultivating allies, gathering support, and more profoundly 
managing the economy.452 He is determined to accomplish his mission of reforming 
the Fiji constitution, but his single minded determination is leading Fiji into further 
economic trouble and international isolation.453 As opposition grows 
Bainimarama’s need to rule by force increases. This causes greater malcontent as 
well as regime weakness.454 Fiji’s first priority must be to have a stable government 
that has the confidence of the people and the capacity to make long term strategic 
decisions on the direction of Fiji. Simply, this cannot happen with an interim 
regime, no matter how idealistic and virtuous its goals.455 
5.4.5 Allegations of corruption - ethnocentricities of the SDL Party 
The SDL party under the leadership of Laisenia Qarase has held power in Fiji since 
2000. It is a proudly indigenous Fijian party which the military claimed had ethno-
nationalist tendencies, and thus caused dissent, unequal development, and unequal 
opportunities in Fiji. Although democratically elected, the party did not adhere to 
democratic principles. One sign of corruption was the political pandering of the 
Qarase government to the Great Council of Chiefs, building a F$30m new 
headquarters for them in thanks for their tacit support of the SDL party.456 The GCC 
were “cheerleaders and fervent supporters”457 of Qarase. The Qarase elected 
government wanted to seize coastal waters and foreshore for ethnic Fijians. This 
showed nationalist traits, and a lack of concern for the impact this could have had 
upon the economy, in particular the fisheries and tourism sectors. 
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The Qarase government was also quick to accede to a GCC request to transfer all 
lands owned by the crown to the NLTB for exclusive ownership by indigenous 
Fijians. Indigenous Fijians already had inalienable rights to 82.5% of Fijian land. 
With the transfer of crown lands, this would increase to 92%.458 This proposal was 
very controversial and against the conclusions of a commission of enquiry.459  
Nevertheless, the bill was rushed through parliament, allowing for only 4 days of 
public submissions. The rationale for the government actions was that a large 
number of indigenous Fijians remained landless and these actions would help revive 
the economy. However, the actions meant that the government ignored the plight of 
all other communities in Fiji who comprise 53% of the total population, especially 
the indo-Fijian sugarcane farmers, already concerned about the expiry of ALTA 
leases, and it sends the wrong message to foreign investors, making the economic 
argument suspect.460 At the very least, it questions SDLs commitment to uplifting 
the quality of life for all Fijians.461  
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5.4.6 Support for present regime – coup rationale 
 
Figure 20: Why did the 2006 coup occur in Fiji? (Indicative Opinion) 
 
Since independence, Fijian nationalists have manipulated the concept of vanua, and 
let it infiltrate politics and some members of the military. Vanua, literally means 
land in English but is a holistic concept referring to the Fijian people, their 
traditions, customs, beliefs and values. It covers any person or institution that helps 
achieve harmony, solidarity, prosperity and provides a sense of identity and 
belonging.462 Vanua “is an extension of the concept of the self.”463 The nationalist 
SDL party is considered part of the vanua, and even has the word in its party name.  
The left leaning Indian dominated FLP was thought to be in conflict with vanua, 
and so when it won the elections of 1987 & 1999 helped cause the coups of 1987 & 
2000. When nationalist power was not retained by the ballot box other actions 
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became necessary. A military supporter suggests the coup of 2006 was reformist 
aimed at restoring balance, “sanity and normality to politics”.464 As such the 2006 
coup in Fiji is different, a reversal of the previous coups to a more Indian controlled 
and supported coup. An Indian columnist in New Zealand wrote “Mr 
Bainimarama’s bold stand is worthy of support because he wants to impact 
positively on the lives of ordinary Fijians and Indo-Fijians who have needlessly 
suffered too much for too long.”465  
Although there appears to be more support from the Indian population in Fiji, there 
are many Indians opposed to the regime, likewise there are ethnic Fijians supportive 
of the coup.466 Indeed, results of who supports or opposes the present regime show 
that this coup is not a racial struggle at all. This coup is more about morality, 
constitutional concerns, corruption, electoral reforms and democratic ideals.467 
Therefore, the issues of the 2006 coup are more complex than previous coups.468 
Other Fijians protest. “A coup is always a coup regardless of what the intentions 
are,”469 a coup harms the moral fabric of society. It is always against democratic 
principles and thus illegal and wrong. Stipulating that one coup is different to 
another, is simply a way of justifying illegal activities.470 
 
                                                
 
464 Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption, "Fiji Interview 25 - Governance Sector Interview". 
465 Prasad, "Darkness Surrounds New Path in Fiji." 
466 Fiji Electoral Commission, "Fiji Interview 20 - Governance Sector Interview". 
467 Ibid. 
468 Ibid. 
469 National Council for Women in Fiji, "Fiji Interview 5 - Ngo Sector Interview". 
470 Ibid. 
FIJI – GOVERNANCE SECTOR 
 
109 
 
Figure 21: Do you support the Interim Regime? [Implicit] (Indicative Opinion) 
 
When interviewing subjects in Fiji the indicative results were profound with 63% of 
respondents against the regime and only 25% in favour. Ethnic Fijians were 
overwhelmingly against the regime. Opinion from other ethnicities was divided. 
Overall, it appears that support for the interim regime is decreasing as time 
progresses. With the 2009 Easter abrogation of the constitution, Mahendra 
Chaudhry leader of the FLP denounced the regime. This is a significant move, 
considering he was once a member of the member of the interim regime in 2007. It 
reflects a general change in thinking by the Indian community, from being in favour 
to opposed.471  
Crosbie Walsh an academic at the University of the South Pacific summed it up 
quite succinctly, stating that what Bainimarama is trying to do is good. The problem 
lies in how he is trying to enact change.472 Bainimarama’s actions show that his 
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resolve to accomplish his mission has not dissipated despite setbacks. If anything he 
has become more resolute.473  
The regime needs an exit strategy, a centrepiece legislation that allows them to 
show to the Fijian people that they have achieved their intentions, and left Fiji better 
prepared for the future. The People’s Charter is clearly Bainimarama’s exit strategy. 
Therefore, if international agencies want a quicker restoration of democratic 
governance, and a way to prove how genuine Bainimarama is, then most prudent 
approach would be to assist the regime with expertise, advice, and ways of 
implementing the Peoples Charter.474 The problem with the present regime is that 
there is no guarantee of consistency in executive decisions, nor any checks on his 
power to ensure that moneys are allocated properly. It is possible for him to decide 
a direction one day and reverse it the next.475 This causes a loss in investor 
confidence and donor agencies are right to be cautious to allocate any funds to the 
regime without knowing where those funds may go.476  
The reactionary and blunt personality of Bainimarama means that he does not have 
strong diplomatic skills. He attacks when threatened and makes it easy for observers 
to demonise him.477 “His manner is atrocious and he’s very clumsy in the way he 
goes about things.”478 It is claimed that Bainimarama doesn’t want to be in power at 
all, but feels it is his duty to create reform before returning power to the people.479 
The ideas, and much of the legislation proffered by the interim regime is quite 
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revolutionary, and seems to be aimed at creating true ethnic harmony and political 
power sharing.480 One NGO interprets the coup as fulfilment of Fiji’s desire to 
stand on it’s own two feet and to put in processes to make it a mature democracy. 
This would be both a strength and a good thing ultimately for the country.481 
However, another claims that Bainimarama is delusional,482 and a few stated their 
concern that he could easily become a Pacific version of Robert Mugabe in 
Zimbabwe.483  
5.4.7 Suppression of Opposition Opinions 
In March 2009 it was reported that politically motivated attacks were on the rise in 
Fiji, with several individuals being subjected to intimidation and vandalism.484 
According to Graham Leung, it was obvious that these acts were being perpetrated 
by those acting on behalf of the interim government, and that the ones being singled 
out are those who are standing up and speaking for democracy.485 Leung was 
reported to say that “This is the regime’s way of shutting down dissent and blanking 
out any alternative view that is not the governments own.” 486 
In April 2009, with the abrogation of the 1997 constitution, martial law was 
imposed a drastic and temporary measure that bans all public meetings and imposes 
strict media censorship. The wide ranging and arbitrary powers of the military to 
decide what the Fijian people should be told, is a direct violation of the very 
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democratic rights the military claims it wishes to restore.487 A military spokesman 
declared that the censorship was designed to change the “highly negative and 
sensationalised news” of the past.488 The suppression of the media is having a 
drastic effect upon its abilities to produce fair impartial critiques of present political 
issues.  
It is quite noticeable in the Fiji Times that most of the news articles now printed are 
bland feature articles that have little real human interest or journalistic depth. The 
Fiji times refuses to print anything that directly supports the regime nor is it allowed 
to print anything that will show the regime in a bad light, meaning that healthy 
political dialogue is non-existent. Some articles have an obvious propaganda slant 
with the Fiji Times publishing a string of articles promoting the virtues of rural 
education to encourage more teachers into rural areas.489 A significant concern 
resulting from the media suppression and increasing isolation of the regime is that 
there are less people able to give constructive advice to the present regime. The 
regime spreads positive rhetoric while being unable to satisfactorily address the dire 
economic and social situations found in Fiji.490  
On July 1st 2009, it was announced that the ‘Public Emergency Regulations’ that 
have suppressed media freedoms will stay in place for a further 6 months. Such a 
long extension is claimed by the Pacific Freedom Forum (PFF) as a sham, and 
confirms that the restrictions have nothing to do with a national emergency, and all 
to do with retaining power and suppressing resistance.491 The PFF predicts that this 
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will not be the last extension, and holds fears for the future. Without freedom of the 
press there can be no genuine dialogue, debate and criticism about the way to build 
a better Fiji.492 A military spokesman countered by hailing the success of censorship 
commenting that “The absence of politics from the national agenda, is contributing 
positively to the peace and stability of the nation.”493 Certainly the media sanctions 
are a success in Fiji, and to gather news about what is occurring politically, can only 
be sourced from personal blogs and sites like twitter. The success can also be 
attributed to the physiological concerns of many citizens more worried about their 
next meal and finding shelter rather than democratic freedoms.494  
5.5 International Response towards Interim Regime: Tie between 
Aid and Democracy 
5.5.1 International Reaction: Sanctions upon Fiji 
 
Figure 22: Are International Sanctions Good or Bad for Fiji? (Indicative Opinion) 
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With every coup and political crisis in Fiji, the standard international response is to 
impose economic and political sanctions. This allows these governments to claim 
they are taking hard and decisive action against the perpetrators of the crisis. Most 
Fijians acknowledge that the present political situation is of significant concern. 
However, only some welcome the use of sanctions and other forms of international 
pressure to help promote dialogue and a restoration towards an inclusive, open, and 
transparent government.495 Sanctions are proven only to be successful in less than a 
third of cases,496 and they do little to help Fiji address the root causes of the 
problem and come closer to a viable long-term solution.497 On the contrary, it 
increases the economic hardship upon poor Fijians, and has the potential to rapidly 
hamper Fiji’s economy to an extent that it may not be able to recover. Australian 
Foreign Minister Stephen Smith agrees that the Fijian economy is in danger of 
‘falling over’, yet defends the actions by Australia and NZ saying that Fiji “should 
be treated like pariahs.”498 He further defends the sanctions saying that don’t 
directly target any economic activity.  
Sanctions, no matter how ‘smart’ are punitive and can be labelled ‘megaphone 
diplomacy.’ Mike Moore, former NZ Primer Minister & WTO Head believes that 
the present crisis in Fiji is simply a culmination of many diplomatic failures over 
several decades.499 To many Fijians, the sovereignty and integrity of Fiji is very 
important, and they would like to handle their own affairs instead of being forced to 
make decisions because of direct foreign influence.500 A cooperative and 
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informative stance by international agencies would probably be more successful in 
Fiji’s case. Some Fijians find the aid donors insistence on democratic values above 
everything else, including economic reform, difficult to understand.501 The 
interview results are clear, although different reasons are given, two thirds of 
interviewees felt that sanctions were doing more harm than good in Fiji.  
5.6 EU Influence / Actions towards Fiji’s Governance 
In relation to the governance and democracy of Fiji, the EU is bound by the 
Cotonou Agreement and must act in accordance specifically with Articles 8, 11, and 
96. Article 11 stipulates that both parties need to “pursue an active, comprehensive 
and integrated policy of peace-building and conflict prevention and resolution” and 
prevent conflicts at an early stage by “Addressing their root causes in a targeted 
manner.”502 Article 8 states,  
The Parties shall regularly engage in a comprehensive, balanced and 
deep political dialogue leading to commitments on both sides….The 
dialogue shall also encompass a regular assessment of the developments 
concerning the respect for human rights, democratic principles, the rule 
of law and good governance.503  
Chapter 7 of the Cotonou agreement went to lengths to define good governance 
legally, encompassing every aspect of the states dealings with civil society. 
Included in its definitions, were the normative principles of respect for law and the 
independence of the judicial system. and upholding human rights principles 
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according to the UN universal declaration of Human Rights in 1948.504 It also calls 
for the state to be transparent, accountable, participatory, and equitable.  
The EU has been outspoken against the present situation in Fiji responding to its 
philosophies and procedural breaches of international law.505 The military takeover 
in Fiji of 5th December 2006 constituted, in the EU's view, a breach of all three 
fundamental principles of the Cotonou agreement,506 and also its beliefs as defined 
by normative actor theory. 
5.6.1 Article 96: Negotiations 
Article 96 specifically sets out a process to follow when a party fails in its 
obligations.507 Article 96 negotiations were enacted by the EU after the coup of 
December 2006 and started in February 2007. These negotiations were the EU 
orientated way of trying to resolve the political situation and encourage a restoration 
towards a democratically elected government. Although the EU – Fiji partnership is 
largely apolitical, the need to engage in political work at the delegation almost 
quadrupled after the 2006 coup with its necessity to continually monitor Article 96 
commitments.508 Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement stipulates: 
2a) If a Party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfill an 
obligation stemming from respect for human rights, democratic 
principles … it shall invite the other Party to hold consultations that 
focus on the measures taken or to be taken by the party concerned to 
remedy the situation.509 
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The procedure draws criticism from some circles, suggesting that the EU takes an 
approach that is too soft and takes too long before reasonable action occurs. The EU 
maintains that it is more beneficial to stay engaged with a country rather than isolate 
the regime.510 Through the Article 96 negotiations, the EU made a genuine attempt 
at creating a realistic roadmap towards the restoration of democracy, creating a 
timeline so that elections would be held not later than March 2009.511 At  
consultations in Brussels on 18 April 2007, Fiji agreed to the March election date 
thereby committing to hold free and fair parliamentary elections within 24 months. 
The EU warned that the importance of and the implementation of this commitment 
by Fiji will influence the nature and scope of whatever EU measures are taken 
regarding its developmental assistance programme. If progress was not made, it was 
decided that the EU Sugar Adaptation Strategy funding would be stalled. 
Consultations continued until October 2007, and the European Commissioner for 
development and cooperation Louis Michel expressed satisfaction at the process, 
stating it there was constructive dialogue with the interim regime.512  The European 
Union offered to provide technical assistance for Fiji’s roadmap towards democracy 
utilising its experience as electoral consultants on technical matters from the 
previous two elections in Fiji. With this experience the EU has an appreciation for 
the need of electoral reforms. However, the EU felt that creating electoral reforms 
before installing a new democratic government was constitutionally impossible.513 
Consequently, the timeline made no allowance for the People’s Charter or assisting 
with electoral reforms even though these moves were viewed as by Michel as “a 
positive development which offers the opportunity of finding a sustainable solution 
to Fiji's problems.”514 The EU advice on the electoral reforms was welcomed by the 
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Fiji Electoral Commission, but also was considered unrealistic given the interim 
regime’s determination to enact change.515 Bainimarama was equally unrealistic 
promising that elections could take place by March 2009. He had a belief that 24 
months was enough time to introduce the People’s Charter, make allowances for 
public consultations, enact the needed changes to the Constitution, provide civic 
education on reforms, and establish fair electoral campaign beginning no later than 
the end of January. Nevertheless, the interim regime made sporadic progress 
towards this election goal. Intermittently EUSAS funding was released when signs 
of progress occurred, and halted when there was none.516 
In November 2008 a high powered delegation of EU parliamentarians came to visit 
Fiji and report on progress for democratic elections.517 It found no ongoing 
preparations. It concluded that it was unlikely that elections would happen, as 
agreed with the EU, by March 2009. It suspected that if election preparations 
commenced immediately, it may be possible for elections to happen by the end of 
2009 and released a statement urging Fiji to that effect.518 The EU delegation for the 
Pacific was instructed to cancel all funding for the Sugar Adaptation Strategy for 
the 2009 year. This cancellation has created some critical issues and severe choices 
for the sugar industry.519 The ability for the EU to remain engaged in Fiji has also 
been questioned by some European diplomats and further punitive measures may be 
considered.520  
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Although the Article 96 negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful, they were 
welcomed by many Fijians.521 This is because the EU took an engaging cooperative 
approach, based upon its humanitarian and legal obligations. The threat of punitive 
action was given only as a consequence if Fiji failed to abide by the agreed roadmap 
towards democracy. Additionally, if the EU failed to act, its integrity could be 
questioned by the international community. The cooperative approach, and search 
for mutual understanding by the EU, illustrates a significantly different approach to 
the rhetoric and immediate imposition of smart sanctions by Australia and New 
Zealand. After the abrogation of the Constitution by Bainimarama, in April 2009, 
the EU became increasingly concerned about the wellbeing of ordinary citizens in 
the Fijian villages.522 This time EU action to cancel EUSAS funding for an 
additional year was swift coming only days after the abrogation. The EU presidency 
reiterates both its desire for Fiji to respect democratic principles, including freedom 
of the media, and its desire for elections to be held as soon as possible.523  Louis 
Michel, the European Commissioner for Development and Cooperation echoed this 
sentiment stating a “deep regret and disappointment regarding recent regressive 
developments in Fiji.”524 The abrogation of the Constitution illustrates to the EU a 
systematic destruction of its normative principles. Liberty, democracy, rule of law, 
and human rights are all jeopardised by the present regime, creating a situation 
totally unacceptable to the EU.525 Developmental assistance is still flowing but now 
being actively reconsidered by the EU, and if halted could cause a critical problem, 
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in other Fijian sectors at a time when “global economic prospects are becoming 
increasingly difficult.”526 
The Fijian Government insists that is it still willing to engage with the European 
Union under Article 96 mechanisms of the Cotonou Agreement.527 In May 2009, 
Frank Bainimarama, claimed that the government has now put in place a realistic 
political process that has the “objective of achieving sustained parliamentary 
democracy, true democratic accountability, and an electoral system based on 
universally accepted principles of equal suffrage.”528 The regime is concerned about 
its increasing isolation, which will jeopardise most efforts by the GoF to stimulate 
an economic recovery. The EU responds that the value of Bainimarama assurances  
now have little value, considering a string of broken promises since December 
2006, and is concerned that the situation is volatile and that the GoF has little 
consistency and continuity.529 
5.7 Conclusion  
5.7.1 Fiji: A Democratic Future? 
I still have faith in democracy. It has been proved in many countries of 
the world that democracy can work and in many different forms, so why 
can’t it work in Fiji? No, it can work!530 
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Figure 23: Belief in a Democratic Future in Fiji (Indicative Opinion) 
 
There remains in Fiji a very positive outlook with regards to a democratic future in 
Fiji.531 Most Fijian commentators agree, regardless of whether they support the 
regime or not that a democratically elected government is desirous and likely.532  
Fiji needs a strong democratic foundation and those who try to establish that should 
be encouraged, supported and guided.533 Fiji is looking towards restoration of 
democratic governance, just not at a pace favourable to opposition parties and 
international aid partners. Both of these parties in turn create obstacles for the GoF, 
which ironically makes progress towards democratic elections even slower.534 
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Nevertheless, there is a resolute acceptance that Fiji has no option other than to keep 
trying until it comes up with a democratic formula that is suitable.535 It is a matter 
of the people standing up to the principles that they feel are right.536  
The democratic parliamentary model in Fiji has worked on inclusiveness, 
transparency, and accountability from election to election and was making good 
progress. All parliament sessions were broadcast on television, public submissions, 
public seating, and committees were all very active. The attempts to normalize 
democracy in a Western sense were active and effective.537 This movement 
however was temporarily halted by the 2006 coup. Bainimarama’s determination to 
reform the system and restore a better democracy through force of arms can be 
considered both ironic and flawed.  
The central lesson that the Bainimarama regime teaches is that if one desires drastic 
reform and change, then the central thing to aspire to is force of arms and then seize 
power.538 However, when talking about viability of democracy in Fiji, it needs to be 
noted that it took centuries for Europe to change and evolve into the democratic 
societies they are today.539 The concern is that the longer the delay in a restoration 
of governance, the greater the potential of an economic meltdown and increased 
instability.540 
The continued need for media suppression shows peoples desires to protest the 
regime. This wholehearted rejection is not necessarily because of the regimes 
policies, of which many are of value and helpful to Fiji, but because of how it 
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seized power trampling upon the democratic voice, and base human rights of the 
people.541 Only the passage of history will be able to judge whether the 
Bainimarama regime was a beneficial turning point in Fiji, or another negative step 
that detrimentally affects the quality of life of Fijians for generations to come.542 
Fiji’s governance issues are complex and traditional international responses 
simplistic and ineffective. Constitutional and electoral reform are needed in Fiji and 
the interim regime is attempting to provide that. Internal opposition to the regime is 
strong showing an active proletariat and desire for action and democracy. 
The EU response to the present crisis has been a relatively engaged and cooperative 
action following EU’s normative principles and structures put in place by the 
Cotonou Agreement. However, arguably the EU has also made the most severe 
negative economic impact on the country by tying democratic progress to the EU 
Sugar Adaptation Strategy. The fact that Bainimarama failed to uphold his side of 
the bargain forged by the Article 96 negotiations is disappointing, and makes 
observers wonder about the rhetoric of the People’s Charter and his speeches, 
wondering if the regimes intentions are genuine or a façade. The EU and other 
international partners are now very suspicious of everything Bainimarama declares, 
relating him to a traditional dictator that employs propaganda and sympathisers to 
establish a false sense of security and belonging. This thesis argues that he is 
genuine, and consequently, the regime, internal opposition to the regime and all 
international agencies are arguing for the same thing: A stable, democratic Fiji, 
freed from its cycle of coups. The conflict arises in the methodology that 
Bainimarama employees which can be seen as detrimentally affecting the very 
goals he is striving for. Democracy must evolve out of the political consciousness of 
the people and will not succeed through dictatorship or  international development 
in isolation.  
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6 Fiji – Sugar Sector 
For us in the Sugar Industry, it is time to face reality… We really have 
to make changes now.543 
6.1 Introduction 
The sugar industry has been the backbone of the Fijian economy since its 
introduction in 1880.544 Since Fijian independence in 1970, the output from the 
sugar industry rose dramatically with the government viewing it as the prime 
industry that would provide Fiji with the economic stimulus needed for sustained 
long-term development.545 This view was codified and given a key incentive by the 
signing of the Lomé Convention in 1975 with the EU. Included as part of this 
convention was the Sugar Protocols, which gave Fiji access to European Union 
markets at a preferential price quota about three times the global market price. 
Sugar production in Fiji peaked in 1986 with over 500,000 tonnes of cane. Since 
then however, there has been a steady decline in production.546 This decline can be 
attributed to many things that will be summarised and illustrated in this chapter. 
It is clear that when the sugar industry was at its height and making the most profits, 
very little was being reinvested into the sugar mills, transport networks, and 
research and development which would help maintain efficiency, viability, and 
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profitability of the industry.547 The sugar sector was in effect being used as a ‘cash 
cow’ and left the complex multilayered industry structure unchanged.  
The Fiji sugar industry has a convoluted design with three main stakeholders. There 
are native Fijian landowners represented by the Native Lands Trust Board (NLTB) 
who lease land to the primarily Indo-Fijian sugarcane farmers in small family sized 
4 hectare (10 Acre) farm plots that need to be manually harvested. Many parties, in 
particular the umbrella organisation called the Sugar Cane Growers Council 
(SCGC), represent the farmers. They sell the produce to the majority owned 
government miller, the Fiji Sugar Corporation (FSC) who in turn processes, markets 
and exports the sugar.548 Each of the main stakeholders mistrusts the other, and 
significant disputes between the parties has led the industry to become one of the 
most inefficient, highly politicised, exploited, and legislated sectors in Fiji.549 There 
have been many commissions and formulas for distribution of profits, none fully 
satisfactory to all parties.550 Therefore, the EU Sugar Protocols while achieving its 
goal of providing ‘aid with dignity’ and providing extra development income to 
Fiji, has ironically intensified the acrimonious disputes between the growers unions, 
mill management, and native landowners. All parties claim that they were not 
receiving a fair proportion of the profits.551 
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Figure 24:  The main stakeholders in the Fiji sugar sector 
 
Today an estimated 51,000 individuals work directly in the sugar industry and 
another 200,000 or roughly 25% of the Fiji’s population rely upon it for their 
livelihoods.552 Nevertheless, the sector only accounts for 7% of the Fijian GDP and 
has been declining since 1994.553 The disparity between its revenue and the people 
it supports shows the industry’s social and structural importance above its economic 
performance. Even sugar’s biggest advocates now “admit the industry is in bad 
shape,”554 “lacks vitality,”555 and without action is destined to collapse.556  
Initial beliefs by policy makers557 that Fiji’s successful tourism industry would be 
able to largely compensate for potential collapse in the sugar industry are now 
dispelled, and in the short to medium term future there are no alternatives to the 
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sugar sector. Furthermore, the sector has a bigger multiplier effect than most other 
industries in Fiji and its decline is acutely felt in all sectors.558 Finally, to worsen 
matters, the long established EU Sugar Protocols preferential pricing options will be 
cut by 36% as of September 2009. This move was well signalled by a WTO ruling 
in 2004, and a general change in development aid direction embarked upon by the  
EU since the Cotonou Agreement in 2000. The move has created dismay in Fiji’s 
unprepared sugar sector. 
The re-establishment of the viability of the industry is an urgent need for Fiji. To do 
this it is necessary to look at the fundamentals that are threatening its future 
viability and to ensure that all stakeholders in the sugar industry work together to 
improve efficiency, quantity, and quality.559 Nrayan and Prasad, suggest that the 
key issues are the non-renewal of land leases for sugar cane farmers, and a rising 
level of inefficiency in sugar production, milling, and transportation.560  
Sugar industry problems are broader with the Sugar Commission of Fiji 
highlighting in addition to the above, declining sugar cane quality, deteriorating 
processing equipment, and infighting within the industry. Effectively, sugar sector 
problems can be divided into those relating to a decline in yield, and those relating 
to a decline in efficiency. The European Union’s involvement in the Fiji sugar 
industry has been directly related to both. In 2006 the EU signed the Sugar 
Adaptation Strategy (EUSAS), which has the potential to save the sugar industry 
and yet force a total change in lifestyle for thousands of Fijians. However, if 
stakeholders and politicians cannot cooperate, identify, and resolve their issues, then 
other sector-wide problems become more significant. Therefore, no matter how 
much international developmental aid the sugar industry receives from the EU or 
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other partners, it will be rendered meaningless. The potential of a doomsday 
scenario caused by the collapse the sugar sector that will affect the entire Fijian 
economy and cause abject poverty,561 should be an incentive to ‘make the tough 
decisions’ and create lasting change. 
6.2  EU and the Fiji Sugar Sector 
6.2.1 EU Sugar Protocols History 
On 28 February 1975 as part of the Lomé Convention, the Sugar Protocols were 
established with the sugar producing ACP countries. In total 18 countries of the 
ACP network are sugar producing countries, of which Fiji is the only one in the 
Pacific-ACP group.562 Article 1 of the Sugar Protocol states: 
The Community undertakes for an indefinite period to purchase and 
import, at guaranteed prices, specific quantities of cane sugar, raw or 
white, which originate in the ACP States and which these States 
undertake to deliver to it.563 
Article 5 stipulates that the guaranteed prices will be based on community market 
prices, “taking into account all relevant economic factors.”564 This effectively 
means that the price of sugar given to the ACP countries is the same as that offered 
with subsidies to European farmers, over 3 times the average market price in any 
given year.565 This means that a specific prearranged amount of sugar grown by the 
sugar sector can gain profits well beyond what would be possible under normal free 
trade conditions. It allows the sugar industry to plan ahead a certain amount of 
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guaranteed revenue, regardless of fluctuating sugar production yields or other 
economic factors.  
6.3 Decline in Yield 
 
Figure 25: Actual Cane & Sugar Production Numbers, and Trendlines since 1984 
 
Figure 25 illustrates both the decline in yield of the sugar industry as well as the 
decline in efficiency shown by the increasing divergence in the trend lines between 
the amount of cane crushed and the amount of sugar produced from that cane.  It 
clearly shows that the decline of the sugar industry has been happening for a 
number of years.  Indeed up until the mid 1980’s Fiji was regarded internationally 
as an efficient and reliable producer of high quality sugar, but those performance 
indicators as early as 1991 showed Fiji had dropped drastically to become a country 
with one of the lowest performance indicators in the industry.566 A report in 2005 
comparing the sugar sectors of all countries demonstrated that Fiji has the 2nd 
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lowest cane yield and the lowest sugar yield per harvested hectare, and yet it has the 
7th highest production costs.567 Figure 25 also shows on a yearly basis how erratic 
production of sugar cane can be. The sugar research institute argues that this is due 
to the industries reliance upon rain and a total lack of irrigation. For example the 
massive dip in 1998 was due to severe drought conditions throughout the sugar 
producing areas. Figure 26, nevertheless, shows the continuing profitability of the 
Sugar Protocols. The EU accepts an average of 175,000 tonnes of sugar from Fiji 
per annum, but its market share of Fiji sugar has risen from about 50% to 90% in 
2007. In effect the Fiji sugar industry has become reliant upon the Sugar Protocols 
to compensate for its increasing inefficiencies and the impact of the removal of the 
sugar subsidies could prove to be catastrophic for both solvency of the industry, and 
the whole Fijian economy. One of the greater ironies of the industry is highlighted 
by the fact that Fiji for the last few years has been importing sugar for local 
consumption from India. This is to ensure it can meet EU quotas, and so export 
100% of its product, most of which is destined for the European Union.568 Locals 
find this situation “crazy”.569 Few sugar producing countries in the world are so 
dependent upon the favourable export market that the EU provides.570 
                                                
 
567 Oxfam, "The Fijian Sugar Industry: Investing in Sustainable Technology." 
568 Fiji Sugar Marketing Company, "Fiji Interview 29 - Sugar Sector Interview". ABC Online, "Eu Says Not Involved 
in New Fiji Sugar Deal." 
569 Fiji Association of Social Workers, "Fiji Interview 11 - Ngo Sector Interview". 
570 Reddy, "Survival Strategies for the Fiji Sugar Industry." 
FIJI – SUGAR SECTOR 
 
131 
 
Figure 26: Fiji Sugar Exports to the European Union & Other Countries 
 
6.3.1 Land Issues 
60% of Fiji’s land area is considered suitable for agriculture, however, only 16% is 
suitable for sustained farming.571 The Sugar Research Institute suggests land issues 
are the core reason for reduced sugar yields. As expansion occurred in the 70’s and 
80’s, there was an increased use of marginal land, that couldn’t naturally produce 
good quantities of high quality sugar. Industry records from the NTLB illustrate that 
90% of land used for sugar cane is classed as poor or marginal.572 Sugar as a crop 
can grow in these poor or marginal areas because it has a high “photosynthetic 
efficiency and requires less nutrient inputs.”573 The sugar industry is entirely 
dependent on rain for irrigation and ever more so in these marginal lands.  
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Many farmers suffer excessive floods and then experience drought conditions 
during certain times of year, which leaves the soil with minimal nutrients.574 
Extreme examples of how the weather can affect the industry were the major 
droughts that halved the sugar yield in 1998 and the floods of January 2009 that 
displaced hundreds of people and destroyed 100% of the sugar crops on many 
farms in the western region of Viti Levu.  
Fiji’s traditional ties to the land are very strong. Emphasis upon vanua, that the 
people and land are one, is a concept at the very core of Fijian culture.575 Most land 
in Fiji is under the communal ownership of native Fijians. Of the total land area in 
Fiji, 82.4% is held by ethnic Fijian tribal units.576 This custom-held land cannot be 
bought or sold, even among Fijians themselves,577 but it can be leased, and the 
leasing of native lands therefore becomes crucial to the viability of any agricultural 
industry.  
The tenant and small farm system of the Fiji sugar industry distinguishes it from 
most other sugar producing countries that are plantation based.578 Since 1997, 
agricultural leases under the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act (ALTA) have 
been expiring, and landowners have been generally unwilling to renew them,579 
causing generations of sugarcane families to loose their livelihoods, and create 
anxiety amongst those tenants still with land.580 A report in 2003 showed that over 
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70% of expired leases were not reissued to the existing tenants.581 The result is that 
land that could be harnessed for commercial gain is lying fallow.582 The Sugar Cane 
Growers Council (SCGC) predicted in 2004 that without renewal of leases and a 
significant restructure of the industry, a 30% decline in production could occur 
within 3 years.583 This prediction proved correct, as the area of sugarcane crops 
declined from 66,000 Hectares in 2003584 to 52,600 Hectares harvested in 2008.585  
A contributing factor to the decline in leases was the passing of two controversial 
Acts by the Qarase government. The first one transfers all crown lands to the 
trusteeship of the NLTB. This amounts to almost 9% of all land in Fiji pushing the 
total land area under the trusteeship of the NLTB above 90% when combined with 
its existing holdings.586 Secondly, the Qarase government has rejected ALTA, in 
favour of the older Native Land Trust Act (NLTA), because of its greater scope to 
extort higher market rents and utilise shorter leases that favour the landowner over 
the tenant. Such leases often include large upfront ‘goodwill’ payments and further 
erode the commercial viability of many farms.587 
The NLTA act caused widespread anxiety and protests in the 70’s and appears to be 
doing so again.588 The rationale for the change by the Qarase government was the 
perception that tenants had become rich at the landowners expense, although the 
facts illustrated by Lal and Reddy show otherwise.589 These above examples show 
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there is very little unity of purpose or appreciation of the interdependent nature of 
the three main stakeholders in the industry.590 The land-lease concerns have reached 
crisis levels and need to be addressed urgently, not only for the sugar industry but 
all other potential agricultural industries in Fiji.591 The land tenure system as it 
stands also does not distribute the lease money equally with an entire tribe of 
people. There is an example of an individual receiving a F$50 million dollar pay out 
from the NLTB.592 A social concern caused by the expiration of land leases means 
that farmers have to leave their land and come to the urban areas in search for 
employment. Job prospects in the cities are also scarce presently and without formal 
living arrangements, the result is a large increase in squatter settlements around the 
city limits.593 
Expiry Year Expired 
Sugarcane Leases 
New Sugarcane 
Leases Issued 
New Sugarcane 
Leases Issues to 
existing Tenants. 
1997 72 67 36 
1998 157 152 45 
1999 1073 861 350 
2000 1708 780 311 
2001 313 155 141 
Total 3323 2015 883 
 
Figure 27: Expiration of Sugarcane Leases and number of reissues from 1997 to 2001.594  
 
6.3.2 Burnt Cane 
In 2003 burnt cane comprised of 40% of the total harvest. This was a result of a 
long upwards trend that doubled the amount of burnt cane supplied since 1978.595 
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The reason growers burn cane is to physically reduce the load of the labourers 
during the harvest by removing up to 90% of the unwanted biomass.596 There is still 
very little mechanisation in the sugar industry, and maintaining a farm requires a lot 
of planning and manpower.597 However, burnt cane adversely affects milling 
performance in two ways. Firstly, it takes longer to mill, and secondly it increases 
the impurities of cane juice, which in turn reduces the quality of the sugar and 
brings lower market prices. Indeed up to 15% of the sucrose yield is lost by burning 
the cane.598  
Yields have also declined by virtue of a loss of experienced farmers. More 
indigenous Fijian farmers are deciding to enter the industry themselves, after the 
non-renewal of leases from their former tenants. However, they take time to gain 
experience in sugarcane farming and it takes a number of seasons before the new 
farmers match the level of efficiency and production levels of the experienced 
farmers (mainly Indo-Fijians) that they are replacing.599 
6.3.3 Money to be made from Sugar Cane? 
The average net return per household from sugarcane farming was estimated 
through census data at F$842 per Hectare, or about F$3500 in total with the 
standard farm plot averaging little more than 4 Hectares.600 This is below the per 
capita GDP of F$3889 for 2000. Furthermore many farms produce less than 50 
tonnes of cane per year making their net incomes less than their net costs. These 
already marginal farms whose farmers according to the 1997 UNDP human rights 
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report are already living below the poverty will be the ones most severely hit by any 
sugar industry reform process.601  
6.4 Decline: in Efficiencies  
The Fiji Sugar Corporation, like many public enterprises, has social obligations that 
can lead it to inefficiency and poor management.602  For example, there is a 
fertiliser subsidiary available from the FSC that has been allowed to run at 
considerable loss for a number of years. The government will not allow the price of 
fertiliser to be increased due to the burden this places on the growers who are 
already struggling.603 Indeed since 2004, the FSC has been technically insolvent, 
continuing operations only by virtue of massive cash injections by the Fijian 
government.604 As infrastructure and maintenance costs increase, so too does the 
level of cash grants needed for the sugar industry to continue operations.605  
One observer declares that it is vital for the FSC to be run on a truly commercial 
basis, separate from any political interference and influence.606 A lack of skilled 
personal, attributed to the large-scale emigration of people following each coup, 
also cause major gaps in capabilities.607 The SCGC complains that infrastructure, in 
particular FSC transportation assets, remain poor. There are antique railway engines 
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some more than 50 years old, and a dilapidated truck fleet, the majority of which 
date prior to independence.608  
The FSC is aware of its deficiencies and acknowledge the necessity vital to repair 
and improve rail infrastructure and truck fleets that transport the sugar cane. In the 
short to medium term there will be some allocation for the improvement of the 
railway lines and truck fleet, but not to the desired or even needed level.609 The FSC 
also admits that it underestimates the full the costs of sugar production because they 
do not include opportunity costs of family labour, nor capital costs such as buying 
farm equipment.610 These issues as well as the overall split in profits between the 
growers and the miller, have traditionally caused of tension and dispute. 611 Indeed, 
as far back as 1960, it was necessary to have legal arbitration, which has made the 
sugar industry one of the most politicised and legislated in Fiji.612 Today, the share 
of proceeds given to the FSC is among the lowest in the world, significantly below 
the profits needed for solvency, let alone the amount required to finance adequate 
renewal of factory and transport installations.613  
6.4.1 Need for Reform 
Such is the importance of the sugar industry that the decline in the last 5 years can 
explain a significant decline in funding for health and education sectors. The most 
obvious visual effect is the dramatic increase in squatter settlements around Suva 
and other major towns.614 In 2006 inefficiency and lower yields meant that the 
average cost of producing the sugar in Fiji of F$38 a tonne exceeded world market 
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prices of F$36.615 The sugar industry had officially become dependent upon the EU 
Sugar Protocols and was no longer sustainable without major reform.616 In effect 
the sugar industry has no right to survive in a commercial sense. It cannot supply its 
market with a sugar product at the quality and price the market demands. It is clear 
that “without radical and rapid reforms, this industry will die.”617 The realisation of 
that, and the desire to reform the industry and reduce costs, is universal.618  
Since 1995 there have been several proposed reform options looked at by industry 
leaders,619 but stakeholders still argue about the fundamental nature of the 
problems. Furthermore, many proposals were based upon poor information, and 
assumptions.620 There is a widespread belief that the industry will not be allowed to 
fail because the stakes are too high, and this has bred complacency thus delaying 
the urgent need for reform.621Consequently, no reform proposals gained significant 
traction or caused lasting change. The GoF is in a very poor financial position and 
will be unable to continue to underwrite the FSC to allow it to continue operations 
indefinitely.622 
6.5 2004 WTO Ruling & EU Sugar Protocols Reforms 
The EU Sugar Protocols subsidised annually 5 million tonnes of sugar globally 
which distorted markets and depressed global prices.623 On 15 October 2004 after 
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an appeal by Brazil, Thailand, and Australia into the legality of EU Sugar Protocols, 
the WTO dispute panel pronounced them illegal and requested action to remove 
imbalances of the sugar sector on the global market.624 The EU appealed the panel’s 
findings but the Appellate Body upheld them on 28 April 2005.625 The rationale for 
the decision was that the Sugar Protocols were distorting global market prices and 
providing unequal market access to the EU. These were both true. To keep the 
guaranteed quotas of the Sugar Protocol going as well as subsidise European 
Farmers meant that the EU was importing more sugar than it needed, and dumped 
the excess sugar back onto the market, lowering market prices even further. The 
Sugar Protocols were in its current form unsustainable for the EU. Therefore, the 
WTO can be held responsible for initiating the changes to the Sugar Protocols 
established since the Lomé Convention,626 it was something the EU needed to do 
anyway. Indeed the EU was keen to modernised all its  aid packages as indicated by 
the Cotonou Agreement. Consequently, the cornerstone of the sugar protocols, that 
of giving 3 times the market price, ‘aid with dignity,’ will come to an end come 
September 2009, ending a 30 year arrangement.627  
The reforms of the Sugar Protocols and the subsequent loss in revenue have been 
heavily criticised by the Sugar Industry. It is argued that without preferential 
pricings, the Sugar Protocols became an “empty shell”.628 Firstly, the protocol is a 
treaty and cannot legally be tampered with unilaterally as the EU appears to have 
done. Secondly, Article 1 specifically states that the protocol will last for an 
indefinite period.629 The EU is thus allowing the legal jurisdiction of the WTO to 
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overrule bilateral trade agreements when the WTO ruling was no more than 
consultative, to expedite desired change. A representative from the FSRI said, “The 
European Union has, because of its strength and power, put tiny countries like Fiji 
in a massively difficult situation and then expects them to survive.”630 The EU was 
adopting measures aimed at “slowly killing the Sugar Protocol” according to the 
ACP-SP countries.631 In May 2007 there was a meeting of the Sugar producing 
ACPs in Nadi. At this meeting it was resolved to safeguard the other benefits of the 
Sugar Protocols, even with the pricing structure reduced to meet WTO demands.632 
However, some ability to negotiate on prices was thought possible if all 18 
countries collectively bargained with their suppliers.633 Furthermore, in Fiji’s case, 
the modification of the Sugar Protocols encouraged Fiji to sign the EPA, in order to 
secure sugar import quotas scheduled to be removed in 2013.634 As such, countries 
like Fiji have to endure immediate losses of revenue that are not covered by the 
proposed adaptation strategy or any other means. 635 
It is clear that in a globalising world, the WTO ruling was not unexpected, or 
unique. The Fiji Times claimed that ‘everyone knew’ sugar protocols would come 
to an end one day, and yet very little preparation was done ahead of time to cater for 
it.636 The WTO makes the same demand of trade liberalisation upon all countries 
without prejudice. Ultimately, this ruling and changes to the Protocols must be the 
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impetus that ensures swift and drastic reformative action occurs in the sugar 
industry, to establish a more cost effective and commercial business model.637 
6.5.1 Implications 
The implications of a 36% price reduction are severe to Fiji, already struggling with 
decreased yields and efficiencies. It is estimated that 42% or 7,320 farms industry 
wide will have negative or zero gross margins affecting some 24,300ha of land and 
sugar output of over 850,000 Tonnes of cane.638 The Lautoka and Labassa refinery 
areas currently have the greater proportion of high cost farms, and will be affected 
most by the EU reforms. In almost 2/3 of farms on Vanua Levu, the cost of 
operating farms will exceed income revenue.639 Consequently, a number of cane 
farmers will be forced out of the industry without enough money to pay for food or 
rent. All living costs in Fiji are going up while the sugar price is going down.640 The 
need to compensate for 36% loss in revenue is acute, and means that the cost of 
production needs to be reduced by the same percentage or an individual farmers 
yield will have to increase similarly. For overall profitability, aiming to do both 
would be ideal. However, increasing yield is easier to achieve than reducing 
production costs according to the FSRI.641 Even with a 36% drop in preferential 
prices by the European Union, there remains a significant premium over world 
market prices, estimated by the World Bank to be double historical world market 
prices.642 The Fiji Sugar Marketing Co did some rough calculations and discovered 
that the new EU price will pay a 50% premium over present prices at F¢75 to 79 per 
kilo of raw sugar, when the world market price remains at F¢51 to 57. As such, the 
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EU will still remain a significant market for sugar exports in the short to medium 
term.643 
6.6 EU Sugar Adaptation Strategy 
With the ending of the Sugar Protocols, both the EU and the Sugar ACP countries 
believe it is vital to leave the sugar countries no worse off than before.644 “Its 
benefits and basic provisions must be maintained” in any successor regime.645 As 
part of the reforms of the Sugar Protocols, Multi-annual Sugar Adaptation 
Strategies were proposed to help alleviate some of the financial burdens and 
encourage reform in the industry.646 In September 2006, the Qarase government 
made its final submissions into what was to become the EU Sugar Adaptation 
Strategy for Fiji from 2006 to 2013.647 The effort by the EU to help with the 
preparation and management of the sector with a gradual transition away from the 
sugar protocols was welcomed by many boosting the start of much needed reform 
in this sector.648 A key aspect of the funding for the 2007 season was to replant 15% 
of Fiji’s crops in a denser pattern to increase sugar cane production to 70 metric 
tonnes per hectare.649 The entire EUSAS promises to provide $F350m worth of 
assistance for certain modernisation and reorganisation projects in the industry. 
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6.6.1 Content of the EUSAS 
The overall objective of the EUSAS is to contribute to restoring a sustainable and 
competitive sugar sector that is market driven, and meets developmental needs at a 
local level.650 This can only happen if Fiji achieves lower production costs, 
improves efficiency, and improves upon its economy of scale. Consequently, the 
EUSAS has three pillars. 
1) “Support for restructuring of the sugar sector, based upon clear feasibility 
analyses and in parallel with clear national commitments on policies. 
2) Support for diversification 
3) Create measures to mitigate social impacts.”651 
A crucial part of the Sugar Adaptation Strategy is to find a way to arrest the decline 
in cane production and to restore it to levels of the early 90s of around four million 
tonnes of cane, which will in turn produce between 400,000 and 500,000 tonnes of 
sugar.652 To this end, a central plank of the EUSAS is an accelerated cane 
replanting programme, with higher content sugar cane varieties planted more 
densely to increase yields.653 The suggested ideal figure of employees in the Sugar 
Sector is 5000 core farmers each supplying over 200 tonnes of cane. This will mean 
that over 20,000 people involved in the sector will “need to find alternate 
livelihoods if poverty levels are not to increase substantially.”654 Hence the need to 
have a social pillar to help these people find new careers. The diversification pillar 
focuses on employing sugar for ethanol production, and cogeneration of electricity 
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from a by-product of sugar the bagasse. For the first three years €60m has been 
allocated to Fiji as follows. 
Funding Allocations for the National Adaptation Strategy   
 Amount % 
Productivity improvement and cost reduction in the sugar sector €26.864m 44.80% 
Services and supply capacities in agriculture €27.28m 45.40% 
Local development strategies for socio-economic needs €2.83m 4.70% 
Coordination and monitoring €3.05m 5.10% 
   
Total €60.024m  
Figure 28: Funding Allocations for the EU Sugar adaptation strategy for the years 2008-2010655 
 
6.6.2 Concerns - General  
 
Figure 29: Comparion Between Sugar Protocol loss in revenue and EUSAS grants, assuming 
200,000 tonnes of sugar exported to the EU annually. 
 
The FSRI voiced several concerns about the structure and implementation of the 
EUSAS. The strongest one is that the funding is back-loaded, with small initial 
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grants that grow in later years. This means that by September 2009 the cut to sugar 
cane prices will be 36%, but the bulk of the funding to deal with this revenue loss 
will not be available until 2010.656 It would have been preferable if the money was 
front-loaded with large initial allocations and tapering off as years progress, to 
enable reforms to occur quicker and prevent the situation that is occurring now.657 
The FSRI also questions the need for a proper safety net in the EUSAS. If the 
industry reforms are successful and the sugar sector becomes sustainable, then there 
wouldn’t be any need for a safety net, because continuation and security of 
employment would still exist.658 However, as illustrated, even with successful 
reforms there will be a significant loss of employment in the sector validating the 
safety net aspect of the EUSAS. 
The FSRI claims that with promised funding of F$350m dollars, a comprehensive 
irrigation system could have been developed drastically increasing yields of the 
sugar industry more so than where the funding is promised now.659 With irrigation 
and use of different cane varieties, the sugar industry could produce year round 
allowing for more regular employment and continuous operation of the sugar 
mills.660 The FSRI is saddened by the EU consultants, who declined to consider 
this.661 Finally, the FSRI is concerned that the EUSAS is trying to do too many 
things with not enough funding, and as such will not be a total success story.662 
It is clear that without restructuring Fiji will not be able to compete on the world 
market especially against the large producers of sugar like Thailand, Brazil, and 
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Australia.663 The results of the reforming of the Sugar Protocols are very significant, 
however the accompanying Sugar Adaptation Strategy may just be the impetus the 
sugar industry needs to organise reform. Despite concerns regarding the EUSAS, 
Fijians are reluctant to criticise the EU directly believing that they are operating in 
good faith to genuinely help the industry. Concern is directed instead at the 
consultants hired by the EU who wrote the strategy paper, and appeared to arrive in 
Fiji with pre-determined objectives and ideas.664 In April 2007, Mahendra 
Chaudhry as the Finance and Sugar Minister stated that he had a lot of faith in the 
EU to understand the plight of the sugar industry, and he stipulated that if it totally 
lost EU assistance, Fiji’s economy could suffer “a severe blow from which [it] may 
not recover.”665  
6.7 Bainimarama Coup 
It was predicted in 2004 that a 30% decline in the sugar industry would drop the 
GDP in real terms by 1.8%.666 The real effect of the decline in the sugar industry is 
less certain. Nevertheless, a combination of the sugar industry production decline 
and the coup of December 2006, and global economic conditions caused the GDP 
to plummet by 7% in 2007.667 Such a massive contraction of the Fijian economy 
could not happen at a more inopportune time for the sugar sector desperate to enact 
change. Reports that Fiji could loose EU sugar funding started only days after the 
coup occurred in 2006. In May 2007, it was claimed that total aid losses could 
amount to F$274m.668 Dr. Ridolfi, the Head of EU Del Pac, suggested that aid and 
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EUSAS money could be redistributed to other countries in the Pacific or farther 
afield.669 Jagannath Sami, the former CEO of the Sugar Cane Growers Council, was 
immediately concerned about the implications of the 2006 coup for the sugar 
industry. It was reported that he feared the total collapse of the industry both before 
and after the coup 2006 occurred, with particular reference to the ramifications if 
‘vital’ EU funding was withheld.670  He stated that the whole restructure of the 
industry was dependent on the $350 Million Fijian the EUSAS plan, and without it 
the country could fall into anarchy.671 
6.7.1 EUSAS Funding Tie to Democracy & Cancellation 
In October 2007, the interim government and the European Union reached a deal 
securing sugar reform funding for the next 3 years, conditionally tied to progress 
towards restoration of a democratic government coming into force from October 
2007. This concluded Article 96 negotiations that started in February 2007672 and 
the funding for the 2006 allocation was released to the value of €4 Million.673 The 
EU Pacific Delegation confirms that, despite the earlier comments of Ridolfi, all 
earmarked money for Fiji remains waiting to be allocated. It is more the timing of 
when and how that funding is released that is affected by the present political 
situation.674 In December 2008, the European Commission deduced that the 
promised elections by March 2009 or in 2009 at all, were unlikely to occur. 
Consequently as per the agreement, the 2008 allocation of EUSAS moneys totalling 
€8 Million was cancelled. On May 18 2009, the European Union, in light of the 
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abrogation of the constitution, and the pushing back of elections from 2009 until 
2014, has cancelled its assistance payments for the sugar sector for the second year 
running. The value of the cancelled funds equates to €24 Million and sets back the 
EUSAS timetable indefinitely raising concerns that it will never be properly 
implemented.675 However, the changes to the Sugar Protocols are still going ahead 
as scheduled. This means EUSAS funding that was already backlogged is now 
guaranteed not to arrive until well after reductions in profits have occurred. There is 
a real potential for thousands to be forced from the industry and into poverty.676 
European Commissioner Louis Michel defends the EUSAS funding halt reiterating 
that the payments were conditional upon a progress towards a legitimate 
government, as per the EU-Fiji agreement in April 2007.677 Therefore, the decisions 
of Bainimarama and the interim government are the sole reasons for the dire 
situation. 
Although the EUSAS funding is officially halted, The EU prefers to view it as more 
of a stop and go exercise as of 2008.678 When there are some indications of 
democratic progress, some proportion of funding is released, and when there is no 
progress funding is halted again. “It is extremely difficult for us (the EU), and if 
must be extremely difficult for the sugar industry too”679  with its need to plan 
ahead which is reliant upon a steady stream of support and income. It is clear that 
“The European Union is putting a gun to our heads when it come to sugar.”680 It is 
the EU that is the main importer of sugar, the EU that created the Sugar Protocol 
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pricing options, and once dependency occurred, removed them. It was the EU that 
offered the most determined strategic solution to the sugar crisis, and the EU that is 
now by removing this funding causing the greatest threat to the viability of the 
sector.681 Bainimarama supporters suggest the theoretical ‘gun’ the EU is using on 
Fiji is far worse than the actual guns used to initiate the 2006 coup because the 
ramifications of the EU policy could cause far greater ‘wounds’.682 
Chaudhry is right when claiming that the EU has a good grasp of the importance of 
Fiji’s sugar industry.683 In December 2008, there was a call for the unions of the 
sugar industry to unite and try to pressure the government into staging elections as 
soon as possible.684 This shows that the EU decision is having some effect upon 
mobilising opposition to the regime. The regimes response has be very negative, 
ignoring such calls and increasing suppression of opposition voices and the media. 
Fears that the industry is destined to collapse if the EU Grants continue to be 
withheld, could still come true.685 The sad thing about EU actions is the sugar 
farmers, who are innocent bystanders of the coup, have become the victims.686 The 
EU is directly attacking the sustainability and livelihoods of sugarcane farmers, 
some of the poorest people in Fiji, with no political affect on the interim regime to 
exact more rapid democratic change.687 On the contrary, the EU has indirectly 
caused the regime to become more autocratic, stoic, cause greater human rights 
violations, and destroy more democratic freedoms. However the EU maybe having 
some affect. Bainimarama showed his concern about EU actions and fear for the 
sugar workers livelihoods in his speeches. In May 2009 he called for the EU to 
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reconsider its stance regarding the withdrawal of aid for reforming the sugar 
industry.688 He suggested that the EUSAS should be a humanitarian and 
developmental aid issue on par with the EDF programmes, which the EU has 
resolved not to stop. The EU considers the EUSAS an economic trade issue and 
with it affecting such a large proportion of the Fijian population, the most severe 
‘economic sanction’ it can exert on Fiji. With reduced profits and a reduced GDP, it 
is very hard for Fiji to divert any resources itself to the restructure and rehabilitation 
of the industry. Bainimarama concedes that such work is needed urgently to ensure 
the future viability of the industry, but he remains unmoved about pushing forward 
democratic reform and elections from September 2014.689 Clearly, even this 
desperate economic situation is less important to Bainimarama than the 
constitutional and electoral reforms he withes to instigate. 
6.8 Implications: Response of the Sugar Sector 
Estimates suggest that many sugarcane farmers are in poverty conditions, and they 
are set to get worse.690 However, optimists argue that true poverty conditions should 
not exist for any person with land, for they should be able to grow enough for a 
subsistence living, despite their incomes possibly falling below the poverty line. 
Farmers will still not be in true poverty conditions.691 Regardless, it is accepted that 
the farmer’s lifestyles are dramatically changing because of the considerable drop in 
income from the EU Sugar Protocols.692 An increase in the number of people 
moving away from the rural areas into urban squatter settlements is also 
happening.693 Commentators and industry employees alike emphasise the 
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significance and detrimental impact of the EU decision to withhold EUSAS 
grants.694 The bleak future of around 20,000 farmers directly and over 50,000 
people in the industry could become a humanitarian catastrophe.695 Nevertheless, 
there is a determination that reform must continue despite pressing circumstances. 
“I would like to say that for us in the industry, I think it is time to face reality. We 
have been living in a dreamland all this while.”696 For example, SCGC is now 
searching for alternative funding to the amount of F$13m for reforms and 
replanting programmes.697 This is one of many programmes initiated and earmarked 
for funding by the EUSAS. There are other positive signs of the determination and 
resilience of the people in the Sugar Sector. 
6.8.1  Fiji Government Actions: Funding, Dollar Devaluation & Tax 
Incentives 
The Fiji Government has responded to the loss of the EUSAS by allocating F$19m 
in 2009 towards the sugar sector of which F$5m is for cane rehabilitation in those 
areas affected by the floods of January 2009, and F$7m for the replanting 
programmes.698 In June 2009, the GoF committed additional F$1.8m towards 
construction and upgrading of some cane access roads.699 The funding is welcomed 
by the sugar industry whilst being criticised as “grossly inadequate,”700 and 
compensates for less than a quarter of the funding lost by the EU decisions. F$5m 
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may not be enough to salvage the industry being millions less that adequate 
compensation from the EUSAS.701  
In November 2008, the interim regime announced new Tax Free Regions (TFR) 
and tax holidays for projects in the agricultural sector. The tax holidays are valid for 
10 years for existing companies and 13 years for new companies. If a quarter of the 
equity comes from indigenous Fijians, then an additional 5 years of tax free benefits 
will be received.702 To qualify for the tax exemption it needs to be shown that a 
minimum of a F$2 million investment has been made into the sector and 
employment made for at least of 30 locals. The goal is to encourage investment in 
processing agricultural commodities for export and the tourism markets, as well as 
conversion of plant materials like sugar, coconut, and cassava into bio-fuels.703  
In April 2009, there was a devaluation of the Fiji Dollar by 20% which helps in the 
short term increase the revenue from sugar per tonne and compensate for the 
reduction of the sugar price from the EU sugar protocols.704  This allows the FSC to 
pay cane farmers at the established rate.705 The devaluation however, is only a very 
short term solution and the essential problem of stagnated profitability remains, and 
it causes other issues like a rapid rise in inflation and increase in import prices. 
6.8.2 FSC Actions: Continued Sales, EU based reforms, Mill Upgrades 
Despite the cancellation of EUSAS funding, the FSC still has secured a deal to 
supply sugar to the EU market. In May 2008 it was reported that Fiji will supply 
300,000 tonnes of sugar a year to European refiners Tate & Lyle, in a deal reputed 
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to be worth more than a billion Fijian dollars.706 However, Bela Dass of the SCGC, 
wonders upon what basis the 300,000 tonne agreement was signed, because there is 
not that amount of yield in the fields at the moment. For the 2009 season, 
production is forecast to increase to 245,000 tonnes of sugar.707  He suggests that 
optimistically it will take 2 years to raise production to the contracted 300,000 
tonnes.708 
In 2008, the FSC secured a $100 Million Dollar Loan for upgrading the Sugar Mills 
which should create improvements in milling efficiency for 2009.709 Initial 
speculation is that with the sugar mill upgrades in the 2009 season, Fiji will produce 
more sugar from the same amount of cane, which will also increase the return price 
per tonne.710 During crushing season, the SCGC was concerned that the upgrades to 
the sugar mills was resulting in frequent disruptions.711 As a result, Tonnes of cut 
cane had to be left on trucks and carriages for days on end lowering the quality and 
quantity of sugar produced.712 The Lautoka Mill stopped crushing for a least 24 
hours, whilst the Rarawai Mill had a recent 48 hour stoppage.713 Such stoppages 
caused about 5000 tonnes of cane to be left stocked in the mill yard for crushing.714 
At the end of May 2009, the FSC released a statement confirming that 
diversification into ethanol, cogeneration from bagasse, and replanting of diverse 
cane crops, all are integral to the reform program and the success of the sugar 
sector. The release confirmed that feasibility studies have been concluded, and 
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implementation will happen after the mills settle with their new technologies that 
have been bought and installed by virtue of a loan from India.715 These projects 
provide very real possibilities of pulling the FSC out of insolvency and back into 
profitability.716 The FSC is thus continuing the best it can with implementing the 
EUSAS despite it not receiving any funding for it from the EU directly. Indeed, 
Deo Saran the CEO of the Fiji Sugar Corporation stated that “we remain positive 
despite all the adversity of the political dimensions thrown at the sugar industry,” 
and is hopeful that double the amount of land will be planted with sugar cane in 
2010.717  
The FSC has shown an interest in large-scale mechanised sugar farming in Fiji, a 
necessary step if it is to remain competitive on the world stage. It plans on 
negotiating and leasing parcels of land a minimum of 75 Hectares in size, in 
relatively flat sugar producing areas. A move into farming by the FSC will make the 
industry more vertically integrated, should be a way to increase profits and 
efficiency.718 Despite land issues being such an intense and sensitive area of 
negotiation, there appears to be some success in this area, and last year almost to 
200 leases were endorsed involving more than 10,000 hectares of land. This means 
the average farm size being leased is around 50 Hectares, a massive improvement 
on the traditional 4 hectare family plot.719 Harvest mechanisation also helps reduce 
the need to burn the sugar cane, and so will aid in increasing the quality of the 
harvest as well as quantity.720 Mechanisation is vital to compete with larger cane 
growers in the world. The average cane farm size in Australia is 73 Hectares with 
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some farms having more than 250 hectares. Each of these farms are worked by only 
a handful of people.721  
Another suggestion of the EUSAS was for the FSC to buy cane not on weight but 
sugar content, thus discouraging the supply of burnt cane, while getting the 
maximum supply of bagasse possible. New equipment for this purpose was 
installed at the Lautoka Mill in 2008 and the other three mills gained such 
equipment as part of their upgrades before the crushing season of 2009.722 There is 
also a significant amount of investigation happening into how to improve and 
reorganise the transportation of the cane harvest.723 
6.8.3 Sugar - Ethanol Production 
As the world market price of oil increases, feasibility studies of many potential bio-
fuels become increasingly common. Sugar cane is often cited as one of the crops 
that has the greatest potential.724 Global bio-ethanol production has risen steadily 
since 1975 and about 60% of global output comes from sugar crops. The price of 
ethanol therefore largely parallels the global market price for sugar.725 The 
fermentation process from sugar to ethanol produces and overall efficiency of 
41.2%.726 Ethanol production has a positive outlook with global demand expected 
to more than double 2006 supply rates by 2016 as sustainable energy security issues 
remain unsolved.727 However, larger sugar producers like Australia and Thailand 
have scaled back their ethanol industries and need to substantially subsidise them, 
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because they are currently experiencing unsatisfactory and unprofitable returns.728 
This must be of concern to Fiji as it looks for diversification programmes. Fiji 
consumes about 80 million litres of petrol each year for consumption by cars. All 
this petrol has to be imported into Fiji as a finished refined product due to a lack of 
refining equipment on the island.729 Additionally, Fiji imports a total of 688 million 
litres of oil for electricity generation.730 Fiji as an island state also needs to import 
most industrial items and a significant portion of its food.731 As the cost of oil 
increases so do all facets of living in Fiji. For long term development it is necessary 
for states like Fiji to tap into other sources of energy, that are renewable, 
sustainable, and environmentally friendly.732 Studies have shown that bio-ethanol 
can be blended with petrol to be used in cars without any engine modifications in a 
blend that contains up to 10% ethanol.733 Ethanol contains only 2/3 of the energy of 
petrol, and so higher blend concentrations require different engine technologies. By 
blending ethanol with petrol, the combustion efficiency of the car is also improved, 
and CO2 emissions are slightly reduced.734 Thus, there is a ready market in Fiji for 
8 million litres of ethanol, if it can be produced at a cost less than petrol, and will 
help reduce fuel prices overall.  
When the sugar industry was receiving high preferential prices from the European 
Union, these provided a higher income than ethanol, but with Sugar Protocol 
reforms coupled with higher oil prices, profits are very possible.735 To increase 
ethanol yields, utilising strains of sugar crops that have a higher proportion of total 
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sugars is a necessary step.736 Replanting such high sugar content crops will also 
help the sugar industry fulfil its quota obligations to the EU and other partners. The 
use of the sugar by-product of molasses it the suggested product to use for ethanol 
production.737  For ethanol to be viable in the longer term there need to be a 30% 
increase in production of cane, so the industry can provide contracted quotas and 
have an excess for expected local ethanol demand. Significant investment into an 
ethanol conversion plant in Fiji would be necessary, and initial interest from private 
investors is positive.738 The impact of the ethanol industry must be considered 
beyond economics in a wider cultural, social, and political context.739 There is 
political support, a social necessity for the continuation of sugar production, even if 
it does only gain marginal returns. If ethanol is one way to ensure the continued 
viability of the sugar industry, its development must be given expediency. 
Nevertheless, it is an field that needs to be approached with caution, and be used 
only in conjunction with several other options for the survival of the sugar industry. 
6.8.4 Bagasse - Electricity Production “Cogeneration” 
Electricity prices in Fiji have risen due to an increase in demand and because 20% 
of generation comes from fossil fuels. 89% of Sugarcane is considered ‘by-product’ 
of the sugar milling process and includes molasses, water, and a fibrous pulp called 
bagasse. Sugar mills have for years used bagasse for electricity generation to power 
the milling machines. Any excess power can be transferred back into the main 
electric grid, if transformers and appropriate connections are in place.740 It is 
estimated that up to 25% of the electricity produced from bagasse is surplus and can 
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be exported.741 With state of the art technology between 60 to 180 Kw of electricity 
can be produced per tonne of processed cane.742 There are ongoing discussions with 
the FEA to come up with mutually beneficial options.743 There has always been 
excess power from the bagasse, supplied to the FEA since significant upgrading an 
installation of boilers and generators in the 90s. However, formalising the 
arrangement and making it a separate and viable business model, is only a recent 
innovation. To date there has been almost F$300 million spent in capital 
expenditure for the mills with few tangible economic returns.744 On average 25MW 
of electricity is produced and 7MW exported to the national grid. With better 
technologies up to 60MW could be produced from the same about of bagasse per 
season.745 Unlike ethanol production which is considered contentious, using 
bagasse for electricity co-generation is almost universally supported.746 Using 
alternative energy sources from sugar by-products, to create ‘end user’ products 
where profits can be more substantial, is both logical and viable.  
6.8.5 Native Land Reform  
Land ownership in Fiji needs to be “severely and critically looked at.” If there is a 
way to make lease arrangements more like a commercial agreement between two 
people, without the influence of politics, then greater demand and productivity 
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would result.747 P. Lal has developed, a sophisticated ‘negotiation support system’ 
(NSS) to help resolve concerns by landowners and lessees regarding fair and 
equitable ‘market based rents’ for use of native land. She uses computer modelling 
based upon the large databases she has accumulated. She declares that the system is 
an objective and systematic way of estimating rent which helps prevent mis-
information and mis-perceptions that are often the cause of land lease conflict.748 
Core to this system is an ability to divide, combine, and transfer grower 
entitlements from one farmer to another and to simulate a standard commercial 
system that reflects clearly what is the present market supply and demand.749 In July 
2009, Frank Bainimarama declared he would implement major land reforms from 
the beginning of 2010 that will allow the present system of ownership to remain, 
while ensuring  leases are negotiated on a longer term basis and that those leases are 
more equitable and commercially viable.750 Whether these reforms are based upon 
any of Lal’s proposals remains to be answered, but if they are they’ll create a more 
positive outlook for Bainimarama by the academic community, proving he is 
genuine in wanting to help solve a key sugar industry concern. 
6.8.6 Repackaging of Sugar 
A fairly low cost diversification option is to repackage sugar into smaller consumer 
orientated packaging to sell at a premium directly to the supermarkets and hotels. At  
present, the FSC packs sugar into 50Kg and 25Kg bags for export into the Pacific 
region, and there is a packaging plant in Vanuatu that reduces this to 1Kg bags. 
With demand for sugar sachets from the tourism industry and the airlines, there is a 
ready market for repackaging of sugar into smaller consumer orientated amounts.751 
                                                
 
747 Canegrowers, "About the Industry." 
748 Lal, Ganna; Portrait of the Fiji Sugar Industry. p155 
749 Lal and Reddy, "Old Wine in a New Bottle? Proposed Sugar Industry Restructuring and Land Conflict in Fiji." 
750 Bainimarama, "A Strategic Framework for Change". 
751 Fiji Sugar Marketing Company, "Fiji Interview 29 - Sugar Sector Interview". 
FIJI – SUGAR SECTOR 
 
160 
It has not occurred in Fiji yet because the EU Sugar Protocol provided preferential 
market access only for raw unpacked sugar according to Article 5-3.752 With 
changes in the Sugar Protocols, there are no restrictions, and feasibility studies by 
the FSMC show that repackaging of sugar would be very profitable. It only needs 
the initiative of a private company with the capital and expertise to establish a 
partnership with the FSC.753 Increasing vertical integration of the FSC like this will 
help increase profits, employment, and will also help retain additional income from 
the tourism sector.  
6.9 Diversification Beyond Sugar 
Overall, the skill levels of sugarcane farmers is low and the occupation is 
considered the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder. School leavers and university 
graduates from sugarcane families will rarely return to agriculture. In a feature 
article, a cane farmer noted that he wouldn’t recommend to anyone to enter the 
industry, rather try and stay at school and get a good job in the city.754 It will require 
a long time frame with intensive vocational training for sugar famers to move to an 
alternate crop.755 There are many crops and options outside the sugar industry for 
Fiji, such as the production of high quality tropical fruit for export. Farmers realise 
that they have to diversify, and are looking into alternative crops that will provide a 
viable income.756 A concern voiced by the FSRI is that sugar diversification into 
other crops or other industries outside of cane, while a good idea in principle, is 
difficult to enact.757 Sugar is a very easy crop to plant and manage, and because 
profits were good with the Sugar Protocols, there was no need to diversify. Moving 
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into more labour intensive vegetable crops that the farmers don’t have the expertise 
or equipment to manage, is a recipe for disaster.758 The FSRI concludes that 
diversification therefore must primarily come from other uses of sugar, rather than 
direct changes away from the sugar cane crop.759 It will take years of intensive 
funding and training to effect substantial change for farmers from sugar to other 
crops. 
In April 2009, it was reported that diversification was indeed happening rapidly 
beyond sugar. The agriculture sector outside of sugar recorded a impressive 30% 
growth in production, and its relative contribution to the GDP has gone from 7.3% 
in 2006 to 8.3% in 2007.760  However, it must be noted that this unsubstantiated 
report comes from a Fiji Times newspaper still heavily restricted in terms of what it 
is allowed to publish. Other sources will be needed to corroborate this positive 
jump. If indeed true, then it is proving that the search and utilisation of other 
agricultural products outside of sugar is underway and garnering positive returns. 
6.10 Conclusion 
The sugar industry has reached a critical crossroad, and time is running out. In the 
short term there are, and will be, many causalities of trade liberalization and reform 
processes.761 A lack of funding at what is a critical juncture for the sugar industry 
could well cause the industry to collapse.762 It is clear that the farmers are feeling 
the burden of the removal of the Sugar Protocols, and it is increasingly hard to make 
a good living, or even make ends meet.763 However, there is still optimism in the 
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sugar industry, with the Sugar Marketing Company stating that the industry is here 
to stay, and that they are looking beyond short-term issues to the long-term 
future.764 Government commitment still seems strong. In a speech in July 2009, 
Bainimarama stated that the Fijian Government is committed to robust and 
successful reforms of the sugar industry, and although funding has been criticised as 
not enough, it is all that can presently be spared.765 The recent EU actions have 
made it go from villain with the cancellation of the Sugar Protocols to hero with its 
EUSAS, and back to villain by tying the EUSAS funding to democratic change. 
The response by Fijians to the EU’s actions in the sugar sector are overall, 
overwhelmingly negative. The Fiji sugar sector is now highly politicised both 
domestically and internationally, detrimentally affecting all those directly involved. 
It is uncertain as to what the future may hold for the sugar industry, but if 
stakeholders make their best efforts to remedy the difficult situation, and targeted 
investment comes from somewhere, it is possible for sugar to become a viable and 
profitable crop once more.766 
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7 Fiji – Education Sector 
7.1 General Background 
The Fijian education system, compared to other developing countries in the South 
Pacific is comparatively good, with high literacy and diverse schools.767 It is crucial 
to have the basic building blocks of education for all sectors of society to 
function.768 Children have a huge capacity to learn, be influenced, and teachers are 
the “key that opens the door to the future.”769 Therefore, if there is a desire for long-
term improvement or change in a society, it must start with the education sector.770 
As the traditional saying by Henry B. Adams states, “A Teacher affects eternity; he 
can never tell where his influence stops.”771 There are many concerns in the 
education sector that need to be addressed, with interviewees highlighting 8 critical 
areas. These concerns are; Curriculum, infrastructure, teachers salaries, 
management, IT, vocational education, civic education, and equality. With so many 
areas in need of improvement, opinion was split when asked which issue should be 
prioritised. 
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Figure 30: Greatest needs in the Education Sector (Indicative Opinion) 
 
Some commentators are particularly scathing of the education system in Fiji 
describing it as “hierarchal, academic, and just meets out corporal punishment”772 
and has become “archaic and redundant.”773 The education sector does not prepare 
children for the future, or realities of modern life. For a lot of people education 
means getting a paid job as an employee. They are not prepared for self-
employment with little management and trade skills. This is a considerable problem 
and a perception that needs to be changed, because there are not enough formal 
sector jobs in Fiji. Indeed, about 17,000 Fijians leave school every year, and only 
5,000 of them successfully find jobs.  This is a considerable and worrying statistic 
that must be improved.774 In 2006, the GoF launched the Suva Declaration on 
education, outlining Fiji’s key goals in this sector for the next 10 years.775 A key 
aspect of the declaration is to make sure all children have access to basic education, 
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and that the curriculum is relevant for all social circumstances.776 The following 
sections will highlight specific challenges of the education sector, followed by the 
European Union developmental response in conjunction with other development 
partners. 
7.1.1 Physical Infrastructure Concerns 
Physical infrastructure in the rural areas is of particular concern with many schools 
and villages not having access to electricity, running water, shops, or modern 
amenities like television, radio, cell phones, internet, and the newspaper.777 Some 
rural schools and villages are only accessible by a boat that goes past once every 
three months, or by walking long hours along dirt tracks, up rivers, and 
mountainsides.778 The FTA sees a direct correlation between a lack of infrastructure 
in rural schools and a lack of scholastic achievement.779 Without better facilities 
rural children are significantly disadvantaged, and cannot reach their potential.780 
Parents are encouraged to send their children to urban centres which exacerbates an 
urban drift already putting strain on the basic services, and the economy as a whole. 
7.1.2 Curriculum Issues 
In Fiji, there remains the idea that academic courses are more important than 
anything else. The current system rewards academic learning and those that can 
“regurgitate information in tests.”781 It seems that the curriculum is designed to 
prepare students to take good degree courses and then become teachers, lawyers, or 
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doctors.782 Such professions have always been considered ideal jobs and where the 
curriculum should be focussed. However, only a small proportion of students will 
ever have the abilities and desire to achieve those skills, leaving many who fail 
disenfranchised, rather than looking at the interests and skill sets they do have.783 If 
students do succeed in the system, there are few opportunities for tertiary education 
in Fiji. The University of the South Pacific is a renowned university, but is a private 
institution and expensive, eliminating all except those wealthy enough or bright 
enough to gain scholarships.784 
When asking the question whether the material being disseminated to the students 
today is helping them make better decisions on how to prosper and be successful in 
a modern life,785 in too many cases the answer no. Therefore, the Fiji curriculum 
does not prepare children for the future, which demands adaptability, multiple 
talents, and skills.786 Fiji has created a surplus of people that are academic, and 
nobody for any other industry.787 What is more concerning is that if a Fijian student 
fails or is unsuited to academics, then they fall through the system with effectively 
no base education that will help prepare them for the future.788 A small number of 
students are dropping out of school without even basic skills, or competence in 
English to fill out job application forms.789 The curriculum needs to be changed to 
reflect the societal circumstances that exist in Fiji, as well as adapt to the specific 
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local community needs around the school. For example, the material and the way 
things are taught in a rural area should be different to that in an urban area.790 
There has been very little work done on the Fiji curriculum in recent years, and 
there needs to be a significant review because teaching methodologies and subject 
matters have changed.791 The curriculum is also vital, because if you have a new or 
inexperienced teacher then they’ll feel compelled to stick exactly to the laid out 
course content. It is only with quality and experienced teachers that may be able to 
improvise and improve the subject matter, who look upon the curriculum as a 
suggested guideline. They will teach the same things, but in a relevant and more 
interesting way.792 In rural areas, the curriculum for primary classes becomes rather 
difficult to manage for the teacher, who often has four different age levels of 
children in the classroom all requiring different lesson plans.793 Mathematics is of 
particular concern to many school principals. In a survey done in 2006, more than 
45% of all students stipulated maths as their least favourite subject, and was 
unanimously considered the least favourite subject in all schools sampled.794 
Without maths, many practical and self employed career jobs become more difficult 
for students.795 The curriculum also needs to be developed to provide more in 
physical education, and basic life skills including nutrition information. Too many 
Fijian school children are either underweight and malnourished, or obese. Sporting 
contact that does occur is sporadic and organised at a school level, instead of a 
regional or national level.796 
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The positives of the present curriculum is the fact that all classes are taught in 
English, meaning that most Fijians are fluent in English as well as their native 
tongues, by Year 5 – age 9 to 10. Statistically, the literacy rate in Fiji is high, at 
93%.797 This is a considerable asset that could be harnessed more in the Fijian 
economy. An ironical result of the current system is that while not meeting local 
needs, the excess of well qualified people in certain ‘white-collar’ jobs can go 
overseas, and the country can gain through remittances.798 
7.1.3 Vocational Training Needs 
One of the more severe criticisms of the Fiji education sector is the lack of 
vocational training options. As illustrated, the curriculum is geared primarily 
towards academic jobs but Fiji cannot absorb that many white-collar jobs and less 
than 10% of Fijians are capable or lucky enough to make it to university. 
Vocational training options need to happen both at the schooling level, and more 
investment needs to be put into the polytechnic opportunities in Fiji.799 Fiji has a 
strong need for specialist tourism industry training, managerial education, and a 
need to develop basic hand made industries in the outer islands as an alternative 
source of income.800 Unfortunately, the perception in Fiji is that getting a technical 
education, and a practical trade style job, is a ‘second grade career path.’ It is not a 
permitted option for many students by parents pressuring their children in a 
particular direction.801 In a survey conducted in 2006, it was discovered that the 
career aspirations of over 2/3rds of final year school students desired a narrow field 
of ‘white-collar’ jobs of accounting, teaching, civil service, nursing, medicine, 
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engineering and law. This is in stark contrast to the labour force needs of Fiji.802 
Indeed teaching and nurse training institutions turn away thousands of applicants 
annually. The Lautoka Teachers College (LTC) had 6000 applicants in 2003 for less 
than 300 placements. Even university graduates with certain degrees can take up to 
10 years to find full time employment.803 As such the aspirations of students at most 
schools are unrealistic in relation to the actual chance of success and market 
demands.804 Therefore, there is a large pool of people that need to be either self-
employed, or acquire vocational skills.805   
Changing the perception that trade jobs are both valued and required in society 
takes time. It will take initiative and resources to create infrastructure and systems 
that support the change. Some schools have already instigated their own vocational 
subjects.806 Several urban high schools now have fully equipped metalwork and 
woodwork classrooms.807 An all girls school in Lautoka just opened a home 
economics and cooking suite.808 However, this development is sporadic and without 
concerted government effort, in conjunction with aid partners, will remain at a level 
well below what is needed. The type of vocational skills being offered also needs to 
be examined to develop a holistic approach that caters for the needs of the 
community and longer term requirements of the Fijian economy. 809 
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7.1.4 IT in Schools 
Fiji needs to develop a knowledge economy, if it is to keep abreast of international 
developments.810 However, it is much more difficult for a developing country like 
Fiji to invest the required resources for information technology. Some rural schools 
have so little infrastructure that they do not have power, or telephone connections, 
so IT technology is just a dream. It does mean however, that some students have 
never seen or touched a computer by the time they leave school.811 In urban areas 
there is more technology, but again disparities between schools are immense.812 It is 
suggested that investigation and planning occur to get this infrastructure in place in 
rural and isolated areas, which will enable children there to learn via 
correspondence. With power and satellite communications rural isolation will 
become a thing of the past. The technology could also be used for many community 
purposes, and will lessen the overall need for physical infrastructure and resources, 
and help equip children with comprehensive IT skills that are increasingly vital in 
today’s society.813 
7.1.5 Economic Issues 
Education has developed erratically in Fiji especially at the secondary school level. 
This means that the quality or standard of education varies greatly between one 
secondary school and another. Typically the rural secondary schools are the ones 
lagging well behind their urban counterparts.814 The reason for this economic 
disparity is because of the traditional funding method done by the Ministry of 
Education, giving a per-capita grant meaning larger urban schools with three times 
the population receive three times the funding. Because of economies of scale, an 
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urban school can pool excess resources to purchase new materials, books, and 
improve facilities with far greater ease than a rural school, which will barely be able 
to cover teachers salaries with their grant. Furthermore, in urban areas, the schools 
ask for donations or fees, are more likely to receive them and receive them because 
of the higher incomes of the parents.815 The obvious solution to the above it to 
move from per capita funding to a decile based funding. But this is also 
problematic, because the larger urban schools despite all advantages are still in great 
need of modernisation and new textbooks, and their overall facilities still fall well 
short that expected in a developed country. Teacher’s salaries in the Fijian public 
system are also very low. A qualified teacher with 10 to 15 years experience, and a 
head of department, would earn between F$15,000 to F$18,000 a year.816 As the 
economy declines, as does funding the government is able to give to the education 
sector to provide the services needed, such as replacement text books, 
infrastructure, teacher salaries and teacher numbers.817 Furthermore, education is 
free only until the second year of high school. When economic concerns become 
difficult, such as Fiji has experienced over the last 2 years, the drop out rate at age 
14 increases dramatically. Unfortunately this leaves the student without any suitable 
qualifications in today’s society.818 A particularly concerning discovery is that when 
families are feeling financial strain, then it will be daughters that are forced to drop 
out of school before sons. There are no surveys showing how widespread the issue 
is since the 2006 coup, because the government will not invest in anything that will 
reflect badly on it.819 This scenario was also happening before the coup. In 2003 
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and 2004, the number of males reaching final year schooling in Fiji was more than 
double that of females.820 
7.1.6 Societal Pressures - School segregation  
Schools in Fiji are labelled as Fijian or Indian schools and ethnic segregation 
appears inbuilt into the system at a structural level. At a pupil level the segregation 
is not there, with Fijian and Indian schools accepting children of the other ethnicity 
and ironically, many Indian labelled schools are predominantly Fijian populated. 
This is due to a perception that Indian schools are more academic, professional, 
worldly, and less community based.821 At the annual Fiji Teacher’s Association 
meeting in May 2009, it was stated by the head of the Methodist Church Rev. 
Waqairatu, that all Fijians need to have a “historical and contemporary 
understanding of themselves which will make them live better… in a multi-racial, 
multi-religious, multi-political party interest society.”822 
7.2 EU Influence / Actions – FESP 
7.2.1 What is the FESP? 
The Fiji Education Sector Programme (FESP) has its origins in discussions for the 
allocation of funding of the 9th EDF. It was decided that the area of intervention the 
GoF would like the EU focus on was rural education.823 Fiji has a reasonably 
intelligent workforce and there are plenty of opportunities to invest in human 
resources, which is one of the major reasons why the EU was keen on investing in 
the education sector. In September 2004 the financing agreement for the FESP was 
signed, and the F$44 Million Project commenced. The vision as stipulated by the 
FESP is to have a “multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society where all communities 
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have equitable access to opportunities and share equally the benefit of 
development.”824 300 of the least developed rural Fijian schools are benefiting or 
will benefit from new infrastructure projects, including classrooms, hostels, ablution 
blocks, solar power, and other facilities.825 As well as providing infrastructure to 
neglected rural schools, the FESP hopes to reduce the flow of students from rural to 
urban areas,826 where they put additional strains on the system. Additionally, 
surveys show these students are unhappy and often are the first to drop-out.827 The 
FESPs objectives are to ensure equity of access and participation for all Fijian 
students, provision of appropriate teaching resources, and providing incentives for 
teachers to take appointments in rural areas, including quality housing for them.828 
The FESP is a joint program being run by the Ministry of Education and the 
European Union, and is the largest donation directed towards education since Fiji 
gained independence. With F$44 Million to be given over 5 years it will make a 
massive impact upon the quality of infrastructure of rural schools in Fiji. 
Furthermore, the FESP is working in conjunction with donor partners in Australia 
and New Zealand who will focus on other aspect of the education system to make a 
significant holistic impact upon the education sector that will last for decades into 
the future.829 
1) Improved infrastructure and 
upgraded school facilities 
Classrooms, libraries, dormitories, 
teachers quarters, kitchens, dining 
rooms, water supply & sanitation, 
and occasionally electricity. 
F$21 Million 
2) Capacity Building and Enabling 
environment 
Particular attention to teacher 
training and experience in rural areas. 
F$1.6 Million 
3) Adequate Quality and Quantity Support for teaching resources F$8.6 Million 
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of resources and materials including books, computers, and 
laboratory equipment. 
4) Effective and efficient processes 
and mechanisms 
Co-ordination between the Ministry, 
NGOs, and other international 
donors, to help strengthen and 
implement MoE policies. 
F$1.6 Million 
5) Community Building, with 
educational partnerships 
Non-formal, vocational and civic 
education and community awareness 
programmes. Areas targeted include: 
Carpentry, farming, micro-enterprise 
development, learning conversational 
Fijian & Hindustani. 
F$6.6 Million 
Figure 31: Budgets and Goals of the FESP.830 
 
7.2.2 How FESP funding was allocated 
The Fijian education system is still largely segregated, and the rural population of 
Fiji is dominated by ethnic-Fijians. Although F$21 Million that was to be allocated 
to schools was a significant and generous amount, it was not enough to target all but 
the most needy of rural schools. Therefore, it was necessary to create an empirical 
and impartial way to rank all the schools in Fiji on criteria of neediness with extra 
weighting given to the schools isolation. This ranking was called the Schools 
Infrastructure Disadvantage Indices (SIDI), and was used in conjunction with the 
MoEs own School Information Management System (SIMS).831 Qualitative 
analysis happened as well through questionnaires and workshops in all educational 
districts. Through this comprehensive grading and analysis system, identification of 
300 most needy schools were targeted without bias or prejudice. Unfortunately 
because of the demography of Fiji, more ethnic Fijian schools were targeted than 
Indian, but list was endorsed by the MoE. “The conceptualisation and development 
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of the 300 Schools List has been objective, transparent, and a judicious mix of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches.”832 
7.2.3 Response of the Sector to the FESP 
One Commentator in the education Sector was full of praise of the EU Education 
Sector Program, saying that they made a lot of inroads into improving the education 
and fostering cooperation between government departments.833 It is clear that the 
EU was simply targeting those schools with the worst infrastructure. In doing so it 
was trying to create a more uniform standard of primary education and satisfy that 
particular Millennium Development Goal.834 One interviewee is cautiously 
optimistic about the FESP, agreeing that Fiji does need good infrastructure 
especially in rural areas, but believes that more should be done to help train the 
teacher, not only for a qualification, but also to provide in service education, so they 
can keep abreast of modern techniques and changes.835  With better facilities in the 
rural areas, there would be less need for the migration of students into the urban 
areas. It will remain a challenge though, to encourage quality teachers to take 
permanent positions in the rural areas.836 The Government acknowledges this and 
has organised a media campaign to encourage more teachers into rural schools. 
The Fiji Education Sector Programme was not without its critics. It was viewed by 
some parties as an unwittingly racial move by the European Union. Allegations 
were made of ethnic discrimination manipulated in favour of indigenous Fijians, by 
an ethno-nationalist government. The fact is that rural areas are composed of 80% 
indigenous Fijians, when the overall population of indigenous Fijians is only 
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55%.837  One member of the FTA believes that this programme was one of the main 
catalysts for the 2006 coup.838 Another issue raised about the education sector 
programme is that it seems to have such a large focus on infrastructure concerns, 
and that it tends to ignore the people that it is designated to help.839 It is conceded 
though that Fiji is still a developing country and so infrastructure aid remains 
crucial.840 However, the type of infrastructure being provided could be re-examined. 
A classroom is just building, and can be used for classes only when there is a 
teacher and physical resources for that teacher and students. If the money being 
used to build the classroom was instead allocated to giving students a computer, a 
generator for powering the computers, and a satellite dish link up to the outside 
world, then the need for a formal classroom disappears, as does the need to fund a 
teacher to be on site on a remote island. The students can have tutorials and lessons 
via correspondence, saving ongoing costs. Furthermore academic materials and 
information remains both comprehensive and up to date by harnessing the power of 
the internet.841 A lot of development funding is being channelled in a direction that 
will not necessarily provide the maximum impact for the rural children.842 
7.2.4 Other FESP Programs 
A lesser-known aspect of the FESP is the funding the EU directed towards school 
management. The EU ran a series of workshops and seminars for school 
administrators, and created a booklet titled “Handbook for School Managers,” 
summarising essential aspects of running a school.843 Such programmes were well 
received by the teacher’s unions, and helped provide a significant lift in capacity 
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and expertise of school administrators.844 Another programme the FESP ran 
through the FFNSA were programs for primary school teachers, teaching those 
intermediate year 7 and year 8 classes.845 The programmes were designed to ensure 
they get the best out of specific subject areas, and although the program ended years 
ago, there was a significance transference of knowledge and capacity so there are 
locals in Fiji still continuing the program today.846 
In January 2009, there were significant floods in Fiji, damaging many schools. In 
response the EU gave just over F$2 million dollars to help with the rehabilitation of 
41 schools in affected areas identified as needing immediate support.847 This money 
will be allocated through the FESP in conjunction with UNICEF and is additional to 
the larger FESP infrastructure budgets.848 The EU then allocated the FESP an 
additional F$715,000 to help repair water and sanitation in flood affected areas. 
Fifty new water tanks were installed in schools and health centres, and repair work 
of mains pipe fittings occurred in 28 villages.849 In June 2009, the EU opened up a 
‘Library Information Point’ at the Suva City Carnegie Library, to allow greater 
access to information and transparency about the European Union and its 
involvement in the Pacific for all members of the general public.850 
7.2.5 Lautoka Teachers College (EDF8) 
As part of the EU 8th EDF, F$8 million was allocated to upgrading and developing 
the infrastructure of the Lautoka Teachers College (LTC). The LTC is the main 
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primary school tertiary unit in Fiji offering 2 year diplomas in primary school 
education and graduates about 180 students each year.851 The college also graduates 
about 25 early childhood students.852 The EU did the LTC upgrade in conjunction 
with AusAID and built several new buildings including a new library, lecture 
theatre, and hostels for the students to live in.853  
The lecture theatre has modified and made more efficient the teaching techniques at 
the college. Before, it was split into 6 sections, with a tutor taking a class and 
repeating the same lesson 6 times. Now, the College can run a more standardised 
international university system, with lectures followed by tutorials for subjects.854 
With these new teaching techniques the LTC qualification has been upgraded from 
a nationally recognised certificate to an internationally recognised diploma855 
accredited to that standard by renowned people from Australia and the Pacific.856 
The new library at the LTC helped it launch itself into the 21st century with a state 
of the art computer suite, and has meant that computers at the college can be 
networked. With the help of Korean volunteers, a computer network and 
computerising of the library catalogue is underway.857  
There are still areas for improvement, as the network operates at slow speeds due to 
the phone connections to the LTC, and internet to the outside world is still operating 
at dialup speeds. There are broadband capabilities along the Queens Road from 
Nadi to Lautoka to help service the tourism industry. It is a matter of securing funds 
to lay additional cable along the access road to the college from the Queens 
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Road.858 Nevertheless, in comparison to before the EU-AusAID project, the LTC 
gives a far better quality education, and this will have a flow-on effect to the 
schooling system in Fiji as new student teachers graduate and are placed in primary 
schools.859  
An LTC spokesman was very happy about how the EU and AusAID engaged with 
the staff in what was a very consultative process.860 He concedes that there were at 
times disagreements such as to the location of the Library, which the EU wanted to 
place centrally on a ceremonial space called the Radah Playground. Eventually the 
staff consented to EU desires seeing the benefit of the library being placed with 
such easy access to the students and visitors alike.861 The LTC is also interested in 
utilising its new resources and expanding beyond its core role of training teachers. 
This will mean moving into the more lucrative markets of teaching English to 
Japanese students, for which there is a significant and growing market in Fiji. It is 
also interested in offering vocational IT courses to up skill present teachers in the 
field, and to people working in other industries that increasingly need to work with 
computers but have little understanding of IT technology.862 To date the Ministry of 
Education has rejected such proposals, being concerned that it will detract from the 
Colleges main services and objectives.863 
7.2.1 P.R.I.D.E Project & N.I.C.E. Programme 
The PRIDE project, (Pacific Regional Initiatives for the Delivery of Basic 
Education) is a programme funded through the EDF in conjunction with NZAID. 
Its purpose is to enhance capacity of basic education programmes in all Pacific 
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Island Forum States, including Fiji, providing the “foundations for vocation 
callings, higher education, and lifelong learning.”864 One of the core aspects of 
PRIDE is a education resource centre called PADDLE, that helps provides material 
for students, teachers, and policy makers, by digitising educations strategic plans, 
core legislation, curriculum frameworks, and school policies.865 The PRIDE project 
is a good example of how the EU works regionally as well as nationally, and with 
other ODA partners. 
The NICE Programme (National Initiative on Civic Education) is a Project that is 
run by the UNDP with funding form the EU and NZAID. Its overall goal is to 
empower communities to participate and contribute to policy development in their 
area.866 This is done through teaching community leadership and negotiation skills, 
and enhancing representation capabilities.867 A recent workshop focussed on 
strategies to help minimise damage caused when floods occur like that of January 
2009.  
7.2.2 EU involvement summary 
Official opinion from the FTA states that the EU involvement in the rural area has 
been both impartial and excellent in terms of delivery. Education is a very broad 
sector that needs well functioning parts to deliver quality teaching. Infrastructure, 
classrooms, teachers quarters, power generators, toilet blocks are all needed and 
much appreciated. Making an impact in an area like infrastructure,  the curriculum, 
or vocational options, will assist with Fiji’s ability to provide a better education 
system overall.868 A report in 2009 gave the FESP a resoundingly positive review 
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starting that “the programme has facilitated tremendously the efforts of government 
in trying to bring about greater equity to access and opportunities in education 
between the rural and urban areas.”869 The MoE is very grateful for the EU’s 
assistance in this area, stating that it has boosted student & teacher morale creating a 
revival in commitment in these schools which in turn and boosts the level of 
scholastic achievement.870 In 2007, the Michael Graf attaché to the European 
Delegation for the Pacific stipulated that the EU wants to build on the success of the 
FESP in the next 5 year funding cycle which officially started in 2008, but is 
presently delayed.871 The challenge for the MoE and the EU is to now look beyond 
primary education and focus on the technical and vocational sectors needed by 
young people to find meaningful employment.872 To do this the EU will continue to 
work in conjunction with other aid donors involved in education, especially 
Australia and New Zealand. 
7.3 Response of the Sector 
7.3.1 Campaign to get More Rural Teachers 
The Fiji times has published no less than 5 articles in mid 2009, pushing and 
promoting rural education in an effort to encourage more teachers into rural 
positions.873 Such full-hearted promotion is propaganda in nature with the articles 
reading as advertisements instead of news.874 One article emphasised how rural 
teachers in particular must be recognised for the integral part they play in the 
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development of a society, usually under the most trying of circumstances.875 “Rural 
teachers more so than their urban counterparts act as opportunity enablers without 
whom many of Fiji’s most successful leaders in both the public and private spheres 
would not have ventured outside their villages.”876 Another feature article 
advertised the stress free, relaxing lifestyle of the rural teacher as opposed to the 
urban one.877 It was also suggested that there be compulsory minimal posting 
requirements to rural areas so that all teachers serve at least one 3 year stint, and 
give special allowances for those willing “to make the sacrifice”.878 This would 
have multiple benefits; it would ensure that all rural postings are filled and could 
potentially improve the quality and calibre of rural teachers. It will also expose 
students to a variety of role models and teaching styles. Finally, it could help 
improve understanding of the trying conditions that rural teachers face in urban 
communities. Another feature article showed how some rural schools have 
diversified their curriculum to better prepare students for other more practical 
occupations for a rural island village.879 There is a special arts and crafts subject that 
includes, building traditional raffia skirts, weaving of mats and the building 
traditional canoes, and bures. Such promotion of vocational pursuits marks a 
significant step away from a traditional academia based schooling system, and 
although a clearly a loaded article, may help remove the stigma attached to 
vocational pursuits.880  This series of articles shows how the present regime is really 
pushing the media to achieve their desired purposes. It also shows those aims are 
idealistic and in line with developmental needs of the sector. 
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7.3.2 Teaching of Hindi & Fijian as a ‘second’ language. 
A recent innovation of the current regime is to implement compulsory teaching of 
Fijian and Hindi as a second language in all Fijian schools.881 There are 2 basic 
components of this program, learning conversational Hindi and Fijian, and basic 
cultural studies of Fijian and Hindi cultures. Part of this project will be to visit, or 
assist a family of that ethnicity through projects further enhancing cultural 
understanding.882 The initiative is not aimed at replacing English, but more to act as 
an enabler in communities to understand the cultural identities of the two main 
ethnicities in Fiji. It is something that many previous governments have attempted 
to implement and was met with fierce traditional Fijian resistance concerned about 
loosing Fijian identity and being consumed by the Indo-Fijian and western 
cultures.883  
Overwhelmingly, the initiative has been greeted by the educational community as a 
positive move and the right direction for the country to go.884 The FTU noted that it 
will only be effective though, with a solid curriculum. Otherwise, the initiative will 
result in an ad hoc learning with little long term benefits.885 The new programme of 
teaching was approved by the MoE in November 2007 and began in Term 2, 2008 
at Year 5 level in primary schools.886 Breaking language barriers between the two 
main cultures helps people learn to appreciate unique aspects of the other’s culture, 
and understand a different way of living. Once a person learns to understand the 
other persons culture, then the potential damage caused by ethnic tensions is 
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lessened.887 The LTC suggests that it should be seen as an attempt to understand 
one another better and not cultural assimilation. As such, it is certainly a positive 
move that will act as a long term strategy for a peaceful multi-ethnic cultural living 
in Fiji.888 
7.4 Future Developmental Aid Focus  
It is clear that despite the positive strides made in the education sector, it will need 
to remain a central focus for developmental aid programs for some time into the 
future.889 Continued concerted efforts on expanding and modernising the 
curriculum need to occur to allow provision of new, relevant, and engaging texts. 
There also needs to be much more focus on agriculture training, woodwork, 
metalwork, home economics, mechanics and other practical vocational subjects that 
will provide lifelong skills.890 A stronger focus on IT will also be of immense 
benefit of Fiji, but it will be difficult to get the expertise there to set up and maintain 
networks, and the capital expenditure needed for constant upgrading will be an 
ongoing concern.891 A possible upgrading of the Fiji College of Advanced 
Education (FCAE),892 in line with the previous upgrade to the LTC could prove 
very helpful in providing higher calibre Secondary School teachers in Fiji.893 
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7.5 Conclusion 
“Education is the foundation of human relationships.”894 The education sector, 
despite issues, is a vibrant sector of Fijian society and quite forward looking.895 In 
comparison to most Pacific Island countries and other developing countries around 
the world, Fiji is performing well in this sector. However, there are hindrances and 
complexities relating to a declining economy and a delicate political situation.896 It 
is very aware of its own practical shortcomings, and is doing its best in conjunction 
with international aid partners to rectify that. It looks set to achieve the MDGs for 
basic education, and provide salient lessons and subject choices that will be needed 
in the 21st century workplace. The Fijian people have immense enthusiasm and 
passion.897 With a coordinated policy focus from the GoF, and will power to make 
education the priority in Fiji, it could rapidly become equal to any western 
education system.898 The Fijian people do need to adapt to the ever-changing 
dynamics of modern society, and a flexible education that promotes a sense of self 
worth, self esteem, initiative and capability over academics is essential.899 If Fiji has 
educated people and an educated society, then other problems become more 
manageable.900 Without education, especially civic education, it will be very 
difficult to change the political climate in Fiji.  
The European Union involvement in the sector has been of immense benefit and is 
applauded almost universally by all Fijians involved in education. It proves that the 
EU EDF programmes are targeted well and provides a physical and psychological 
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boost to many schools. The quest for continued diversification and innovation 
continues in Fiji. In summary then, the education sector is relatively strong and 
provides optimism and encouragement for the future of Fiji. 
8 Conclusion – Coherency of EU Policy 
8.1 Situation in Fiji  
Fiji has been on a ‘rollercoaster ride’ since 1987 with a series of coups, increasing 
economic, social problems, that run contrary to its location as a regional hub and 
comparatively high GDP. The December 2006 coup by Frank Bainimarama, is the 
latest twist to a political situation that remains very fragile. At present it appears that 
Fiji is moving away rather than towards democracy. There are two essential 
political questions that need to be asked. Firstly, whether Frank Bainimarama’s 
intentions are honourable and what he’s trying to do necessary and good for Fiji. 
The comments on electoral reforms, changes to the education system, efforts to 
reform the sugar sector, attempts to encourage international investment, and the 
removal of race based politics, all suggest a preliminary answer of yes. The interim 
regime is trying to make positive and needed changes. The second question is 
whether the short term cost to Fiji is worth the price, economically, politically, and 
socially. Resoundingly, this thesis demonstrates that the answer must be no. 
Regardless of how good the regimes ideas and intentions are, the way Frank 
Bainimarama has pursued such objectives means poverty in Fiji is increasing with 
no end in sight, the sugar industry which was on the verge of collapse pessimists 
would say is now inevitable, and tourism and investment dollars have plummeted. 
Commodore Bainimarama is a career soldier to the detriment of everything else. 
This causes him to view any hindrance to his vision as an enemy that needs to be 
suppressed, thus censoring the media, alienating the church, chiefs, and every 
foreign aid partner. Moreover, his key reasons for the coup, that of reducing 
corruption, enabling electoral reforms, a revision of the constitution are, despite his 
best intentions making little progress. In the meantime many thousands of ordinary 
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Fijians are paying the price by a reduced standard of living, and an uncertain short 
term future. Even though the analysis shows Bainimarama’s ideas are both sound 
and desperately needed, they will not be accepted by Fijians in the long term 
because of how they were forced upon them.901 It is a sad and desperate situation 
with no quick fix solution. 
8.2 EU Development Policy in Action 
 EU’s relations with the developing world is a “complex mosaic of frameworks.”902 
Ensuring that the different elements of EU development policy are consistent and 
don’t provide conflicts of interest is a considerable task.903 The European Union 
involvement in Fiji shows this complex mosaic in operation. This thesis has 
examined four sectors of Fijian society and shows that its response to each sector is 
different and subsequent opinions about the EU’s influence by Fijians differ. In the 
economic sector, there is caution and concern about the EPA, mainly because many 
Fijians are concerned about trade liberalisation in general. In the governance sector, 
the EU has employed its rigid Cotonou Agreement structures and Article 96 
negotiations. This has created a predictable, soft, and engaging approach to 
governmental issues that is generally welcomed by Fijians. It is hoped that the EU 
does more along these lines and that other ODA partners follow the EU’s lead. 
However, the tying of democratic development to funding for the EU Sugar 
Adaptation Strategies is a crippling blow to the sugar sector, who feel that the EU 
has targeted one of the weakest aspects of Fijian economy to create maximum pain. 
In the education sector we see the EU’s EDF programmes in action.  Here, the 
response by Fijians has been very positive, and there is a feeling that the EU has 
made a marked change to peoples lives. 
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Consequently the EU is both hero and villain, the generous understanding partner, 
and a suspicious bureaucratic heavy handed monster. Such a response is confusing 
and shows the EU’s external relations are not as integrated and cohesive as the EU 
intends. The EU can be considered a multi headed hydra with certain branches 
working in conflict with others. When relating the EU’s actions and responses with 
normative actor theory, we see that the EU is determined to project its normative 
principles onto its developmental partners. Prioritising governance over the sugar 
sector can be viewed in line with these projections of value based power. Even in 
the EPAs, normative actor theory functions providing a policy that both normative 
and in line with present trade liberalisation demands. 
8.2.1 General Hopes for aid targets by Fijians into the Future  
 
Figure 32: Ideas and ambitions for EU ODA in the next funding round (Indicative Opinion) 
 
There were many ideas as to where EU aid could be prioritised into the future by 
Fijian experts. Generally though, most expressed a resolve that the EU continue the 
work it is doing with infrastructure, capacity building, rural education, and 
governance. Overall then, this is a positive indictment of EU operations in Fiji. The 
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EU commitment to Fiji is still very strong, and it will remain engaged despite the 
political upheavals. The unsolved political and constitutional issues in Fiji are a 
compelling reason to remain involved in Fiji, to help create positive outcomes for a 
solution in the near future. The EU development programme in Fiji will continue to 
provide beneficial results in targeted areas. The decision as to which area future 
EDFs will focus on will be decided in conjunction with the Fijian government, and 
not unilaterally.904 Consultations and full awareness of both donor and recipient 
needs will enhance implementation of effective aid in the various areas. Harnessing 
the EU’s strengths could prove to be crucial to future developmental success in Fiji.  
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9 Appendices 
 
9.1 Map of the South Pacific  
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9.2 Interview Information 
9.2.1 List of Interviews 
LIST OF INTERVIEWS  Conducted During Fiji Research Trip June & July 2008 
      
Interview N: Sector Organisation Date Length Location 
      
Interview 1: 
 Tourism Ministry of Tourism 17 June 21:50 Suva 
Interview2: 
 Education Fiji Teachers Association n1 18 June 38:08 Suva 
Interview 3: 
 NGO Transparency International 18 June 50:15 Suva 
Interview 4: 
 Governance USP Political Science Dept 19 June 20:23 Suva 
Interview 5: 
 NGO National Council for Women 19 June 23:18 Suva 
Interview 6: 
 NGO Fiji Methodist Church 20 June 19:46 Suva 
Interview 7: 
 Governance Howards Law Firm 20 June 35:20 Suva 
Interview 8: 
 Governance USP Governance School 23 June 21:26 Suva 
Interview 9: 
 Education Fiji Education Sector Programme  23 June N/A * Suva 
Interview 10: 
 Economy Fiji Employers Federation 24 June 43:24 Suva 
Interview 11: 
 NGO Fiji Association of Social Workers 24 June 22:23 Suva 
Interview 12: 
 Education Fiji Teachers Association n2 24 June 42:46 Suva 
Interview 13: 
 NGO ECREA 24 June 48:06 Suva 
Interview 14: 
 Governance USP Development Programme 25 June 1:14:11 Suva 
Interview 15: 
 NGO Good Neighbour International 25 June 56:26 Suva 
Interview 16: 
 Economy Mark 1 Apparel 25 June 24:06 Suva 
Interview 17: 
 Governance EU Delegation for the Pacific 26 June 1:09:16 Suva 
Interview 18: 
 Economy Consumer Council of Fiji 26 June 38:19 Suva 
Interview 19: 
 Education International School Suva 26 June 33:47 Suva 
Interview 20: 
 Governance Electoral Commission Fiji 26 June 58:03 Suva 
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Interview 21: 
 
 
 
NGO 
 
 
FASANOC 
 
 
27 June 
 
 
21:13 
 
 
Suva 
Interview 22: 
 Education Fiji Teachers Association n3 27 June 39:17 Suva 
Interview 23: 
 Health Nutritional Research Department 27 June 32:55 Suva 
Interview 24: 
 Governance Pacific Island Forum Secretariat 27 June 46:36 Suva 
Interview 25: 
 Governance FICAP 1 July 40:27 Suva 
Interview 26: 
 NGO Fiji Women’s Rights Movement 1 July 50:35 Suva 
Interview 27: 
 NGO Citizens Constitutional Forum 1 July 16:30 Suva 
Interview 28: 
 Education Fiji Teachers Union 1 July 21:16 Suva 
Interview 29: 
 Sugar Fiji Sugar Marketing Company 2 July 33:59 Lautoka 
Interview 30: 
 Sugar Fiji Sugar Research Institute 2 July 49:15 Lautoka 
Interview 31: 
 Governance Leader of Opposition 2 July 21:38 Lautoka 
Interview 32: 
 Tourism Air Pacific Headquarters 3 July 44:33 Nadi 
Interview 33: 
 Tourism Tokatoka Resort 3 July 24:23 Nadi 
Interview 34: 
 Education Lautoka Teachers College 4 July 43:40 Lautoka 
Interview 35: 
 Tourism Blue Lagoon Cruises 4 July 33:45 Lautoka 
Interview 36: 
 Tourism Nadi Bay Resort Hotel 5 July N/A * Nadi 
      
 
N.B. 1)    Interviews 9 and 36 occurred but the people declined to be recorded, and are not 
present in the statistical analyses, nor used for anything other than background research. 
 
 
 
N.B. 2)    The organisation label shows whom the interviewee is affiliated with and / or where the 
interview took place. Due to UOC Human Ethics Committee requirements the specific people 
remain anonymous. Thus for the purposes of this thesis, these organisational labels are used 
when citing the interviews even though the interviewee is speaking as an individual and largely 
voicing personal opinions and not that of the organisation. 
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9.2.2 Demography of Interviewees 
GENDER   
 Number % 
Male 
 26 65 
Female 
 14 35 
Total 
 40 100 
   
   
ETHNICITY   
 Number % 
Ethnic-Fijian 19 47.5 
Indo-Fijian 8 20 
Ex-Pat 10 25 
International 3 7.5 
Total 40 100 
   
NB: More Males than Females were interviewed is 
representative of the patriarchal society in Fiji where less 
females hold positions of influence. 
   
NB: There is a massive over representation of ex-pats 
and international people in the interviews which illustrates 
both the international nature of the Thesis question, and 
the lack of suitably qualified people in certain fields. 
 
9.2.3 Raw Data Results of Interview Questions 
Question 1:  International Aid: Good or Bad? TOTAL % 
A1: Cause Political Sanctions = Bad 6 10 
A2: Civic Education Programs = Good 8 13.33 
A3: Fly by Night' Investors = Bad 9 15 
A4: Humanitarian Aid = Good 9 15 
A5: Trade Liberalisation = Bad 8 13.33 
A6: Sugar Protocol Reforms = Bad 2 3.33 
A7: Capacity Building = Good 4 6.67 
A8: Regionalisation = Good 2 3.33 
A9: Failure to Understand Fiji = Bad 6 10 
A10: Aid Conditionalities = Bad 4 6.67 
A11: Exert Undue Pressure = Bad 2 3.33 
 Totals: 60 99.99 
    
Question 2: Should (EU) Aid be tied to a type of Govt. TOTAL % 
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A1: Yes: Principles and Values are Crucial 9 28.11 
A2: Yes: EU has every right to place conditions 13 40.63 
A3: No: Aid for economic, human rights reasons,  4 12.5 
A4: No: Physiological concerns should have Primacy. 3 9.38 
A4: No: Imposing 'foreign' values 3 9.38 
 Totals: 32 100 
    
Question 3: Awareness of EU Involvement in Fiji. TOTAL % 
A1: Yes 23 65.71 
A2: No 1 2.86 
A3: Only from the Papers 11 31.43 
A4: Unanswered 0 0 
 Totals: 35 100 
    
Question 4: Where IS the EU proving most Helpful?   
A1: 
Labour Mobility: Upskilling Staff, Management 
Programmes 3 7.89 
A2: Education & FESP 12 31.58 
A3: Sugar Protocols 4 10.53 
A5: Governance and Democracy 2 5.26 
A8: Way it engages with locals. 3 7.89 
A4: It's Not: EPA BAD 3 7.89 
A5: It's not: EU Motives Suspect 2 5.26 
A12: It's Not: Too Bureaucratic 1 2.63 
A9: Unsure, Don't Know  8 21.05 
 Totals: 38 99.98 
    
Question 5: Fiji's Greatest Assets. TOTAL % 
A1: People (Human Resources) 24 53.33 
A2: Education 3 6.67 
A3: Geography 9 20 
A4: Ethnic Diversity 2 4.44 
A5: Physical Resources 2 4.44 
A6: Tourism 2 4.44 
A7: Land 1 2.22 
A8: Christian Values 2 4.44 
 Totals: 45 99.98 
    
Question 6:  Fiji's Greatest Challenges. TOTAL % 
A1: Education System 4 6.45 
A2: Political Situation, Instability - Coup 12 19.35 
A3: Investor Confidence 7 11.29 
A4: Business Sector 1 1.61 
A5: Electoral System 5 8.06 
A6: Lack of Opportunities (Employment) 3 4.84 
A7: Lack of Direction / Leadership /Initiative 13 20.97 
A8: People - Tensions 3 4.84 
A9: Native Land Issues 2 3.23 
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A10: Poverty 3 4.84 
A11: Cultural Mindset of People 3 4.84 
A12: Constitutional 1 1.61 
A13: Efficiency 2 3.23 
A14: Lack of Respect for Democracy & Responsibility 2 3.23 
A15: Malnutrition 1 1.61 
 Totals: 62 100 
    
Question 7: Why is there a cycle of coups?   
A1: Influence / Ill Discipline of military 11 30.56 
A2: Ethnic Discrimination 4 11.11 
A3: Ethnic Fijian Nationalists 6 16.67 
A4: Personal Interests 3 8.33 
A5: Constitutional Problems 7 19.44 
A6: Lack of Leadership 4 11.11 
A7: Its not a Problem 1 2.78 
 Totals: 36 100 
    
Question 8: How do you break cycle of coups? TOTAL % 
A1: Must come from within (Organic) 14 41.18 
A2: Remove Westminster form of Govt  4 11.76 
A3: Reduce Power of Military 8 23.53 
A4: Remove Ethnic based systems 2 5.88 
A5: Its not an issue 1 2.94 
A6: Civic Education 5 14.71 
 Totals: 34 100 
    
Question 9: 
Does Trust in a Democratic System Exist in 
Fiji? TOTAL % 
A1: Yes, Might Take a while 14 42.42 
A2: Yes, Always there with traditional system 3 9.09 
A3: Yes, Stronger with coup than before 10 30.3 
A4: No, Evaporating 3 9.09 
A4: Unsure - Unanswered 3 9.09 
 Totals: 33 99.99 
    
Question 10: Ethnic Tensions: Real or False? TOTAL % 
A3: False: Crated by Politicians 22 64.71 
A1: False: Emphatic 1 2.94 
A2: Real: Certain Circumstances 4 11.76 
A4: Real: Exploited by Politicians 7 20.59 
 Totals: 34 100 
    
Question 11: 
Are you concerned about use of the Fijian 
military as peacekeepers by the UN? TOTAL % 
A4: Yes, hypocritical of UN - Not Fiji 5 25 
A1: Yes, hypocritical conduct by military. 11 55 
A2: No, permits a better military 3 15 
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A4: No, Generates income for Fiji 1 5 
 Totals: 20 100 
    
Question 12: Why did the 2006 Coup Occur? TOTAL % 
A1: Ethnically Orientated Education Funding 1 3.33 
A2: Personal Vendetta 3 10 
A3: Former Govt Corruption 4 13.33 
A4: Political Demography: Ethnic Split 2 6.67 
A5: Influence of Military 14 46.67 
A6: (Preventing) Influence of Nationalists 2 6.67 
A7: Prevent possible civil war 1 3.33 
A8: Address Wrongs of 2000 Coup 2 6.67 
A9: Influence of Media 1 3.33 
 Totals: 30 100 
    
Question 13: Do you Support the Regime? Implicit. TOTAL % 
A1: Yes (Ethnic Fijian) 2 5.56 
A2: Yes (Indo Fijian) 4 11.11 
A3: Yes (Ex-Pat) 3 8.33 
A4: No (Ethnic Fijian) 16 44.44 
A5: No (Indo-Fijian) 3 8.33 
A6: No (Ex-Pat) 4 11.11 
A7: Unsure / Unanswered 4 11.11 
 Totals: 36 99.99 
    
Question 14: International Sanctions: Good or Bad? TOTAL % 
A1: Bad: Hit those not responsible for coup 9 30 
A2: Good: Questions what values, Fiji Should have. 6 20 
A3: Bad: hypocritical endangers human rights 1 3.33 
A4: Good: Democracy FUNDEMENTAL 4 13.33 
A5: Bad: Physiological Concerns Dire 6 20 
A6: Bad: Imposing Values not necessarily compatible 4 13.33 
 Totals: 30 99.99 
    
Question 15: Fiji a Democratic (& Positive) Future? TOTAL % 
A1: Yes: Definitely - Very Likely 7 20.59 
A2: Yes: Hopefully - Likely 17 50 
A3: Unsure: Would like 7 20.59 
A4: No: Doubt - Unlikely 3 8.82 
A5: No: Emphatic - Very Unlikely 0 0 
 Totals: 34 100 
    
Question 16: Greatest Need: Education Sector TOTAL % 
A1: Curriculum 6 30 
A2: Infrastructure 1 5 
A3: Teachers Salaries 3 15 
A4: Equality in the System 1 5 
A6: Better Management 2 10 
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A7: Vocational Pursuits 2 10 
A8: IT 1 5 
A9: Civic Education - Democratic Principles 4 20 
 Totals: 20 100 
    
Question 17: 
Where should the EU Focus ODA in the 
Future?  TOTAL % 
A1: Infrastructure 13 23.21 
A2: Assistance in Managerial Education 5 8.93 
A3: Market Research 3 5.36 
A4: Capacity Building' 12 21.43 
A5: Continue Rural Education 3 5.36 
A6: Governance & Governmental Structures 9 16.07 
A7: Regionalisation 2 3.57 
A8: Trade Opportunities 4 7.14 
A9: Housing 1 1.79 
A10: Civic Education 4 7.14 
 Totals: 56 100 
    
    
 
NOTE: Due to the Semi-structured nature of the interviews, some questions were 
unanswered, by certain interviewees. Some interviewees listed multiple answers for 
certain questions and all answers were recorded with equal weighting. The goal of 
the interviews was to gather expert opinions first, and indicative analyses. The data 
is not a representative statistical sample. 
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9.3 Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement 
ARTICLE 96  
 
Essential elements: consultation procedure and appropriate measures  
as regards human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law  
 
1.   Within the meaning of this Article, the term "Party" refers to the Community 
and the Member States of the European Union, of the one part, and each ACP State, 
of the other part. 
 
2.(a) If, despite the political dialogue conducted regularly between the Parties, a 
Party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfil an obligation stemming from 
respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law referred to in 
paragraph 2 of Article 9, it shall, except in cases of special urgency, supply the 
other Party and the Council of Ministers with the relevant information required for a 
thorough examination of the situation with a view to seeking a solution acceptable 
to the Parties.  To this end, it shall invite the other Party to hold consultations that 
focus on the measures taken or to be taken by the party concerned to remedy the 
situation.  
 
The consultations shall be conducted at the level and in the form considered most 
appropriate or finding a solution.  
 
The consultations shall begin no later than 15 days after the invitation and shall 
continue for a period established by mutual agreement, depending on the nature and 
gravity of the violation. In any case, the consultations shall last no longer than 60 
days.  
 
If the consultations do not lead to a solution acceptable to both Parties, if 
consultation is  
refused, or in cases of special urgency, appropriate measures may be taken.  These 
measures shall be revoked as soon as the reasons for taking them have disappeared.  
 
(b) The term "cases of special urgency" shall refer to exceptional cases of 
particularly serious and flagrant violation of one of the essential elements referred 
to in paragraph 2 of Article 9, that require an immediate reaction. The Party 
resorting to the special urgency procedure shall inform the other Party and the 
Council of Ministers separately of the fact unless it does not have time to do so.  
  
(c) The "appropriate measures" referred to in this Article are measures taken in 
accordance with international law, and proportional to the violation.  In the 
selection of these measures, priority must be given to those which least disrupt the 
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application of this agreement.  It is understood that suspension would be a measure 
of last resort.  
 
If measures are taken in cases of special urgency, they shall be immediately notified 
to the  
other Party and the Council of Ministers.  At the request of the Party concerned, 
consultations may then be called in order to examine the situation thoroughly and, if 
possible, find solutions.  These consultations shall be conducted according to the 
arrangements set out in the second and third subparagraphs of paragraph (a).905  
 
 
 
                                                
 
905 European Commission, "Cotonou Agreement." 
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9.4 Photos: EU Upgrade of the Lautoka Teachers College 
 
   
 
Figure 33: Photo Collage of new buildings constructed at the Lautoka Teachers College 
implemented through The EU 8th. Top Row, The new Library. Middle Row, the new lecture 
theatre, bottom row, existing classroom block and promotional sign.  
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